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Political Designs: Architecture and Urban Renewal in the Civil Rights Era, 1954-1973 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation considers the impact of the U.S. civil rights movement on postwar urban 
design and urban policy, looking specifically at the case of urban renewal, a federal program of 
urban reconstruction intended to help central cities modernize and compete with the growing 
suburbs. Tracing the history of three renewal projects from planning through design and 
implementation, it argues that these projects were shaped by public debates on civil rights and 
desegregation and the growing ability of community groups to organize and advocate on their 
own behalf. This dissertation also revisits the usual critique of urban renewal as a program of 
social and physical destruction and describes these years as a tumultuous period of construction 
and community building defined by new expectations for community participation and racial 
justice.  
Conceived in the 1950s, as the impact of postwar suburbanization began to be felt in 
older urban neighborhoods, renewal projects aimed to revitalize declining areas through targeted 
interventions in the built environment, including the construction of modern housing, shopping 
centers, and community facilities, as well as the rehabilitation of existing housing. During the 
turbulent 1960s, these physical design strategies took on political significance, as city officials, 
planners, and residents considered urban change alongside the social issues of the period, such 
the racial integration of the housing market, de facto school segregation, and community control 
over neighborhood resources. Although these projects often began as idealized experiments in 
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racial and economic integration, they quickly became battlegrounds on which communities 
struggled to balance their desire for federal investment and modernization against the costs of 
displacement and gentrification. Ultimately, as the civil rights and Black Power movements 
gathered strength, racial identity and community control were privileged over integration and 
assimilation, and the buildings and spaces that represented postwar liberalism became targets of 
anger and protest. While many of these spaces now seem ill-conceived or poorly designed, the 
collapse of urban renewal is no mere failure of design or planning policy—it is the result of a 
profound shift in social and political relationships that played out through the negotiation of 
change in the urban built environment.  
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Introduction  
After the Bulldozer: Urban Renewal and the Construction of Community 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In early 1958, Mayor Richard C. Lee spoke to a reporter from Life magazine about the 
ambitious program of urban renewal that he had launched in New Haven, Connecticut. At a time 
when other small cities were struggling to get their programs started, Lee and his redevelopment 
agency had moved quickly to take advantage of federal subsidies to help cities modernize aging 
urban areas and enable them compete with the growing suburbs. Beginning in 1954, they charted 
out the demolition of the city‟s oldest tenements along Oak Street, then they began to replan 
New Haven‟s business district at Chapel Street. By 1958, they had five projects in the planning 
stages, encompassing much of the city‟s downtown and older neighborhoods. “I won‟t accept 
things as they are,” Lee told the reporter, explaining the grand scale of his plans. “Just because 
they‟ve always been that way doesn‟t mean we shouldn‟t change.” Lee posed for a photo on the 
site of the Oak Street project, sitting in the cab of a crane with a wrecking ball and gesturing 
confidently. [figure 1.1] “Some mayors give out keys to the city,” he said. “We knock down 
buildings for our guests.”1 
Mayor Lee was the darling of the pro-development media in the late 1950s; the Los 
Angeles Times observed that he had brought “sex appeal” to the “unglamorous word 
„redevelopment,‟” and the Boston Globe speculated that his success rebuilding New Haven had 
made the young mayor one of the hottest politicians in New England and a viable candidate for 
                                                 
 
1
 “City Clean-up Champion,” Life (February 17, 1958), p. 88. 
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governor or senator.
2
 But if Lee‟s optimism and efficacy were extraordinary, the message he 
conveyed was not. Throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s, politicians and planners and 
newspaper editors across the nation echoed Lee‟s words: demolish, rebuild, modernize. 
Demolition was a sign of progress, and the new city would not emerge without the destruction of 
the old. Lee explained urban change with optimism and charisma; New York‟s master builder 
Robert Moses put it much more brutally: “When you operate in an overbuilt metropolis, you 
have to hack your way with a meat axe.”3 
Even more than other periods of dramatic change in U.S. cities, the three decades after 
the Second World War are associated with demolition, bulldozers, and empty lots. It was not just 
urban renewal that reshaped central cities during these years; highway construction, market-
driven redevelopment, and, in other cases, disinvestment and abandonment also transformed the 
urban landscape. But urban renewal—a comprehensive set of urban policies launched with the 
Housing Act of 1949—occupied a privileged place in the public imaginary, and it quickly 
became most closely associated with the bulldozers and demolished buildings that seemed so 
prevalent in postwar urban life.  Particularly in the first years of the program, public discussion 
of planned urban change focused on the harmful effects of slum life, the need for the demolition 
of older buildings, and the elimination of outdated street patterns and land uses. Advocates of 
renewal like Lee posed with hard hats and shovels for the press, campaigned on ideas of 
comprehensive urban change, and targeted larger and larger parts of the central city for 
intervention.  
                                                 
2
 Earl Banner, “How New Haven‟s Young Major is Solving Urban Redevelopment,” Boston 
Globe (April 1, 1956); Fred Danzig, “Redevelopment of City Wins Friends, Influences Voters,” 
Los Angeles Times (November 4, 1957).   
 
3
 Robert Moses, Public Works: A Dangerous Trade. 
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Meanwhile, critics, astonished by the number of people who were displaced and horrified 
by the sheer extent of demolition, also began to portray urban renewal as an exercise in 
destruction—the work of the “federal bulldozer,” as one opponent memorably phrased it. 
Gathering force in the early 1960s, they attacked the urban renewal planners, whose heavy-
handed, top-down approach to the city seemed unnecessarily destructive. “This is not the 
rebuilding of cities,” Jane Jacobs wrote in The Death and Life of Great American Cities in 1961. 
“This is the sacking of cities.” Critics like Herbert J. Gans observed the impact of redevelopment 
on older urban neighborhoods and documented the accompanying destruction of a working-class 
way of life. Observers like Gail Sheehy, who travelled to New Haven in the late 1960s to 
describe the emergence of the Black Panthers as a political force in the city, saw the urban 
renewal years as a period of erasure and profound dislocation. “Bulldozers were the great 
weapons in the war on blight,” she wrote. “Bulldozers ate up the ugliness and plowed under the 
obvious. City fathers ran their bulldozers over New Haven‟s inner-city neighborhoods for twelve 
years. By the time black folks woke up, downtown New Haven was gone.” This sense of loss 
pervades the literature on the period, from the writings of contemporary observers like Jacobs 
and Gans and Sheehy to historians like Marshall Berman, who remembers watching the 
demolition of old tenements in the Bronx for a new expressway with a sense of grief.
4
  
And yet, more often than not, the construction crane followed the bulldozer. While they 
are not often described this way, the urban renewal years were a period of massive public and 
private investment in center cities, even as suburban development exploded at the urban 
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 The phrase “the federal bulldozer” comes from Martin Anderson‟s book of the same name. See 
also: Jane Jacobs, see Death and Life of Great American Cities, p. 4; Herbert J, Gans, The Urban 
Villagers, pp. 371-374; Gail Sheehy, “The Consequences of Panthermania,” New York Magazine 
(November 23, 1970), p. 46; Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, p. 290-309. 
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periphery. These years saw the construction of hundreds of thousands of new units of housing, 
new schools, new shopping centers, industrial parks, cultural centers, civic buildings, libraries, 
parks, tot lots, and plazas. If local redevelopment authorities had a flair for destruction, they were 
also engaged in a complex and largely understudied attempt to reconstruct the city and reshape 
the social practices that took place within it. Critics and historians have spoken eloquently about 
the process of demolition, but we have yet to come to terms with the profound social and spatial 
transformation that urban renewal represents. 
Shifting our focus from the large-scale redevelopment projects of the 1950s to the more 
incremental renewal projects of the 1960s, this dissertation revisits the usual critique of urban 
renewal as a program of social and physical destruction and suggests instead that we need to 
understand and analyze the urban renewal years as a period of urban construction and social 
change, marked by intense, often heated public debate about what might make a good 
neighborhood and a good city. Coinciding closely with the growth of the suburbs, the 
establishment of the interstate highway system, and the proliferation of shopping malls, urban 
renewal was the single most significant policy affecting the central city, reshaping it in the image 
of postwar modernity: clean, spacious, ordered, and normatively middle-class. 
Renewal area residents responded to urban change in myriad ways. They endured the 
dislocations, adopted the city‟s vision, challenged its plans, and intervened throughout the 
planning process and the long years of implementation. Some residents were proponents of 
renewal, which projected an appealing, stable, middle-class vision for neighborhoods that were 
suffering from disinvestment. Some attempted to revise the city‟s plans to their own ends. Some 
fought the bulldozer. Some were radicalized by the events of the sixties—particularly the 
burgeoning civil rights movement—and in the process began to understand just how destructive 
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planned change could be in poor neighborhoods and communities of color. If initially renewal 
plans offered the illusion of a seamless, inevitable unfolding of change—and indeed the 
bulldozer metaphor certainly strengthened that impression—implementation proved to be far 
messier. The public process of project approval and the complexities of redevelopment and 
rehabilitation meant that urban renewal needed to be made and remade, project by project, year 
by year, in social, political, and economic circumstances that were changing so rapidly the 
planners and the politicians could hardly catch up. 
Urban renewal itself was transformed by public engagement, critique, and protest. Earlier 
urban renewal projects, like Boston‟s troubled West End project or New York‟s high-profile 
Lincoln Center, had envisioned the construction of luxury housing or institutions of high culture 
as ways of drawing the suburbanizing middle and upper middle classes back into the central city. 
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, liberal politicians and planners were backing away 
from large-scale clearance projects, which had sparked accusations of land grabs, 
mismanagement of public funds, and insensitivity toward the residents they displaced by the 
thousands. Chastened by the experiences of these early projects and dependent on good will for 
continued support at the polls, planners and city officials began to scale back their renewal plans 
and articulate the short-term and local benefits of renewal for the specific communities affected 
as well as for the city as a whole. In a calculated effort to win the support of critics and 
community leaders who were worried about the impact of displacement, they argued that 
federally subsidized physical planning projects, implemented with the consent of residents, 
might improve life for residents in the very urban neighborhoods that were being replanned and 
renewed, all while helping modernize the city as a whole. 
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In older urban neighborhoods, planners proposed spacious new middle-income housing, 
rehabilitated apartments, moderate-income coops, and public housing projects. Rather than 
envisioning institutions of high culture, they planned elementary schools, community centers, 
and public libraries. In an effort to generate community support and convince residents to 
relocate or participate in rehabilitation programs, they drew residents into the planning process, 
created citizens' committees, and framed these urban renewal projects as participatory and 
democratic, an opportunity for declining neighborhoods to stabilize and transform themselves. 
Most significantly of all, as news of the civil rights struggle in the South began to appear in the 
newspapers of the North, they used the language of racial liberalism to emphasize the renewal 
program's commitment to racial integration and the potential for physical planning to create 
stable, racially and economically mixed urban neighborhoods. Public intervention in the postwar 
city, they argued, would do what the private housing market on its own could not: break up the 
ghetto and encourage the movement of black and Puerto Rican families to the new suburbs and 
integrate existing urban neighborhoods. 
The idealism of this integrationist, participatory, and neighborhood-oriented idea of urban 
renewal stands in stark contrast with the evidence of the often adverse impact that renewal had 
on urban neighborhoods, particularly with the evidence of the impact of relocation politics on 
working class residents and communities of color. Between the late 1940s and the early 1970s, 
when the urban renewal program was in effect, projects in hundreds of American cities displaced 
hundreds of thousands of urban residents, disrupting neighborhood life, damaging local and 
small-scale economies, and altering the social geography of the city. Even the less heavy-handed, 
more liberal neighborhood renewal schemes had devastating effects. In the polarizing 
atmosphere of the 1960s, damning critiques of the impact of renewal developed on both the right 
7 
 
and the left, and mainstream liberal proponents faltered under the pressure of public critique, 
inflation, mounting construction costs, diminished federal funding, and increasingly organized 
community groups critical of relocation policies. Critics and subsequently historians of the 
program argued that it did not matter what ideas motivated the supporters of urban renewal 
policies in the 1960s, when their plans had so clearly gone awry.
5
  
Recovering the liberal ideas driving renewal, however, is an essential historical task. 
Without recovering some of the sense of possibility of these years, it is impossible to 
understanding why urban housing emerged as such a powerful and contentious site for debate in 
the 1960s, what the growing opposition reacted against, or why the program remains such an 
important part of our urban histories today. Renewal projects brought together an unlikely 
coalition of liberal supporters, among them civil rights leaders, who supported the construction 
of integrated housing; homeowners, who were eager to participate in local decisions about their 
neighborhood; unions and local institutions, which supported investment in construction and in 
neighborhood development; and liberal members of coop boards, who saw themselves 
integrating the central city, one building at a time. For a brief time in the early and mid 1960s, 
they were joined by tenant organizers, community activists, public housing advocates, and other 
allies on the left, in part because the participatory and open housing requirements of the urban 
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 The best-known work of criticism of the urban renewal program from the right remains Martin 
Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 1964). Among the most 
significant radical and progressive critiques focusing on the impact of renewal are Herbert Gans, 
“The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment and Relocation Planning” (Journal of the 
American Institute of Planners 25, 1961) and “The Failure of Urban Renewal” (Commentary, 
April 1965); Robert Goodman, After the Planners (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972); and 
Joel Schwartz, The New York Approach : Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and Redevelopment of 
the Inner City Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1993. More recent scholarship has 
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Jackson, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York (New York: 
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in Cold War New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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renewal program made urban renewal areas natural targets for intervention and change. The 
vision of the stable and racially and economically mixed renewal neighborhood was the only 
thing that brought these groups together and made the extensive redevelopment and 
rehabilitation of the 1960s possible. When that liberal vision collapsed, these coalitions fell apart, 
and the radical reshaping of the city that had characterized the 1950s and the 1960s came to an 
abrupt and uncelebrated end. 
This dissertation charts the history of three neighborhood renewal projects in three cities 
in the Northeast: Dixwell in New Haven, Washington Park in the Boston neighborhood of 
Roxbury, and the West Side Urban Renewal Area in New York. All three projects were begun in 
the late 1950s, well after the urban renewal program got underway, as city officials confronted 
public backlash against both the social upheaval and the radical physical transformation effected 
by the first experiments with urban renewal. All three sought to use less intrusive physical 
planning techniques and reduce displacement. Most importantly, all three were the product of a 
liberal local power structure that thought it could use federal money and modern planning to 
improve the quality of life in the city‟s declining neighborhoods as it promoted modernization.  
In a sense, projects like these three represent unstudied cross-currents swirling beneath 
the broader trends described in the existing literature on renewal and the postwar city. While 
none of these case studies necessarily contradicts existing narratives, all demonstrate that 
transformations were far more complex and nuanced than the old paradigm allows. In New York, 
New Haven, and Boston, the experience of renewal was characterized by changing alliances, 
shifting objectives, and an evolving agenda for the physical transformation of the neighborhood. 
Above all, urban renewal was an uncertain business, more complex in its social consequences 
and less effective achieving its economic goals than we might expect. Where historians usually 
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presume a clear, cause-and-effect relationship between federal policies and changes in the spatial 
organization of the city, I argue that urban renewal was not so much a vehicle of large-scale 
change as a politically charged, social and cultural process, the outcomes of which were less 
predetermined by demographic chance and large-scale economic restructuring and more affected 
by the events of the 1960s than previous research implies. 
All three projects were planned in the late 1950s, when growing prosperity and optimism 
about the power of physical planning led cities to chart out ambitious programs for rebuilding 
their oldest areas. The first generation of projects, planned in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
tended to be large-scale clearance projects in neighborhoods adjacent to downtown. They 
targeted the oldest, most deteriorated housing—the so-called slums—and replaced them with 
modern, high-rise apartments and shopping centers intended to lure middle-class residents back 
from the suburbs. Public reaction to the large-scale demolition, charges of corruption in the 
development process, and—in New York and Boston especially—gross mishandling of the 
relocation process meant that cities looked for a new approach with projects begun in the late 
1950s. These projects used more targeted clearance and a battery of other tools and techniques, 
including a rigorous enforcement of the housing code and loans for residential rehabilitation. 
They typically targeted declining neighborhoods further from the city center in which only some 
of the housing was deemed too deteriorated to retain and thus only some of the residents would 
be displaced. In order to assemble a coalition in support of these projects, local officials had to 
reach out to residents of renewal areas for the first time and engage them in the planning process. 
The twin phenomena of increased citizen participation and progressively more intricate, 
multi-part plans characterize the renewal projects begun in the late 1950s. The multiple physical 
planning approaches of this generation of projects—spot clearance, rehabilitation, and code-
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enforcement or conservation—divided the community socially as well as geographically and 
created a complex political dynamic in which some residents would be displaced and some, often 
the working-class or middle-class homeowners, would stay. Planners and city officials began to 
articulate the short-term and local benefits of renewal as well as the long-term, city-wide goals of 
modernization and economic viability in the face of suburban growth. On the overcrowded West 
Side in New York, they emphasized the prospect of spacious, middle-income, modern housing; 
in Dixwell and Washington Park, both predominantly African American neighborhoods facing 
red-lining and disinvestment, they proposed new schools, community buildings, and 
government-backed loans for home improvement. Aware that they needed widespread 
community support to get these plans through public hearings and that they needed to convince 
residents to relocate or participate in rehabilitation programs, they drew residents into the 
planning process, created citizens‟ committees, and framed these projects as participatory and 
democratic. In all three cases, they emphasized the renewal program‟s commitment to racial 
integration in federally aided housing and the potential for physical planning to revitalize the 
neighborhood. The racial liberalism of the planners and politicians who backed renewal was 
mirrored in the hopes of middle-class leaders in communities of color, where racial integration, 
individual opportunity, and the potential to move into middle-class neighborhoods outside the 
ghetto were important priorities in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Beginning in the early 1960s, nineteenth century tenements were replaced with high-rise 
housing in New York, and aging frame houses gave way to modern, two-story townhouses in 
New Haven and Boston. New schools, churches, community buildings, public plazas and 
neighborhood parks were constructed. Older housing was modernized and brought up to code, 
streets were widened and landscaped, and corner grocery stores were replaced with shopping 
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centers. For neighborhoods suffering from disinvestment, the phenomenon of new construction 
was a remarkable and often symbolically important phenomenon. But a detailed description of 
the changing design objectives and the politics of implementation suggests that some of the most 
meaningful changes in the built environment were small-scale; indeed, amidst so much building 
and rebuilding in the center city and in the suburbs beyond, residents understood renewal not in 
terms of its overall impact but in the details of development: where a new school was located, 
which lots stood vacant, how many units of affordable housing were promised and how many 
ultimately constructed. Concerned first and foremost with quality of life issues, working within 
the constraints of the planning paradigm rather than making systemic critiques, neighborhood 
groups viewed renewal in more concrete terms than planners and city officials. Focused on such 
everyday issues as street cleaning and abandoned buildings, the affordability of housing, the 
availability of home improvement loans, and the quality of education in the public schools, they 
approached renewal plans critically, attempting to make the most of the new attention paid to 
their neighborhood and the federal funding that was suddenly available to local communities. 
We tend to think of local residents—often black, poor, elderly, Puerto Rican, or recent 
arrivals in the city—as victims of the urban renewal process, but all three of these projects 
created coalitions of residents with hopes for and fears about the renewal process that suggest 
they exercised much more agency during the process than histories of the period tend to suggest. 
Both the participatory requirements of this generation of projects and the red tape and numerous 
roadblocks to implementation meant that all of these plans were negotiated and renegotiated, 
with different aspects of the renewal process receiving more or less attention as city and 
community priorities shifted. Who had the right to speak for the community and set the agenda 
during the planning and implementation process was a deeply contentious issue, and that right 
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was often challenged during the course of the project. Planners and city officials often began by 
dealing with established community leaders like ministers and principals and drew on the 
conservative organizing tradition of homeowners‟ groups, block improvement programs, and 
clean-up, fix-up campaigns. Only as the 1960s wore on did new and more radical groups like 
civil rights and Black Power organizations and anti-poverty and student activists gain enough 
support to participate in the renewal process, where their demands were sometimes supported by 
sympathetic architects and planners. Similarly, although residents living in housing targeted for 
demolition and redevelopment had long had reservations about renewal, effective community 
protest against displacement and inadequate relocation practices gained momentum only as the 
civil rights movement did. In fact, the increasing organizational ability of all types of local 
groups to deal with public agencies and articulate community positions on planning issues seems 
to be to be rooted in the community organizing movements of the 1960s as much as it related to 
the planning process itself. 
The Dixwell project in New Haven was pushed toward completion relatively quickly, but 
in Washington Park in Boston and on the West Side in New York, the consensus developed 
around the liberal idea of neighborhood renewal collapsed in the late 1960s. Tenants organized 
to protest their displacement, activists pointed out the disproportionate effects renewal had on the 
poor and residents of color, and even residents who had initially supported these projects grew 
disillusioned by the impact of demolition and vacant lots, unfulfilled promises on the part of 
planners and city officials, and the slow pace of rebuilding. Under-funded and ill-maintained, the 
modern housing complexes and public plazas that figured so prominently in renewal plans 
eventually became unpopular with local residents, and, in the face of increasing unrest in African 
American neighborhoods and growing criticism over displacement, residents and planners and 
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city officials ultimately came to believe that the new schools, community buildings, housing, and 
open spaces of these renewal projects were achieved at too high a cost. Just as organizing in 
support of renewal brought together unexpected constituencies in the early sixties, protests 
against renewal helped local community articulate common interests, and a growing awareness 
of a community and racial identity brought about by the civil rights and black power movements 
was essential to the opposition that developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
By the time a federal moratorium on renewal funding brought these projects to a halt in 
the early 1970s, renewal was widely viewed in negative terms. Local citizens‟ groups backing 
renewal, proponents of modern architecture and physical planning, and advocates of federal 
programs to aid minority and low-income communities—the constituencies most invested in the 
change that urban renewal represented—viewed them as a failed experiment. Local citizens‟ 
groups opposing renewal and critics on both the right and the left viewed the program more 
cynically, arguing that its high social costs had been evident from the beginning and that local 
interests had been sacrificed in the process of modernizing the city for the middle class. On New 
York‟s West Side, where an influx of middle- and upper-middle class residents took advantage 
of the rehabilitation program and precipitated the gentrification of the neighborhood, we can see 
hints of the structural transformation that historians have described. But in poor black 
neighborhoods like Dixwell and Washington Park, where the social effects of displacement were 
exacerbated by continuing disinvestment and decline, the story is not so straightforward. What 
does seem clear is that between the late 1950s, when these three projects were inaugurated, and 
the early 1970s, when the renewal program collapsed, attitudes towards the housing crisis, the 
potential of physical planning, the accountability of local and federal government agencies, and 
the right of low-income and minority residents to make decisions about their own neighborhoods 
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all changed as dramatically the built environment did. By exploring the social context of various 
decisions in the physical planning process and the changing cultural assumptions and 
expectations of the major local actors, we can better understand the way the process of 
modernization transformed the postwar city. Ultimately the story of urban renewal is a story 
about local attempts to shape the built environment—to control the design and development of 
new buildings and spaces, to be sure, but also to redefine the very meaning of “neighborhood” 
and “community.” 
 
The Liberalization of Urban Renewal  
In October 1955, New York City Mayor Robert Wagner quietly announced that he 
planned to designate Manhattan‟s entire West Side, from West 59th Street to West 125th Street, 
from the Hudson River to Central Park, for something he called “urban renewal.” “We think we 
have a new and workable approach,” Wagner said in a hearing organized by the Housing 
Subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency Committee. “It involves a cooperative effort 
on the part of private enterprise and the city, state and federal governments to rehabilitate one 
entire section of our city—to concentrate on it, rather than a few square blocks here and there.” 
Drawing on ideas developed by the Citizens‟ Housing and Planning Council, a liberal planning 
advocacy group, and by Samuel Ratensky, the planning director of the New York City Housing 
Authority, the mayor described an approach to the 200-block area in which the modern buildings 
in the area would be preserved, the deteriorating buildings would be rehabilitated, and those 
buildings that were not salvageable would be demolished and replaced with new low- and 
middle-income housing. By concentrating city, state, and federal resources on a single district—
perhaps even devoting the city‟s entire low-income housing budget to it—the city could reverse 
15 
 
the fortunes of a declining area. “We feel that if we set the pace, as we reclaim a three-block 
section here, and another there, that private enterprise, using the public credit under the urban 
renewal law, will go in and reconstruct the adjoining block, since the area will be on the way up 
again.”6 
Wagner made no mention of the New York‟s controversial redevelopment czar, Robert 
Moses, and said nothing to suggest that these plans contradicted the city‟s current approach to 
redevelopment, but the designation of the West Side for “renewal” rather than “redevelopment” 
would mark a major change in the city‟s—and the nation‟s—approach to declining 
neighborhoods. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Moses and the city‟s redevelopment agency, 
the Slum Clearance Committee (SCC), had launched the most ambitious and widely watched 
urban redevelopment program in the nation, aiming to improve the overall quality of the city‟s 
housing by targeting large swaths of substandard housing, marking down the price of the 
underlying land through Title I—the urban redevelopment provisions of the 1949 Housing Act—
and reselling the discounted properties to private developers who promised to demolish the 
slums and rebuild the neighborhood anew. Moses, who had been constructing parks, parkways, 
and playgrounds in and around the city for two decades, was a firm believer in the bulldozer 
approach and fully prepared to take advantage of the federal redevelopment legislation as soon as 
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 “Mayor‟s Remarks at Housing Hearing,” New York Times, October 6, 1955. On the origins of 
the West Side project and the source of the mayor‟s ideas on renewal, see J. Clarence Davies III, 
Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal, pp. 116-117. While Davies emphasizes Ratensky‟s 
role in bringing these ideas to the mayor, the Citizens‟ Housing and Planning Council, headed by 
Roger Starr, had also begun advocating for conservation on the West Side in its widely 
distributed newsletter with “West Side Area Needs Conservation Measures,” Housing and 
Planning News 12 (January 1954) and “Neighborhood Conservation Plan Sent to Mayor,” 
Housing and Planning News 12 (February 1954).  In West of Fifth: The Rise and Fall of 
Manhattan’s West Side, James Trager notes that a series of discussions held by the Riverside 
Neighborhood Council in the early 1950s were another source of thinking on the renewal project. 
West of Fifth, p. 101. 
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it appeared. The SCC‟s first report was issued the day before the 1949 Housing Act was signed; 
by 1953, seven Title I projects were under contract; by 1955, the city‟s first project was open for 
occupancy. At a time when most other American cities were still figuring out how to use the new 
legislation, Moses had developed an extraordinarily effective method for attracting “sponsors” or 
developers, ushering plans through the bureaucracy of the federal regulations, and getting 
projects under construction as quickly as possible.
7
 
“The New York Method,” as Moses‟ approach was called, was designed to convey land 
to private sponsors as quickly as possible, minimizing the city‟s risk and involvement and 
stream-lining a complex public process. It involved back-room deals, a secretive and highly 
managed process of sponsor selection, and virtually no city involvement in the most difficult part 
of the redevelopment process, the relocation of residents and small businesses from the areas 
slated for clearance. In every other city in the country, local authorities interested in beginning a 
redevelopment project would acquire the land in the project area, supervise the relocation 
process, demolish the buildings on the site, and then, finally, resell the land at a mark-down to 
the highest bidder. In New York, however, Title I projects were pre-negotiated and sponsors pre-
selected. Resale was immediate, and sponsors took on the responsibility of relocation and site 
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Cleveland Rodgers, Robert Moses (New York: Henry Holt, 1952); Rexford Tugwell, “The 
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clearance themselves. If sponsors shared Moses‟ commitment to getting things done, the New 
York Method proved an effective way of getting Title I projects off the ground.
8
 
It was also, however, highly susceptible to corruption and mismanagement. In the 
summer of 1952, a group of sponsors took title to an urban redevelopment area on the Upper 
West Side known as Manhattantown and became landlords to the area‟s 11,000 residents. The 
private relocation firm they had hired offered little assistance. Plumbing went unfixed, windows 
were broken, and in some cases heat and hot water were shut off. Vacated units were not boarded 
up, and vagrants began to move in. Meanwhile, the sponsors continued to collect rent from 
tenants while neglecting their duties as landlord, milking the site for profits much as the old 
slumlords had—now, apparently, with the city‟s approval and support. Word of corruption 
spread, and the story finally broke in the World-Telegram in 1959 under the damning headline 
“The Shame of New York.”9  
Sponsor abuses were particularly egregious at Manhattantown, but they were not 
uncommon. As reports of cronyism, profit-taking, and resident distress spread in the late 1950s, 
it became clear that the federal urban renewal program as it had been was in flux. Not just in 
Mayor Wagner‟s New York, but in Chicago, Boston, and countless other cities, redevelopment 
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officials faced public outrage over back-room sponsor-selection process, sponsor corruption, and 
mismanaged relocation programs. Development delays plagued projects, and many sites in 
downtown locations sat vacant for month or years or were converted to parking lots. Public 
officials sensed the first stirrings of community unrest over the large-scale clearance of housing 
units during a housing shortage, as well as outrage over the sheer extent of demolition that the 
first redevelopment projects had entailed.  
Even before the publication of Jane Jacobs‟ influential 1961 critique of urban renewal 
policy and planning, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, politicians and development 
officials nationwide were reconsidering the impact of urban renewal and determined to reinvent 
it. Drawing on the new provisions of the Housing Act of 1954, which attempted to shift the focus 
of the program from individual slum clearance projects (“redevelopment”) to a more 
comprehensive approach emphasizing long-term planning and several types of intervention, 
including clearance projects, code enforcement, and rehabilitation (“renewal”) they pledged to 
scale back clearance, to preserve rather than rebuild marginal neighborhoods, and to improve 
relocation programs and build more housing for displaced residents. 
10
 They promised more 
extensive citizen participation and reached out to residents in renewal neighborhoods, seeking 
their support and including them in the planning process. 
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 In 1953 the social scientist Miles Colean noted that the term redevelopment was “generally 
limited to specific projects involving the assembly, clearance, and preparation of land within a 
designated area for rebuilding,” and suggested instead renewal, “borrowed from Patrick 
Geddes…to represent the comprehensive process of maintaining urban vitality.” (Renewing Our 
Cities, p. 28, n. 25) The term was adopted in the 1954 Housing Act, where renewal indicated a 
comprehensive program of planning, redevelopment, and rehabilitation. The footnote in Miles 
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for calling my attention to it. Outside official circles, where the use of the word renewal signaled 
a very clear shift in federal policy, redevelopment and renewal seem to have been used 
interchangeably until the early 1960s, when renewal becomes the favored term.     
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As Mayor Wagner described it, renewal would be simultaneously broader in overall 
scope and more fine-grained in approach than Moses‟ model of slum clearance and 
redevelopment. Rather than focusing on a single site and relying on a single sponsor, plans 
would encompass a larger area, involving dozens or even hundreds of smaller investors and 
encouraging incremental improvement rather than wholesale demolition and rebuilding. Planners 
could designate the properties in the worst condition—often, the most dilapidated housing—for 
demolition and redevelopment, while nearby buildings could be spared. In a sense, renewal was 
far more suited to the real estate dynamics of existing cities than redevelopment had ever been. 
Although the city was responsible for long-term and comprehensive planning, individual 
parties—real estate developers, individual property owners, or, later, community organizations—
were only concerned with the development of a single parcel of land or the rehabilitation of 
individual buildings. Renewal spread the responsibility for change among hundreds or even 
thousands of parties rather than a single sponsor or developer, and it acknowledged the 
complexities of neighborhood decline, which did not affect all properties equally. 
Renewal also created complex coalitions of residents, building owners, and small 
businesses who had very different stakes in the renewal process. Some buildings would be 
condemned and demolished, their owners and residents displaced, while others would be 
designated for rehabilitation—itself a demanding and expensive process the city had the power 
to enforce on an unwilling owner. Some properties would be designated for “conservation” and 
left alone entirely. The division among properties, property owners, and residents was not always 
clear-cut. Often residents and properties owners fought condemnation and displacement, but a 
rehabilitation designation was not necessarily a better scenario. Slumlords whose buildings were 
designated for rehabilitation were, unsurprisingly, reluctant to comply. Many working-class 
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homeowners resented the financial burden of rehabilitation, which could be onerous. Other 
property owners had previously been unable to secure a loan to improve their properties and 
welcomed the designation for rehabilitation, along with the federal loans that came with it. 
Similarly, sometimes residents in declining neighborhoods had tried and been unable to sell their 
houses and welcomed a condemnation and guaranteed payment from the city. Owners whose 
properties were not condemned often had strong feelings about nearby blighted or deteriorating 
buildings that affected their own property values and quality of life. Home owners and long-term 
tenants often had a very different relationship with the renewal process from short-term tenants, 
absentee landlords, or small businessmen. The planner‟s map that divided the neighborhood 
divided the community, too, and not in ways that were easy to predict or explain.  
In 1961, a further amendment to the Housing Act provided for long-term, below-market-
rate loans to community groups or organizations that acted as non-profit developers for 
moderate-income housing, a policy shift that radically changed the politics of housing 
construction in urban renewal areas. Up to that point, local authorities had favored new, market-
rate housing, which added to the city‟s tax rolls but was unaffordable for local residents and 
economically unrealistic for declining neighborhoods, while planners and housing advocates had 
favored public housing, which was so controversial in many locations that it was politically 
implausible for the city, no matter how needed it was in the neighborhood. Provisions for new, 
moderate-income housing—called 221(d)(3) housing, after the clause that authorized it—raised 
hopes that central cities might see the construction of the kind of modest, affordable, modern 
housing had transformed the suburbs in the late 1940s and 1950s. Through its sponsorship 
requirement, 221(d)(3) also increasingly drew local organizations into the planning and 
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development process, as local organization began to view 221(d)(3) housing as a way to ensure 
that residents could remain in the neighborhood in a time of change.  
So, too, as the 1960s wore on, the citizen participation requirement of the 1954 Housing 
Act took on new meaning.
11
 In 1954, responding to the recommendations of President 
Eisenhower‟s Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and Programs, the federal 
government introduced the a new funding requirement, the “workable program,” a nine-point 
plan of action that cities were required to submit to the federal government as part of their 
funding application to demonstrate that their individual renewal project was part of an effective 
comprehensive plan.
 12
 The last of these points required that a citizens‟ advisory committee be 
established to encourage citizen participation. Participation was not necessarily a politically 
progressive or idealistic requirement; it had support not only from idealists, who wanted to see 
the planning process democratized and made more responsive to local needs, but also from 
pragmatists, who recognized that local support was an effective way to preempt opposition and 
ensure the smooth progress of a renewal project. It was, however, transformative. 
Many cities already had civic organizations dedicated to encouraging good governance 
and better planning and housing, and many of those organizations had already taken upon 
themselves the task of generating support for the renewal program and addressing citizens‟ 
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 Title I, Section 101, subsection (c). As described in the legislation, the “workable program” 
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concerns. Often these organizations, like the Citizens‟ Council on City Planning (CCCP) in 
Philadelphia or the Citizens‟ Housing and Planning Council (CHPC) in New York, were well-
established; dozens of housing and planning advocacy organizations had been founded in the 
wake of turn-of-the-century progressive interest in the slums.
13
  Others, like Mayor Lee‟s 
Citizens Action Commission (CAC), were formed specifically to provide a forum for public 
involvement in the program. Initially, local authorities satisfied the participation requirement by 
pointing to the active involvement of an organization like New York‟s CHPC or the recent 
establishment of a city-wide citizens' advisory committee like New Haven‟s CAC.14 But in the 
political climate of the late 1950s and early 1960s, amidst charges that renewal was 
dispossessing the poor and causing more harm than good, local authorities turned their attention 
from blue-ribbon committees of local notables to the ordinary residents of renewal project areas. 
“Planning with people” became a mantra, not only for planners and development officials, who 
believed that citizen participation would redeem the beleaguered Title I program, but for project 
area residents, who believed that they would benefit from a formalized role in the planning 
process.  
In theory, citizen participation—the active involvement of ordinary, project-area 
residents in the process of planning, redevelopment, and rehabilitation—was one of the most 
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significant changes to the urban renewal program during the 1950s and early 1960s, raising the 
possibility that cities and neighborhoods could finally make the connection between two very 
different aspects of the original, 1949 Housing Act—the social provision of  “a decent home and 
suitable living environment” for urban residents and the economic development of the city 
through the modernization of its built environment. In practice, the shift from “redevelopment” 
to “renewal” was complex. In some cases it amounted to little more than a cosmetic 
improvement on current practices—pro forma consultation with the community, or ambitious 
talk about rehabilitation where demolition was still the order of the day. In some cases, it 
signaled genuine changes in the relationship between city and community—resident involvement 
in the planning process, a formal commitment to addressing the needs of working class and poor 
neighborhoods, which, very often, centered on housing. In some cases, the shift from 
redevelopment to renewal simply put in place a more public commitment to better planning that 
would only come into play years after the fact, when residents began to demand that the city live 
up to its promises. But in all cases we see a kind of slow liberalization of urban renewal, in the 
sense that important aspects of the program were brought progressively closer in line with liberal 
social, political, and economic ideals of the 1960s favoring an open, expanding middle class, 
economic growth, racial integration and civil rights, and public expenditures on housing, schools, 
and health. If in 1949, urban renewal represented a difficult compromise between conservative 
business and real estate interests and liberal and leftist housing and planning interests, by the 
1960s, particularly in the case of neighborhood renewal, it was much more coherent, pushed 
toward mainstream liberalism both by the politicians and planners who reformed it and by local 
communities who pushed for change. 
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The Narrative of Urban Renewal 
From the beginning, the narrative of urban renewal has been a contested, political affair. 
The complexity of the legislation, the multiple and conflicting motives and ambitions behind it, 
and the difficulties that politicians and voters had in understanding it meant that the program 
needed interpreters and advocates in the early stages. The daily newspapers, the Sunday 
supplements, and the national magazines wrote the first draft of renewal‟s history in their efforts 
to explain the program and report on the debates that inevitably arose around it. Journalist Jean 
Lowe—also an advocate for urban renewal as an employee at the national American Council to 
Improve Our Neighborhoods—wrote extensively about renewal for various media in the 1950s 
and 1960s, publishing the first full-length survey of the program, Cities in a Race with Time, a 
book that remains the fullest description of the program in print, in 1967. It is a frankly partisan, 
optimistic account, stressing the good intentions of its proponents, but it‟s typical of early 
popular writings on renewal, which were often deeply invested in evaluating a current, 
controversial national policy.  
Academics initially viewed the program as an exercise in local governance and wrote 
eloquently about the political alliances that made renewal effective and the impact 
redevelopment had at the local level. Harold Kaplan‟s Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance 
in Newark, published in 1963, and Peter Rossi and Robert Dentler‟s The Politics of Urban 
Renewal: The Chicago Findings, published in 1962, are both examples of this type of 
scholarship. But the program was so extensive and so intimately tied to so many aspects of urban 
life—politics, governance, planning, real estate, local economies, community formation, social 
activism—that it also functioned a kind of case study for economists, sociologists, and political 
scientists who were more broadly interested in the American city and the social life of its 
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residents. In perhaps the best known example, a psychologist at Massachusetts General Hospital, 
Eric Lindemann, launched a large-scale research project into the effects of relocation on 
residents who were displaced from the adjacent West End urban redevelopment area. The study 
launched the careers of three junior researchers, Herbert J. Gans, Marc Fried, and Chester 
Hartman, who found that the loss of a home had profound, negative social and psychological 
effects. More importantly, perhaps, they helped reevaluate the importance of older, working class 
neighborhoods that had previously been dismissed as slums. Under the pressure of a demolition 
schedule, critical of the redevelopment policies being implemented, academics like Gans, Fried, 
and Hartman documented and reconstructed the West End‟s local neighborhood culture in 
sympathetic terms. They treated terms like “slum” and “blight” with the utmost caution; they 
took local social structure and local values seriously.
15
  
Gans, Hartman, and Fried were also among the urban renewal program‟s first prominent 
critics. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the effects of the projects of the late 
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1940s and early 1950s reached the headlines, scholars and journalists lashed out against the 
urban renewal planners whose heavy-handed, top-down approach to the city seemed 
unnecessarily destructive. Scholars and critics on the right, like Martin Anderson, whose critique 
The Federal Bulldozer, was published in 1964, were concerned with eroding property rights and 
the increased power of the state, and they blamed the planners and the expanded use of the 
powers of eminent domain that enabled such extensive replanning and redevelopment in the first 
place. Scholars on the left, horrified by the social costs of relocation, blamed the planners and the 
technocratic, efficient vision of the city that had led to the wholesale condemnation of older 
urban neighborhoods in the name of modernization.  
Jane Jacobs is, by far, the best known of these early critics. The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities, published at the end of 1961, took on not just the urban renewal and public 
housing programs but the basic assumptions and values that drove them. Planned change, Jacobs 
argued, was simply not effective as a top-down proposition; cities grew best organically, 
developing a fine-grain complexity and diversity that could not be imitated by housing and 
renewal schemes. The kind of money that accompanied renewal programs was “cataclysmic,” 
effecting immediate, large-scale, unsustainable change where neighborhoods needed to grow 
slowly and incrementally. And housing and renewal programs were particularly harmful because 
of the way that they replaced the small-scale social spaces of the sidewalk and street—policed by 
residents and small businessmen—with empty plazas and undefined green expanses.  
Jacobs‟ essential insight, that housing and renewal schemes created public spaces that 
were too intrusive and too disconnected from the social networks of the neighborhood to work, 
gained traction quickly and was interpreted a critique of physical determinism—though Jacobs 
herself clearly believed that more traditional types of urban spaces nurtured particular types of 
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social interaction. Meanwhile, radical activists like Staughton Lynd, academics like Gans and 
Scott Greer, housing advocates like Charles Abrams, and hundreds of local journalists and critics 
attacked renewal on social grounds, pointing out the program had been devised so that its costs 
were borne disproportionately by the working class, the poor, the elderly, and by blacks and 
Puerto Ricans and other urban minorities.
16
  
Early scholarship on the program tended toward a portrayal of urban renewal in the terms 
it presented itself—as a policy solution to particular urban problems, including poor housing and 
outdated commercial and industrial areas, or traffic congestion, or a declining central city tax 
base. Sympathetic writers tended to see it as an effective—or potentially effective—solution to 
pressing and important problems, while critics saw it as ineffective or misguided—or even a 
solution that created other problems. Some of the more powerful critiques, like those of Jacobs 
and Gans, argued that politicians and planners had misidentified the problem at the start—that, 
for example, older housing might be a valuable resource rather than a blighting condition. But 
only in the late 1960s did scholars and critics begin to point out that urban renewal might be 
operating in broader and more subtle ways, accomplishing things it did not necessarily claim to 
address.  
By the time Nixon dismantled the urban renewal program in the early 1970s, younger 
scholars were beginning to formulate a more complex narrative for what had happened in central 
cities across the US under urban renewal. Many of this new generation had been radicalized by 
protest or community organizing in the late 1960s and early 1970s and were sensitive to the 
grass-roots devastation wrought by a policy with at least nominal social aspirations. They turned 
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to political economy for explanatory frameworks. Focusing on the “pro-growth coalition,” the 
unexpected alliance of actors who had made renewal possible, they argued that urban renewal 
was only a chapter in a much larger story of political and economic change. Politicians eager for 
urban growth, developers eager for profit, key business and civic leaders, and even unions and 
social services had shared interests in the spatial restructuring of the postwar and increasingly 
postindustrial American city, where service industries were replacing the city‟s older, 
manufacturing base and white collar workers replacing the city‟s traditional working class. 
Harvey Molotch‟s classic 1976 essay, “The City as a Growth Machine,” argued that above and 
beyond political ideology or policy concerns, the key urban actors were united in their desire for 
urban growth and the concurrent creation of wealth. Political economists like Susan S. Fainstein 
and Norman I. Fainstein, Michael Peter Smith, and John Mollenkopf took a similar approach to 
the subject, emphasizing the inherent conflict between urban residents, for whom the city was a 
primarily place to live and to work, and urban elites, for whom it was not.
17
 
The other major revision of the urban renewal narrative has come from scholars 
researching the racial politics of urban renewal and associated housing policies. Local activists 
and the black press had long accused local authorities of targeting communities of color with 
their urban renewal plans, but historians like Arnold Hirsch placed these protests in the larger 
historical context of endemic white violence against people of color, demonstrating how housing 
and renewal policies—in Chicago in the 1940s and 1950s, in Hirsch‟s case—helped displace 
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black residents and re-segregate them in a “second ghetto” of isolated public housing projects. 
Similarly, Thomas Sugrue described how the displacement associated with urban renewal 
policies was part of a much larger pattern of disruption, disinvestment and violence in the lives 
of blacks in Detroit.
18
  
With so much focus on the structural causes and ultimate consequences of federal 
intervention in the postwar city, relatively little had been written on the various ways in which 
federal policies were translated into local programs and individual projects until recently.  Some 
historians have begun to fill out the narrative of urban renewal with case studies of the programs 
in individual cities and begun to reconsider the larger narrative of central city crisis and decline 
that permeates writing on the city.
19
 Others have revisited the original legislation and the 
impulses behind it in an effort to write a more nuanced history of the program and to determine 
why it developed the way it did.
20
  
Even more recently, urban historians and cultural historians have begun to revive the 
politics and ideas driving renewal projects—redirecting our attentions to the cultural meaning or 
significance urban change. These latest articles and books represent another major revision of the 
urban renewal narrative, one that departs significantly from the first generation of writings, 
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which were deeply invested in an evaluation of a current urban policy, and the second generation 
of narratives, which tried to understand the structural forces beneath the social and economic 
changes associated with urban renewal. Sandy Zipp, for example, has described the changes that 
reshaped New York City in the 1940s and 1950s as part of a “symbolic and imaginative 
struggle” over the city‟s image. Christopher Klemek has described renewal not just as an urban 
policy but as part of a postwar social and cultural “order” that included a popular interest in 
modernist architecture and urbanism, an increased reliance on professionalism, an expanded role 
for the federal government, and the rise of reformist, anti-machine politicians in local politics.
21
  
 
Argument 
This dissertation takes a similarly revisionist position, arguing that urban renewal might 
be more fully understood in the broader context of postwar liberalism, expanding middle-class 
consumerism, changing attitudes towards federal intervention, and an increasing emphasis on 
self-determination in poor neighborhoods and communities of color. The changes we see in 
renewed neighborhoods in New Haven, Boston, and New York were the result of intense 
negotiation that dealt with far more than the specific redevelopment and rehabilitation projects at 
hand. The participatory requirements of this generation of urban renewal projects as well as the 
amount of red tape involved in implementation meant that plans were not simply imposed upon a 
neighborhood at the beginning of the process but negotiated constantly, with different aspects of 
the renewal process receiving more or less attention as city and community priorities shifted.  
Debates and conflicts over urban renewal projects tapped into the cultural values and 
aspirations of urban residents, changing conceptions of racial identity and racial solidarity, and 
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hopes for social change. Neighborhood renewal projects often helped produce unexpected 
coalitions of residents brought together by varying hopes for and fears about their neighborhood. 
Moderate activists became radicalized. New coalitions emerged. Who had the right to represent 
the community and to set the agenda during the planning and implementation process were 
deeply contentious issues, and the right to speak for the community could be challenged during 
the course of the project as new organizations and concerns emerged. Planners and city officials 
often began by dealing with one group of consensus-oriented community leaders, powerful 
during the optimistic days of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and ultimately found themselves 
negotiating with radicals by the end of the decade. Even where residents held reservations about 
renewal from the outset, effective protest required a strong sense of community identity and 
organizing skills, and in many cases protest only gained momentum only as residents learned 
from the social movements of the 1960s.  
All too often when they write the history of urban conflict over renewal and 
redevelopment, historians tend to think of the attitudes of local residents as predetermined, 
primarily by their class and racial identity and their immediate interests in the issues at hand.  
Instead, this dissertation argues that conflict over change in urban neighborhoods helped form 
racial and community identity just as much as it exposed underlying racial and class divisions. 
Paying particularly attention the growing northern civil rights movement, this dissertation argues 
that neighborhoods undergoing renewal were an important locus for debates about integration, 
community power, and community control. Indeed, as we reconsider the legacy of the postwar 
period, we need to pay more attention to these highly charged, contested locations, which 
marked the negotiation of new ideas, debates, and identities just as much as the passing of an 
older type of urban neighborhood and an older way of life. Projects like those in Dixwell, in 
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Roxbury, and on the Upper West Side remind us of what was at stake during the tumultuous 
decade of the 1960s and help us understand the complexity of social change at the most local 
levels.  
The following chapters show just how closely neighborhood renewal debates were tied to 
larger social concerns and how deeply they were influenced by the social movements of the 
1960s, which galvanized even moderates and radicalized many residents. In Chapter 2, we trace 
the history of the Dixwell Urban Renewal Project in New Haven, a project made possible by an 
alliance between the city, which wanted to rebuild and rehabilitate the deteriorating black 
neighborhood, and the neighborhood‟s middle-class black leaders, who saw in urban renewal a 
chance to desegregate the ghetto and bring new housing and new public facilities into the 
community. Chapter 3 tells the story of the Roxbury project in Boston‟s emerging black ghetto, 
where pro-integration community leaders supporting renewal faced challenges from black power 
advocates, who offered powerful critiques of the program even as they attempted to shape it to 
their ends and wrest control, funding, and jobs from it. Chapter 4 follows the progress of the 
racially mixed West Side Urban Renewal Project in Manhattan, where local residents seized 
upon the rhetoric of diversity and inclusion in the city‟s initial plan and pushed it to use the tools 
of renewal to preserve the neighborhood for the Puerto Rican newcomers as well as middle-class 
blacks and whites. In all three cases, we see local groups coalescing around key issues of 
housing, schools, and jobs, organizing for change and finding themselves increasingly defined by 
their own activism and their own approaches to neighborhood issues. As this dissertation argues, 
neither neighborhoods nor the communities that live in them are autonomous; each works shapes 
and recreates the other. 
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Chapter 2 
Power Structures: The Built Environment of Postwar Liberalism 
Dixwell, New Haven 
 
Introduction 
For residents of the Dixwell neighborhood in New Haven, the urban renewal process 
began modestly enough in the summer of 1959 with a knock on the door. Pollsters were 
canvassing this aging, crowded neighborhood with questionnaires in hand. The city was 
considering plans to improve the area, the pollsters said. Would residents like to see new housing 
built in the neighborhood? A green? A new shopping center? Would they be interested in low-
interest loans to fix up some of the older houses? Would they still support these plans if some of 
their neighbors needed to move? If local businesses had to relocate? Would their opposition 
lessen if they learned that better shopping might come to their neighborhood, or a health clinic, 
or a new park? At house after house, the pollsters found that Dixwell residents wanted more 
modern housing, new community facilities, new schools, and more municipal services, all of 
which renewal promised to deliver.
22
 
If the bulldozer symbolized progress in New Haven in the 1950s, the pollsters‟ arrival in 
the predominantly black neighborhood of Dixwell in the summer of 1959 quietly marked a new 
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era in the city‟s postwar rebuilding. Unlike many cities that experienced a sharp break in the 
development of their urban renewal programs in the late 1950s—unlike Boston, for example, 
which saw the restructuring of its program around the arrival of a new redevelopment 
administrator after the failure of the West End project, or New York, which regrouped in the 
wake of the scandals that rocked Robert Moses‟ program of slum clearance—New Haven‟s 
program evolved gradually. Beginning as a relatively conventional program of slum clearance 
focused on modernizing and revitalizing the center of the city in an attempt to compete with the 
expanding suburbs, it gradually became much more comprehensive, combining redevelopment 
with residential rehabilitation with social programs in an effort to improve the quality of life in 
the city‟s outlying neighborhoods. Dixwell was not the city‟s first experiment with neighborhood 
renewal—new methods and tools were tried out at Wooster Square first—but, in the context of 
the burgeoning civil rights movement of the 1960s, it was one of its most contested and 
politically significant. 
In accordance with theories current during the early years of Lee‟s tenure, New Haven‟s 
earliest redevelopment projects were primarily concerned with the elimination of slums and 
outdated commercial areas and were designed to attract the suburbanizing middle class back to 
its department stores and downtown apartments. The Oak Street urban redevelopment project, 
begun under Lee‟s predecessor, William Celantano, involved the demolition of a neighborhood 
of dilapidated tenements, the relocation of its residents to public and private housing in other 
parts of the city, and its redevelopment by high-rise, luxury apartments intended to attract young 
professionals to the city center. [figure 2.1] The nearby Church Street project reorganized the 
city‟s main commercial district around an enclosed shopping mall and a massive parking 
structure adjacent to the new highway; here the aim was to alleviate traffic congestion and 
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compete with the new shopping malls emerging in the suburbs. [figure 2.2] These early projects 
were primarily economic development projects intended to make the city competitive with its 
own prosperous, expanding suburbs; early in Lee‟s tenure, in fact, the New Haven 
Redevelopment Agency published its grand list—the list of the appraised values of all real estate 
parcels in the city—on the back of its annual report, implying that the success of the Agency‟s 
effort could be read in its increasing tax rolls. 
By the late 1950s, however, New Haven‟s redevelopment program was transforming into 
a more complex, socially inflected program of neighborhood renewal, combining limited 
clearance and housing development, code enforcement, residential rehabilitation, and the 
construction of neighborhood-scale buildings like schools, shopping centers, and civic buildings. 
Economic development was still important, but under the supervision of administrator Edward J. 
Logue, the Redevelopment Agency expanded to include experts in rehabilitation and social 
services. The Family Redevelopment Office hired additional social workers to help displaced 
residents find better housing. In 1959, a well-known housing official from Philadelphia, Howard 
Hallman, was brought in to supervise an extensive program of code enforcement. In 1962, the 
Ford Foundation helped establish the anti-poverty agency Community Progress Inc., which 
became active in urban renewal areas. This combination of social programs and physical 
redevelopment and rehabilitation quickly became the hallmark of New Haven‟s renewal 
program. None of these new programs were aimed at the affluent suburbanites targeted in the 
1950s; the second generation of urban renewal projects focused on improving existing 
neighborhoods rather than attempting to restructure the metropolitan area, and they addressed 
social problems as well as physical deterioration or obsolescence. “You can‟t bulldoze all slums 
into extinction,” Lee told a Life reporter in 1965, retreating from his earlier claims. “You can‟t 
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just push people from slum to slum. You have to work with them, help them rehabilitate their 
homes and build pride in their neighborhood and their city.”23 
Neighborhood renewal in New Haven began in the mid 1950s in Wooster Square, a 
predominantly Italian American neighborhood of stately nineteenth-century Italian revival 
houses and small businesses just east of downtown New Haven. A veteran of Philadelphia‟s 
pioneering renewal programs, the planner Mary Small, was brought in to coordinate the project. 
Beginning in Wooster Square, one of the nation‟s first neighborhood renewal projects, the city 
learned how to work with landlords and homeowners to rehabilitate older buildings, how to 
relocate existing businesses to modern facilities, and how to rally the community around public 
meetings. Hundred of homeowners were persuaded to update their buildings by a team of 
architects who offered instruction on how to bring their structures up to code and—where the 
houses had architectural value—how to restore them to their original state. [figure 2.3] Teams of 
financing specialists followed, showing homeowners how to refinance their properties with long-
term, low-interest loans from the Federal Housing Administration. A local factory operating out 
of a nineteenth century industrial building, Sargent and Company, was persuaded to stay in the 
area and invest in a new plant in the newly designated Wooster Square industrial district. Plans 
for an outdoor plaza with refreshments quickly ran up against the area‟s powerful Catholic 
priests, who frowned at the prospect of social mixing in the neighborhood‟s new public spaces, 
and the city refocused its efforts instead on the replacement of the aging Columbus School with a 
modern, community school that included an auditorium and public meeting rooms. [figure 2.4]  
The city‟s second neighborhood renewal project in Dixwell posed even more challenges. 
On its face simply an experiment in new planning techniques like Wooster Square, the Dixwell 
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project presented social and political obstacles that previous projects had not; Dixwell‟s status as 
the city‟s largest black ghetto raised the stakes for both the city and the black community. Unlike 
Wooster Square‟s working-class Italian families, few households in Dixwell had any savings to 
draw on to rehabilitate their houses. Unemployment ran high, and economic evaluations of the 
area predicted that it would be almost impossible to attract significant private investment to the 
area. The city‟s Family Relocation Office had struggled to find relocation housing for black 
families displaced from the Oak Street area, and ultimately many had been relocated not to the 
outer neighborhoods, but to Dixwell, which had a public housing complex that was nominally, if 
not officially, black. [figure 3.4] The prospect of another round of relocation was daunting. 
Already in 1956, when plans for a renewal project in Dixwell became public for the first time, 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) wrote to Lee in 
concern, anticipating large-scale displacement from the area. 
24
 
And yet the Dixwell project also promised rewards that hadn‟t accrued to the Wooster 
Square project. Neighborhood interest, as gauged in polls in the summer of 1959, proved high. 
Black support at the polls was solid; in fact, black support for new housing, new schools, and 
new parks—the major promises of a renewal project—far outpaced the support indicated the 
city‟s other ethnic groups. Local institutions like the venerable Dixwell Avenue Congregational 
Church had already expressed a keen interest in building in the proposed urban renewal area. 
Then, during the early 1960s, as the North began to take note of the civil rights struggle taking 
place in the South, the relationship of city and neighborhood changed dramatically. To Lee, who 
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thought of himself as liberal on race issues, Dixwell presented an opportunity to take a stand on 
civil rights issues in New Haven as well as a chance to reverse physical decline in the area.
25
 For 
New Haven‟s black community, the project represented an opportunity to build for the future. 
For both parties, Dixwell represented an opportunity for systemic change and a test of the vigor 
of New Haven‟s professed racial liberalism, which promised that a declining, predominantly 
black neighborhood could be revitalized and brought into the larger life of the city. 
 
Community Power in Neighborhood Renewal 
In a landmark study of local or “community” power published in 1959, Who Governs?, 
the Yale political scientist Robert A. Dahl described New Haven‟s political system in the late 
1950s as pluralist, characterized by multiple, changing, and competing interests. Where earlier 
researchers like Robert and Helen Lynd, Lloyd Warner, and Floyd Hunter had found that cities 
were ruled by a small, close-knit group of local elites who shared many of the same interests and 
objectives, Dahl argued that power was dispersed among members of temporary alliances and 
competing coalitions whose interests and objectives often clashed. If the elite theorists had 
depicted the American city as a place where resources were tightly controlled and decisions 
settled behind closed doors; Dahl‟s pluralism argued that the public realm was a place of debate, 
compromise, and opportunity for the most interested and active parties.
26
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Many of the arguments and ideas found in Who Governs? were drawn from Dahl‟s 
observations of the political process in New Haven and from interviews with participants in 
Lee‟s redevelopment program in particular, and, indeed, the pluralism Dahl describes bears a 
strong resemblance to the balance of power that seemed to underlie the city‟s renewal process in 
the 1950s. Early redevelopment efforts and public outreach efforts like the formation of CAC 
involved the cooperation of very different interests in the city, including industrialists and labor 
leaders, representatives of the university and the city, the local Chamber of Commerce and good-
government groups, and both political parties. As Dahl argued, this kind of dispersed power was 
a key element of stable and largely democratic governance in New Haven more generally.   
The realities of neighborhood renewal posed a significant challenge to widely accepted 
ideas about democracy and pluralism in New Haven—challenges to ideas about the transparency 
of the political process, the balance of power among competing groups and interests, and the 
openness of the system to the ideas and interests of the unorganized and powerless. As planners 
in Wooster Square and Dixwell quickly discovered, neighborhood renewal projects were 
complex exercises in local or community power, demanding extensive and unprecedented 
compromise and negotiation. Even total-clearance, “bulldozer” redevelopment projects like those 
at Oak Street and Church Street had required extended negotiations with various parts of the 
community. Residents and small business owners living in the urban renewal area needed to be 
convinced to relocate and needed help finding new housing and new properties, and the city‟s 
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Family Relocation Office grew rapidly, from a single employee in 1956 to a staff of 18 in 1962, 
including interviewers, social workers, real estate agents who helped relocated families and 
individuals across the city.
27
 [figure 2.5] Support needed to be drummed up for the public 
hearing process, both Lee‟s administration and the Redevelopment Agency worked hard at 
public relations, establishing committees of local leaders like the Citizens Action Committee 
(CAC) and constructing a futuristic exhibition space, the Progress Pavilion, to publicize 
Redevelopment Agency plans and argue for the renewal‟s urgency and importance. [figure 2.6] 
Neighborhood renewal projects, with their more targeted clearance and rehabilitation programs, 
demanded even more negotiation than these early projects, requiring the cooperation of local 
interests long after plans had received public approval and residents and businesses had been 
relocated. Support need to be solicited from local residents and organizations that would be 
directly affected by the renewal process. Civic organizations, small businesses and local 
institutions like the parish church all had strong—and often conflicting—ideas about how change 
should come to the neighborhood. Even where change seemed straightforward—as was the case 
with the city‟s campaign to enforce the housing code at overcrowded or illegally subdivided 
buildings—individual property owners accustomed to lax municipal oversight needed to be 
persuaded to take action.
28
 
In theory, at least, redevelopment and renewal depended upon a balance of power that 
was continually negotiated among politicians, planners, business interests, civic leaders, and 
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residents. The basic legal mechanism behind redevelopment, rehabilitation, and code 
enforcement, the power of eminent domain that allowed the city to condemn and purchase 
substandard properties, seemed to give the city the upper hand in negotiation. In practice, 
however, Lee‟s administration and the Redevelopment Agency operated under a variety of 
constraints. Sponsors and developers needed to be solicited. Where federally backed loans 
weren‟t sufficient, local banks needed to be persuaded to lend money for development and 
rehabilitation. A hostile press could make the public approvals process difficult. Powerful 
opponents could easily derail a city‟s redevelopment program, and cities with successful 
programs, like New Haven, found that they needed to assemble a coalition of downtown business 
interests, and of civic and labor leaders, and local powerbrokers who all recognized the need for 
continued central city development and modernization in an era of suburban expansion. 
Individuals who felt their interests were not well-represented in the process could—and 
did—object to the Redevelopment Agency‟s plans, as we see in the case of the jeweler Robert R. 
Savitt, a small businessman who challenged the city‟s  “substandard” designation of a building 
he owned on Church Street in a law suit that held up the project for years. Others launched 
petitions and appeared at public hearings to voice their concerns. Those who lacked resources to 
protest still could engage in what the anthropologist James Scott has called the “ordinary 
weapons of relatively powerless groups” including foot dragging, dissimulation, and false 
compliance (and, indeed, the records of the Family Relocation Office are filled with evidence of 
this kind of covert protest).
29
 Finally, even if indirectly, the vote mattered. No matter how 
                                                 
 
29
 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xvi. For Family Relocation Office Records, see Alvin A 
Mermin Collection, NHCHS, Box V, Folder A: New Haven Family Relocation Office—Daily 
Log of Relocation Data, 1956-1958. 
 
42 
 
effectively Lee portrayed his renewal program as nonpartisan, it was still very closely tied to his 
own administration and political career, and in New Haven he stood for reelection every two 
years. One of the first politicians to use polling extensively in his campaigns, Lee surveyed 
voters about their reactions to redevelopment extensively, managed voluminous correspondence 
on issues related to renewal, and even badgered his staff at the city‟s Progress Pavilion for 
feedback on the public perception of his program. “Your memos overwhelm me, and I am 
grateful to you,” he wrote to Anita Palmer, the Progress Pavilion hostess, several months after 
the exhibition space opened in 1960. “There must be some people who are critical, however, 
what are they critical about? What are they negative about? What do they believe is going to 
happen? Are they concerned about the timetable? Do they make any snide comments? Are there 
any questions you can‟t answer?”30 He wrote to his redevelopment staff repeatedly, asking them 
to address concerns that residents had expressed. 
 Increasingly in the 1960s, however, critics of New Haven‟s renewal program began to 
argue that the kind of power that neighborhoods and residents possessed—largely reactive—did 
not compare with the power the city wielded over residents of urban renewal areas, no matter 
how concerned it was for its residents. Lee‟s administration and the Redevelopment Agency set 
the agenda, defined the options that were presented, and controlled the direction of neighborhood 
renewal. In the academic sphere, Dahl‟s pluralism was challenged by younger scholars like Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz, who began to research non-decisions, areas in which power might 
be exercised covertly, and Steven Lukes, who argued that cultural norms could be so powerful 
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that conflict never arose.
31
 In New Haven, pluralism ran up against an emerging generation of 
young radicals, black, white, and Puerto Rican, who rejected the implicit individualism of Dahl‟s 
approach in favor of class-based critiques of local power, black nationalism, and Black Power. 
 
The Avenue and the Plaza 
Dixwell is one of the city‟s oldest residential neighborhoods, located close to the Green 
and directly northwest of the Yale campus. [figure 2.7]  In the late 1950s, at a time when the city 
as a whole was losing population to the suburbs, Dixwell was growing. Migrants from the rural 
South were beginning to settle here, as well as families displaced by the city‟s first 
redevelopment project, which was just getting underway at Oak Street. Housing in the area—
apartments over stores along the major thoroughfares, Dixwell and Goffe Avenues, as well as 
two- and three-story wooden frame structures along the side streets—became increasingly 
overcrowded as landlords subdivided existing apartments. Rents were rising even as apartment 
conditions deteriorated. 
Historically, Dixwell had been the center of the city‟s small African American 
population, which had grown dramatically since WWII, both in absolute numbers and in 
proportion to the city‟s total population. Between 1950 and 1960, as middle-class whites 
relocated to the suburbs and black newcomers arrived, the city‟s black population had increased 
from approximately 6% of the city‟s total population to approximately 15%. Blacks found it 
increasingly difficult to rent outside the neighborhoods that were emerging as New Haven‟s 
primary ghettos: Dixwell, Dwight, and The Hill. With the Winchester Repeating Arms Factory, a 
major employer of blacks during the war, and the modern Winchester Community School, 
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Dixwell drew many of the newcomers. It was also the destination for a significant number of 
black families displaced by the Oak Street project and highway construction, some of whom 
found rental housing in the area and some of whom settled in Dixwell‟s Oak Haven public 
housing project. Dixwell Avenue, a busy commercial strip lined by converted frame houses, ran 
through the heart of the Dixwell neighborhood, home to most of city‟s black institutions, 
including the main black churches, jazz clubs, and restaurants. 
32
 [figure 2.8] 
Renewal faced little organized opposition in New Haven neighborhoods in the late 1950s, 
and Dixwell was no exception. Dixwell had been slated for redevelopment by the City Planning 
Commission as early as 1950, and specific proposals for the area had been in the works for 
several years, first becoming public in 1956.
33
 If anything, the prospect of intervention in the 
neighborhood appealed to long-time Dixwell tenants and homeowners who were frustrated by 
what they perceived as signs of a declining neighborhood—overcrowding, deteriorating 
buildings, and instances of public drinking and gambling along Dixwell Avenue—but who were 
unable to move elsewhere, even if they could afford to. As one survey found, by the early 1960s, 
more than one-quarter of black Dixwell residents had looked unsuccessfully for housing in New 
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Haven‟s wealthier, predominantly white neighborhoods in New Haven or in its almost 
exclusively white suburbs.
34
  
Despite New Haven‟s reputation as a liberal New England city, the black community in 
Dixwell in the late fifties had few organizations working to address its problems.
35
 The Dixwell 
Congregational Church, founded in the nineteenth century, had long played an important role in 
the community, as did the other Black churches. The Dixwell Community Council had been 
formed in 1950 to help provide social services, and the new Winchester Community School 
offered classes and meeting space to adults as well as children in the community. But a long-
standing local chapter of the NAACP was among the few organizations actively working on 
issues of segregation and discrimination in housing. When the Reverend Edwin Edmonds, a civil 
rights activist in North Carolina in the fifties, moved to New Haven to take over the leadership of 
the Congregational Church in 1959, he found little political organization or institutional support 
for civil rights issues here. “This was one backward town,” Edmonds later recalled.36 
In 1959, the Redevelopment Agency approached community leaders about plans for 
urban renewal in Dixwell, and the leaders of the established Dixwell community organizations 
consolidated behind the plan. Charles Twyman, a school teacher and the former head of the 
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Dixwell Community Council, was invited to join the Renewal Committee, as was Fred Smith, a 
doctor; Isadore Wexler, the principal of the Winchester School; and Alphonse Tindall, head of 
the Dixwell Community House. Lee perused the list while it was being formed in 1959 and shot 
back to his administrators: “How is it in your Urban Renewal Executive Committee you don‟t 
have a single minister? …These people are our friends and they do have some influence.”37 
Edmonds, the pastor of the Dixwell Community Church, was added at Lee‟s request. James 
Mitchell, formerly the only black supervisor at the Winchester Repeating Arms Factory, the 
largest employer in the area, was hired as a community liaison. The Redevelopment Agency 
shied away from including businessmen on the executive committee for fear of committing 
themselves to selling specific parcels of land in the project area to committee members, but 
business interest in the plan was high. By early 1960, the committee had expanded, with an 
executive committee of 35 members and an additional 70 on a business committee and 44 on a 
residential committee. 
Together with members of the Redevelopment Agency‟s project office, the committee 
began to organize the neighborhood to support the proposed plan. Between 1959 and 1960, the 
committee passed out leaflets, organized subcommittees, held public meetings, and consulted 
with the Redevelopment Agency. Code enforcement and rehabilitation were high on their list of 
priorities, as was the possibility of bringing more black-owned business to the neighborhood, 
which was a point they mentioned repeatedly.
38
 Working with the planning consultant Maurice 
Rotival, the redevelopment agency developed four different plans for review during these early 
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meetings in 1959 and 1960. One plan, referred to as the “scatteration” or “scattershot” plan, 
directed renewal funding only to the most dilapidated structures in the project area. Another, 
modeled on the agency‟s work along Grand Avenue, a commercial strip near Wooster Square, 
proposed rebuilding commercial Dixwell Avenue with more spacious, modern buildings. The 
final two, the two plans the agency considered viable, were variations on an approach that was 
much more radical than either: the total clearance of the most overcrowded and deteriorated four-
block area in the center of the neighborhood, which would be redeveloped with a large public 
square, a modern shopping plaza, and new housing. This central redevelopment project would be 
complemented by the rehabilitation of houses along designated residential streets, including 
Dickerman, Orchard, Admiral, and Henry Streets; the widening of Goffe Boulevard; and the 
construction of small parks and the planting of street trees throughout the renewal area. 
At first glance, the plan approved by the city in 1960 was not especially remarkable. 
[figure 2.9] As the city argued during the public process, it eliminated substandard and mixed 
use dwellings in the center of the neighborhood, introduced modernized housing, lowered the 
overall residential density in the neighborhood, created new open space, separated vehicular and 
pedestrian traffic, and improved traffic circulation, especially on streets like Dixwell Avenue and 
Goffe Boulevard, which connected downtown to New Haven‟s wealthy northern suburbs. Its 
goals and physical planning strategies were, in short, the same goals and strategies of countless 
redevelopment agencies the late fifties, with the possible exception of its residential 
rehabilitation agenda, which was relatively innovative in 1960. 
Upon closer inspection, however, one aspect of the plan stands out: the large public 
square that was designed to traverse Dixwell Avenue near Admiral Street. [figure 2.10] The 
plaza was the most radical intervention in the neighborhood and the clearest sign of change. It 
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opened up the area in front of the popular and busy Winchester Community School, a spacious, 
modern structure that had been built in 1950 to replace a deteriorated century-old school after 
community protest. [figure 2.11] It was the selling point for the Dixwell plan; images of the 
plaza were circulated among Dixwell residents and used to publicize and rally support for the 
city‟s renewal plans.39 
More importantly, perhaps, the plaza functioned as a negation of Dixwell Avenue—one 
so complete and rhetorical it proved almost unbuildable. Extending from the planned new 
housing located on the west side of Dixwell Avenue all the way to the front of the Winchester 
School on the east, the plaza was essentially a monumental void. In a neighborhood increasingly 
associated with crime and overcrowded conditions, along a street associated with package stores, 
the plaza replaced the commercial strip with an open space that echoed the genteel, leafy public 
squares of Wooster Square and the New Haven Green, creating a new axis for the neighborhood 
perpendicular to the one it eliminated. The city‟s renewal plan blandly referred to the plaza as 
“badly needed open space in the heart of the neighborhood,” 40 but the radical transformation it 
represented quickly became evident in preliminary designs for the area developed by the 
architect John Johansen in 1961, 1962, and 1963—designs that included extensive commercial 
space on the west side of Dixwell Avenue and three civic and residential buildings on the east, as 
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well as an amphitheater and skating rink and a pedestrian bridge that spanned the busy Avenue.
41
  
[figures 2.12, 2.13]  
In the early 1960s, the only shopping center in the New Haven metropolitan area with 
more than 100,000 feet of retail space was Hamden Plaza, located just north of the city of New 
Haven, along Dixwell Avenue in the suburb of Hamden. One economist studying the new 
shopping center estimated that patrons made five times as many trips to Hamden Plaza as they 
did to downtown New Haven and concluded that “its drawing power resembles that of a CBD 
[central business district] of a medium-sized city.”42 Hamden Plaza was, in fact, New Haven‟s 
chief retail competitor and one of the reasons the city had invested so much effort the shopping 
center at the heart of the Church Street project. Encompassing approximately 105,000 square feet 
of retail in its first iteration, with 22,000 additional square feet of office space, the proposed 
commercial spaces of Dixwell plaza were large enough to compete with Hamden Plaza and rival 
the Chapel Square Mall that had been under construction downtown since 1957. Even in a 
second, more developed conceptual design published in September 1964, the commercial space 
still included 78,000 square feet of retail space, including two supermarkets, a restaurant, a 
pharmacy, and no fewer than 319 off-street parking spaces.
43
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Ultimately, the commercial space on the west side of Dixwell Avenue was reduced again 
and reoriented along the street at the request of its prospective tenants, who wanted to be “on the 
Avenue.”44 [figure 2.14] The vast expanse of open space east of Dixwell Avenue was reduced 
by siting a public building in front of the Winchester Community, while funding for the 
amphitheater and pedestrian footbridge never materialized. But if the original vision for the plaza 
was never realized, the political legacy of the original design was powerful. 
In a very real sense, renewal dislocated one set of local leaders—the owners of the 
package stores and nightclubs and small businesses that were condemned by the renewal plan to 
make room for the plaza—and empowered another—the civic leaders and professionals who sat 
on the area‟s Renewal Committee. Citing a potential conflict of interest, the Redevelopment 
Agency had refused to consider Dixwell Avenue‟s small businessmen, black and white, as 
leaders of the renewed neighborhood. None were invited to join the Renewal Committee; a 
separate and less powerful business committee only after repeated requests. Only two displaced 
businesses, the supermarkets Capitol Market and Shiffrin‟s, were deemed important enough to 
consult about the possibility of relocating to the new commercial area. (Both ultimately did.)
45
  
With the formation of the Renewal Committee in 1959, the area‟s small businessmen 
were sidelined, and a core group of black teachers, ministers, social workers, and professionals 
given a more prominent role in the life of the neighborhood. The tone of the public process 
leading up to the plan‟s approval in 1960 was, predictably, high-minded and ambitious. Their 
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efforts culminated in a strong show of community support for the plan at the public hearings in 
the summer of 1960.
46
 Approximately 300 people came to hear committee member Charles 
Twyman, speaking on behalf of the Renewal Committee, denounce the “blight” of 
overcrowding, vermin, gambling, narcotics, and prostitution in the Dixwell area. He called the 
plan a “calculated risk” that would “bring about many changes in the usual order of things”—
calculated, but a necessary, an effort to “set the pace for good community living.” James Gibbs, 
speaking for the local branch of the NAACP, encouraging expanded project boundaries, 
increased demolition, and the designation of open-occupancy housing. All the major 
organizations in the Dixwell area supported the plan; opponents included a Republican politician 
running for state office and a long-time hotel owner whose business was located in the area 
slated for demolition. The hotel owner spoke in favor of the plan but wondered what would 
happen to the single men, often poor and alcoholic, who rented rooms from him. “You [are] 
going to build a good place for the people, yes, but what are you going to do with that class?” he 
asked.
47
 In a memo to Lee shortly after the final hearing, Logue called the Dixwell public 
process “far and away the best substantive solid support we have ever had.”48 
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Go Slow: Housing as Social Change 
In late July 1960, six months after four black students from North Carolina Agricultural 
and Technical College first sat down at the segregated lunch counter at the F.W. Woolworth 
department store in Greensboro, NC, Mayor Lee turned to the problem of slum housing in New 
Haven. Speaking in front of a black church group on July 28, 1960, several weeks before the 
public hearings on the Dixwell plan, he proposed similar direct action for New Haven‟s slum 
dwellers:  
Why not a „sit-out‟ to follow the sit-ins?‟ …Just imagine, if all the people who 
live in the slums of our great cities were to leave their tenements, take chairs into 
the middle of the streets, and site, out under the starts some fine summer evening 
at 5:30. Perhaps then, when traffic ground to a halt and commuters were late for 
supper, perhaps then we could convince some of the landlords and businessmen 
who make their living in the cities but live in the suburbs to take a walk through 
the slums and see the conditions which prevail.
49
  
 
But Lee, the liberal, the Kennedy supporter, the warrior against slums, had stepped too far. The 
New York Times picked up the story. The local Connecticut newspapers hammered him. The 
New London Day described the suggestion as a “tactical blunder.” The Hartford Times found it 
“irresponsible.” The Waterbury American described it as “enthusiasm…carried too far.”50 A 
week later the city received preliminary federal approval for the Dixwell Redevelopment and 
Renewal Plan as well as some good news: the federal Urban Renewal Administration had set 
aside approximately $14.3 million for the project, and due to savvy accounting, a state 
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contribution, and the complexities of “in-kind” local contributions, New Haven did not even 
need to contribute any cash to the project.
51
 Lee never mentioned sit-outs again. 
The burgeoning civil rights movement, however, continued to influence the planning and 
implementation process. From the beginning, Lee had worked closely with the Family 
Relocation Office to ensure that African American families displaced from projects at Oak Street 
and Church Street were not re-segregated in the process of relocation. He went so far as to 
characterize the city‟s relocation program as a positive method for integrating families of color 
into established white neighborhoods and in 1957 invited Jackie Robinson to New Haven to visit 
the relocation office and see what it had accomplished. “I‟d like you to come to New Haven 
quietly and I will show you our whole program on relocation and integration,” Lee wrote.” I feel 
confident you will be impressed by it.” (Robinson declined.)52 Although a number of national 
black newspapers including the Chicago Defender and the Amsterdam News had warned that 
relocation caused by highway construction and urban renewal was reducing already meager 
housing opportunities for African Americans, Dixwell‟s leaders were not alarmed. They saw 
renewal as an opportunity to bring resources into a neighborhood that city government had long 
neglected this part of New Haven. No new private housing had been built in Dixwell for half a 
century, and redlined homeowners were unable to obtain loans to rehabilitate or modernize their 
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property. Urban renewal promised new community facilities, new housing, government-backed, 
and low-interest loans. Given Lee‟s interest in integration and Dixwell‟s proximity to downtown 
New Haven and Yale University, the renewal plan also seemed to be an instrument the city could 
use in the process of desegregating the city.  And, the city promised, it would be accompanied by 
a relocation program that would help displaced residents find better housing elsewhere in the 
city.  
This point deserves further elaboration. No one in the late fifties—neither city officials 
nor community leaders—expected that rehabilitated units or new construction might 
accommodate all the residents who would be displaced from the neighborhood. In fact, the very 
opposite was true: one of the salient attributes of a renewal plan like this one—for both city 
officials and community leaders—was the likelihood that a significant minority of the residents 
of the neighborhood would be relocated from the neighborhood and find new housing in other 
parts of the city. In the case of Dixwell, the Family Relocation Office prepared for several 
hundred families, while the plan included only 200 new housing units and—through code 
enforcement, rehabilitation, and spot clearance—would probably cause the elimination of a 
number of other illegally subdivided apartments.  
To the city planners, this was part of the process of decentralization, the suburbs 
absorbing newcomers from outer urban neighborhoods, the outer urban neighborhoods absorbing 
population from the overcrowded urban renewal areas and former “slums.” To those concerned 
about the housing crisis for Blacks, however, this was part of the process of integration. As the 
suburbs absorbed young white families, the outer urban neighborhoods—and perhaps even the 
suburbs—would absorb those Black families who were, for the first time, able to move out of the 
ghetto. As the NAACP argued in a policy statement: 
55 
 
…the [urban renewal] program can serve as an effective tool not only to eliminate 
slum and improve housing conditions but also to broaden the housing 
opportunities of Negroes and other minority families being displaced…urban 
renewal programs often present minority families with a long-awaited opportunity 
to move out of racial and economic ghettos into better neighborhoods with better 
housing.
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To New Haven‟s Black community, the Dixwell renewal process would be an opportunity break 
up the ghetto and to open housing throughout the city to black occupancy as much as it was the 
chance to renewal and rehabilitate of an existing neighborhood. 
Indeed, the racial politics of relocation were closely associated with white resistance to 
integration—rather than black resistance to displacement—that the Dixwell renewal project 
featured in the 1961 mayoral campaign. When Republican mayoral challenger James Valenti 
warned voters that the Dixwell project represented a misguided “bulldozer approach” to renewal 
in the area, local leaders defended Lee and the renewal plan, charging that Valenti wanted to 
preserve the “Negro ghetto” in the neighborhood.54 Taking the cue from the mayor and his 
Redevelopment Agency, the Renewal Committee speculated on the possibility that planned 
relocation might open the city‟s wealthier neighborhoods to black occupancy. “Here in Dix[well] 
there is a new oppor[tunity] to bring balance of groups back into area,” they noted.55 Valenti‟s 
opposition, they implied, might be a sign of his unwillingness to see blacks move into 
neighborhoods throughout the city. 
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Increasingly in the early 1960s, however, various community leaders and organizations 
began to question the coalition that had formed between the city and the Renewal Committee. 
Could Lee, a liberal and an advocate of civil rights, be trusted to keep the interests of the black 
community in mind as he rebuilt the city? Did the black community need to place additional 
pressures on him—or represent its own interests? Would new housing help bring about social 
change or would protest? Between 1961 and 1963, the debate took shape, with the older 
generation—ministers, teachers, social workers, professionals—standing behind plans for urban 
renewal, while the younger generation advocated new strategies to address the community‟s 
problems, including sit-ins, pickets, and protests.  
Lee‟s abandoned plans for a sit-out to protest local housing conditions resurfaced again 
among a group of NAACP members in the fall of 1961.Several members of the local chapter of 
the NAACP, including President James Gibbs, and Blyden Jackson, a young activist who was 
also part of the city‟s recently formed CORE chapter, had proposed a sit-out to draw attention to 
residential segregation and poor housing conditions. They met with opposition from other 
members of local civil rights groups—supporters of Mayor Lee and urban renewal—who argued 
that a new statewide anti-discrimination law was just going into effect and that the group should 
be patient and support these efforts. At a meeting at the Winchester School, NAACP members 
debated the issue heatedly: should the group support direct action for open occupancy, as Gibbs 
and Jackson wanted, or “go slow” and wait to the see the results of the new legislation? Lee 
supporters, in the majority, favored the “go slow” approach. Compounding the local tensions 
were strict instructions from the national organization: the NAACP was not supporting direct 
action in this case, and members risked losing their charter if they moved forward with their 
57 
 
protest.
56
 No decision was made that evening. A week later Gibbs resigned as president of the 
chapter, saying that he was joining CORE, and CORE announced its plans to hold a “sit-out” 
along Dixwell Avenue in October.
57
 Lee, who felt the defection keenly, was comforted by his 
aide, Barry Passett: “They are not necessarily mad at you. They do not however, feel the Dixwell 
Project is not benefiting them and they have the strong feeling that they must do something 
active, like down South, to win support for their cause.” The shape of black activism in New 
Haven for the new few years seems to have been determined by Gibbs‟ defection; there would be 
little compromise or communication between the groups, simply competing strategies for social 
change. 
The sit-out took place on a Friday evening, October 6, much as Mayor Lee had imagined 
it. [figure 2.15] After a CORE rally in a local park, leaders urged attendees to take a seat along 
the sidewalk along Dixwell Avenue near Foote Street—the same site selected by planners for the 
new civic and commercial plaza, the symbolic heart of the community. About a hundred 
demonstrators did so. CORE leaders issued a statement condemning the “subtle, nagging, 
Northern brand of racism” and the “snail-pace of improvement” in housing and employment, 
demanding a meeting with Lee and calling for the enactment of municipal ordinances that 
prohibited refusing or raising rents on the basis of race or raising rents without improvements on 
the apartment.
58
  
All in all, the event was more orderly that the one Lee had suggested—no one blocked 
traffic or challenged the suburban commuters during their Friday afternoon flight from the city. 
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It was also, however, more radical. The young CORE activists had clearly declared their 
independence from both the NAACP and the politics of conciliation that marked race relations 
during the early stages of the Dixwell plan. So, too, had they rejected the argument that isolated 
new projects in New Haven‟s black neighborhoods would bring about change in the overall 
condition of housing for the majority of residents. In 1961, as households were relocated from 
the Dixwell neighborhood, in 1962, as demolition began, and in 1963, as the city broke ground 
on the first redevelopment projects, CORE continued to work on the issues of segregation and 
substandard housing with its own tactics, sending inspection teams into apartment buildings to 
document code violations, holding rallies, and staging sit-ins at businesses owned by 
slumlords.
59
 [figure 2.16] When the New Haven Board of Aldermen voted in February 1962 to 
reject a fair housing ordinance, CORE picketed outside city hall. It continued to place pressure 
on Lee and his Redevelopment Agency, following up with renewal area families who had been 
relocated to substandard housing and naming Lee, as the head of the city and the landlord to 
dozens of substandard units awaiting rehabilitation, one New Haven‟s worst slumlords. As the 
historian Yohuru Williams argues, CORE was, during 1962 and 1963, “a significant challenge to 
the Lee Administration,” one of the few he faced in the early and mid 1960s.60 
Shortly after CORE‟s sit-out in the fall of 1961, Mayor Lee announced that negotiations 
were underway for approximately 200 units of private, moderate rental apartments in Dixwell, to 
be built under section 221(d)(3) of the Federal Housing legislation passed in July 1961. The most 
recent of a series of Housing Act provisions intended to support the construction of new housing, 
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221(d)(3) provided for below-market-rate mortgages for nonprofit organizations that wanted to 
build rental or cooperative housing for low- and moderate-income families. This legislation was 
anticipated eagerly by administrations like Lee‟s, which wanted to see new housing construction 
in renewal areas but were unwilling to support controversial public housing projects. With 
typical bravado, Lee declared that New Haven was “on the threshold of the great private housing 
construction boom in its history.”61 
If, prior to 1961, members of the Renewal Committee conceived of physical planning as 
an essentially negative process—the clearance of the most deteriorated housing, or the 
elimination of code violations or night clubs, or the dissolution of the ghetto—the requirements 
in 221(d)(3) for non-profit sponsorship helped draw community organizations into participation 
in the renewal process and helped them formulate a positive conception of Dixwell as a modern, 
middle-class, and racially integrated neighborhood. New housing, the city promise, would attract 
new residents to the area. “Through sensitive planning in which the community really 
participates, you can make a former ghetto attractive enough to integrate it,” redevelopment 
official Mel Adams declared.
62
 
Studies of the housing market in Dixwell conducted before the advent of the renewal 
program indicated that, given the neighborhoods demographics, any new housing would almost 
certainly be occupied by African American families. Now, with integration in the air, the city 
engaged a public relations firm to advertise the Dixwell project—now “University Park 
Dixwell”—with whites. Color brochures touting the “outstanding architects” involved in the 
                                                 
 
61
 On the meeting with Lee, see New Haven Register, October 23, 1961. On Lee‟s 
announcement, see New Haven Register, October 26, 1961. 
 
62
 Adams quoted in Hommann, “Symbolic Bells in Dixwell,” p. 57.  
60 
 
project and described the project as creating a “brand new neighborhood” with “ultramodern” 
housing and a new elementary school that offered “enriched curriculum and numerous services 
supplementing the regular school program.”63 [figure 2.17] Unlike the upmarket apartments then 
under construction in the Oak Street project, housing in Dixwell was geared toward families. The 
plaza figured prominently in the advertising materials, as did a young white family no doubt 
intended to appeal to prospective white buyers. [figures 2.18, 2.19] As one housing researcher 
noted: 
Experience in other communities, notably in the Lake-Meadows-Prairie Shore area in 
Chicago, has shown that the integration of an existing non-white community is most 
likely to succeed where young white families can be encouraged to move into an area. 
These families apparently can be attracted only by new housing developments which 
provide good housing and good location at a reasonable cost, and by new school 
facilities.
64
 
 
Florence Virtue Homes, located in the central clearance area, adjacent to the new 
shopping center and civic plaza, was the largest and most closely watched of the 221(d)(3) 
developments. [figures 2.20, 2.21] With 129 cooperative units named after a longtime 
neighborhood resident, Florence Virtue was sponsored by the Dixwell Congregational Church, 
the chief local supporter of the renewal program. A series of flat-roofed, concrete block 
townhouses designed by John Johansen, Florence Virtue was designed to fit into the scale of the 
neighborhood and yet stand out as bright and modern in a neighborhood of late nineteenth 
century wooden frame buildings. The city recommended two or three-story town houses and 
warned against any institutional feel reminiscent of public housing: “The design of all multi-
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family units should approximate as closely as possible, a development of single family row 
houses directly related to well defined public and private spaces.”65  It was important to “capture 
something from the „past‟ for the „new‟ neighborhood,” the architectural program advised.66   
As the first new housing built in Dixwell in more than fifty years and ambitious 
experiment in racial integration, its progress was monitored by the local press and advertised  
aggressively by the city, which promoted its low-to-moderate sales prices and monthly 
maintenance charges, modern appliances and open spaces.
67
 Advertisements emphasized the 
modernity of the houses—all-electric kitchens, parking spaces and private patios. Units were 
staggered in pairs, so that backyards to afford more privacy.
68
 [figure 2.22] As the ads claimed, 
Florence Virtue offered “the privacy and seclusion you desire, yet with every advantage of city 
living close by.”69 
And indeed, on the opening weekend at Florence Virtue in November 1964, a thousand 
people toured the model apartment.
70
 The Register proclaimed Florence Virtue a “significant 
step in integration” and Reverend Edmonds praised the cooperative ownership system and 
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declared that the “ingredients” to neighborhood revitalization were “responsibility, pride of 
ownership, and stability of neighborhood.”71 At approximately $325, the down payment was 
modest, and the city helped arrange loans for those who did not have the payment upfront. 
Monthly maintenance fees ran from $91 to $130, making the smaller units at Florence Virtue 
slightly more expensive than the average rental in the area when studies were first conducted in 
1960.
72
 By the time the project neared opening in1964, there was strong demand for the new 
housing units from the black community itself, but Lee pressed the issue of racial integration. 
“We aren‟t having a 100 percent black project as long as I have anything to say about it,” he 
said. “We‟re getting 30 percent whites, or I don‟t open it.”73 The project opened integrated at 45 
percent white and 55 percent black.
74
  
Between 1961 and 1964, St. Martin de Porres Church, the Human Relations Council, a 
local civil rights organization, and one member of the renewal committee, Dr. Fred Smith, all 
took on sponsorship of new housing developments that opened in 1965 and 1966. Although 
together these projects only accounted for approximately 250 new units of housing, and although 
the requirements for sponsorship were minimal—in most cases sponsors were responsible for a 
down payment of 10% of the project costs—symbolically the stakes were high. Sponsorship 
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represented a joint investment, federal and local, in a community that was experiencing 
disinvestment and neglect. 
At one end of the market, One Dixwell Plaza, Fred Smith Housing, was Dixwell‟s first 
and only private (non-subsidized) development. 
75
 One Dixwell Plaza contained two professional 
offices opening out onto the plaza and 22 one- and three-bedroom units, designed New Haven 
architect Gilbert Switzer. These apartment had modern electric kitchens, wall to wall carpeting, 
sliding glass doors, enclosed balconies or patios, off street parking, a master TV antenna.
76
 
[figures 2.23, 2.24] 
During these years, the city also built a limited amount subsidized housing for the elderly. 
Prescott Bush Housing for the Elderly at Henry and County Streets was a low-rise garden 
apartment block with 60 public housing units designed by the local firm Granberry Cash and 
Associates. (It was named after the Connecticut senator whose advocacy on New Haven‟s behalf 
in the Senate was one reason the city‟s renewal program was so well-funded.) [figure 2.25] 
The campaign for residential integration was complemented by efforts to transform 
Dixwell in other ways.
77
 In meetings and negotiations in the early sixties, for example, the 
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Renewal Committee persuaded Lee to begin training programs to integrate the all-white unions 
that were building in Dixwell.
78
 They also convinced the Redevelopment Agency to bring social 
services into the community, promoting social as well as physical renewal.
79
 Several of the 
neighborhood‟s churches, including Rev. Edmonds‟ powerful Dixwell Congregational Church, 
joined together and reached out to white church-goers in an effort to integrate their 
congregations.
80
 The Redevelopment Agency also actively sought out New Haven landlords who 
had pledged open occupancy policies for their rosters at the relocation office. Dixwell project 
director Lloyd Davis declared that renewal was “as much a vital part of the civil rights-free 
revolution as our sit-ins, boycotts and demonstrations”81  
Meanwhile, the local Redevelopment Agency office sponsored public information 
campaigns, worked to create block associations to deal with the more mundane neighborhood 
problems of maintenance and repair, and promoted rehabilitation and clean-up campaigns in the 
neighborhood. Far more than redevelopment, rehabilitation required community outreach. 
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Throughout the mid 1960s, the local office worked to create block organizations to deal with 
more mundane neighborhood problems. It sponsored contests in the local schools in the fall of 
1962 to determine the name of a mascot for its fix-up, clean-up campaign, and the winner, 
Freddy Fixer, presided over the first annual Freddy Fixer Parade, held May of 1963 along 
Dixwell Avenue before some 7,000 people. (The parade, in fact, outlasted the renewal program 
by several decades and continues to this day.) 
82
 
The local Redevelopment Agency office promoted rehabilitation by sponsoring 
informational coffee hours, distributing booklets with design recommendations, and rewarding 
compliant homeowners with a plaque from the Dixwell Redevelopment Office suitable for 
mounting on their houses, evidence of the work and money invested.
83
 After teams of inspectors 
canvassed the neighborhood, taking stock of both external conditions and interiors, the local 
office began visiting homeowners, household by household, explaining where their buildings had 
fallen out of compliance with the building code, describing the kind of FHA-sponsored loans 
might be available to help them in the process of rehabilitation, even bringing renderings to show 
the homeowners what their house might look like when rehabilitated.
84
 [figure 2.25] 
Although rehabilitation was important to the renewal program, however, the new 
development of the mid 1960s had a symbolic potential that newly tidy older houses lacked. 
Both the city and the neighborhood‟s Renewal Committee had a clear vision of the new 
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Dixwell—orderly, vibrant, respectable, and interracial—that was defined by the clean lines of 
the modern architecture and the open places that symbolized their reforms, particularly in the 
center of the renewal area, which the Redevelopment Agency described as “a very attractive core 
which will radiate strength throughout the area.”85 The power of physical design was clear to the 
city and the Renewal Committee; the new housing, school, shopping center and open spaces 
would bring modernity, stability, and middle-class affluence to the neighborhood at a time when 
it seemed to face isolation and decline. The open floor plans, floor-to-ceiling windows, and green 
spaces of Johansen‟s Florence Virtue Houses and the powerful, prismatic shapes of the Grant 
School, the Congregational Church, and Dixwell Community House all stood out from the 
surrounding built environment, announcing the neighborhood‟s break with the past. At the same 
time, they also represented strengthened ties with the white power structure in the city.  
Promotional images of the new neighborhood produced in the mid 1960s announced this vision 
explicitly with illustrations of well-dressed black and white families mingling in the 
neighborhoods new spaces, interacting, shaking hands. [figures 2.27, 2.28] 
 
A Riot of Their Own 
By the mid 1960s, the costs of the alliance struck between the city and the Renewal 
Committee were beginning to become clear. While the Renewal Committee expanded multiple 
times and ultimately included several hundred members, it did not effectively represent 
newcomers or the very poor, who invariably lived in the areas that were designated for 
demolition rather than rehabilitation and who received eviction notices rather government grants 
and loans for improvements. Large families found it difficult to relocate; already in 1961, the 
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Family Relocation Office had to offer a finder‟s fee of $100 and $150 for the rare three- and 
four-bedroom unit that would house a larger family. Demolition and redevelopment were 
expanded in amendments to the plan in 1963 and 1964, bringing the total number of families 
displaced, once estimated at approximately 200, closer to 800.
86
 At numerous hearings and 
public meetings, the Redevelopment Agency heard requests from Dixwell residents for greater 
demolition in the area, particularly on the poorest blocks with the worst housing conditions. 
Long-time middle-class and working class residents of Dixwell knew what parts of their 
neighborhood they would like to see redeveloped, and they were invariably the poorest areas: the 
deteriorating wooden frame houses in the center of the neighborhood that had been subdivided 
into multiple units for the recent Southern migrants who were moving to New Haven in the 
fifties and sixties. Subsequent amendments to the plan continued to expanded demolition and 
displacement. [figure 2.29] 
Support for renewal remained high among the city‟s black population as a whole, but 
there were also signs that many former supporters were becoming disillusioned with renewal and 
its disruptions and dislocations.
87
 The city had difficulty filling vacancies in the new shopping 
center. Interest in the complex had died down during the long period of construction, and the city 
filled one of the properties with a branch library. Tenants began organizing in the Elm Haven 
public housing projects, where they were experiencing problems with overcrowding, punitive 
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evictions, and dilapidated conditions. They demanded security guards, elevator operators, and 
playgrounds.
88
 At One Dixwell Plaza, Fred Smith ran out of patience with the responsibilities of 
a sponsor. Shortly after residents moved into One Dixwell Plaza in December 1966, drainage 
problems in area caused flooding in the units. Then a sequence of fires damaged the units again, 
causing vacancies. Smith, whose property taxes had risen sharply, tried repeatedly to turn the 
complex over the New Haven Housing Authority, but the NHHA refused him. Smith, who had 
served as a housing commissioner for eleven years, joined the police commission in1967.
89
  
Then riots hit New Haven in September 1967. Like many cities that saw civil 
disturbances in the summers of the mid 1960s, New Haven was shaken by the experience. 
Resident participation in the riots, estimated at about 30%, was high, and observers believed that 
“the riots revealed Lee‟s redevelopment had not affected the lives of those who needed it the 
most.”90 Although events were centered on Congress Street in the Hill, and not in Dixwell, the 
main office of Elm Haven broken into and the white-owned stores in the neighborhood were hit. 
There were scattered reports of looting and fire-bombs and three nights of violence in Elm 
Haven housing project along Dixwell Avenue, as crowds gathered in the neighborhood‟s empty 
lots. Small businessmen in the Dixwell Plaza shopping center reported that the area had become 
so closely associated with the riots that business in area never picked up. 
After the disturbances, Lee stopped speaking on behalf of the city‟s blacks. Many blamed 
his disruptive renewal policies for unrest in the city‟s neighborhoods; by 1967, nearly every 
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working class neighborhood in central New Haven had been designated for renewal. [figure 
2.30] As one observer wrote: 
How are we to react to your [Lee‟s] statement quoted in the August 20 Register: „I 
seriously thought it would never happen!‟ Is our Mayor naïve? Had he no idea of the 
violence, disruption, and insecurity that has become a permanent part of their daily lives? 
Is he unaware of the violence that is daily perpetuated upon them by the Redevelopment 
Agency?
91
  
 
In a word, the riots discredited Dahl‟s vision of New Haven as a city with a pluralist balance of 
power. Critics like Marian Glaser, a public health student who opposed the city‟s renewal 
program, began to circulate research on the official documentation justifying New Haven‟s 
redevelopment projects, arguing that the Redevelopment Agency had repeatedly abused its 
power and condemned buildings without serious defects or deterioration.
92
 A local anti-Vietnam, 
anti-Lee political movement, the American Independent Movement, gained traction, and its 
newsletter expanded its coverage of the displacement and conflict that renewal was causing. The 
newsletter published critiques of the Lee administration and its renewal policies, including a 
damning analysis of the planned Ring Road that would have cut Dixwell and nearby Dwight off 
from downtown. [figure 2.28] When the AIM leader and Yale political scientist Robert Cook 
declared that “the forces which control the community are in fact illegitimate, and that at bottom 
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their position rests upon force and violence,” he spoke of Lee‟s power in New Haven as well as 
the US‟s involvement in Vietnam.93  
So effectively had Lee drawn black activists into his administration that after the collapse 
of the local CORE chapter, the city had few independent black organizations able to respond to 
the disturbances. The Register ran lengthy articles about leadership in the black community, 
trying to identify the next generation of leaders. The Hill Parents Association, formed in 1966 
over protests about conditions at the Prince Street School in the Hill, was the most effective 
organization at expressing the anger of blacks who felt they had not benefitted from the Lee‟s 
administrations programs, and the political center of gravity shifted from Dixwell to that 
neighborhood, where younger and more radical activists involved in the black power movement 
demanded Lee‟s attention. When the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders held 
public hearing in New Haven in 1968, activists from the Hill offered the only challenge to the 
city‟s account of liberalism that simply had not gone far enough.94 When Martin Luther King, 
Jr., was assassinated in the spring of 1968, the Rev. Edmonds was the only Dixwell leader 
invited to speak at the memorial service on the New Haven Green. 
In Dixwell, construction projects begun long before September 1967 were pushed to 
conclusion. The open plaza on the east side of Dixwell Avenue was completed. [figures 2.32, 
2.33] The Brutalist Dixwell Congregational Church, designed by Johansen, opened in 1969, its 
crystalline form, isolated from the plaza and the street by a moat, now inappropriate for a black 
community that was abandoning its vision of a new, interracial city and embracing its members 
on their own terms. [figures 2.34, 2.35],Where changes to the designs in progress could still be 
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made, they were. The Dixwell Community House/Neighborhood Services Building, a joint 
public private building designed by Edward Cherry in association with Herbert Newman, was 
completed in 1970. [figures 2.36. 2.37] Designed to echo the same powerful, geometric shapes 
as Johansen‟s church, the Community House expanded its social service-based program in the 
late 1960s to include meeting spaces for local organizations and a library for Afro-American 
culture.  
By the late 1960s, the modern, heroic vision of Dixwell has lost its appeal and legitimacy. 
Its monumental buildings housed institutions closely associated with the community leaders of 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, and they represented a political alliance between the city and the 
members of the Renewal Committee that had since come under fire. The city, no longer so sure 
of its welcome, reversed course with its last projects, commissioning contextual buildings that 
tried hard to fit in. Rehabilitation plan for a block of eight Civil War-era row houses on Henry 
Street begun as moderate-income housing when it was announced in 1966, now became one of 
the area‟s showpiece projects. [figure 2.38] Cherry, a black architect and the designer of the 
Dixwell Community House, was awarded the last major housing project at Goffe Boulevard and 
Orchard Streets. [figure 2.39]  
The commission for the last major public building in the urban renewal area, the 
firehouse on Goffe Boulevard, went to the firm of Venturi and Rauch, well-known for its 
contextual designs. The firehouse, designed in 1970 and completed in 1974, strives for the 
ordinariness that Venturi and partner Denise Scott Brown were advocating in the early 1970. 
[figure 2.40]  Venturi and Rauch‟s use of brick on the façade, a nod to both the tradition of 
firehouses in the city and to the commercial buildings along Goffe, is only the most obvious 
departure from the Brutalist architectural language of the rest of the project area and of New 
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Haven‟s renewal architecture more generally. In contrast to the heroism of the city‟s Brutalist 
Central fire Station in Wooster Square, for example, it sits quietly along the well-traveled route 
to the suburbs, rejecting even the modest element of a tower that the designers considered in 
early schemes. [figures 2.41, 2.42] A photograph of the fire station submitted for publication is 
an excellent illustration of the gritty realism that this building attempts to project. Carefully 
composed, it emphasizes the building‟s close relationship to the street and the commercial 
lettering that defines it as part of the city of New Haven, rather than Gothic Yale University 
visible in the distance behind it. Comparing this photo with Johansen‟s presentation drawings for 
the Grant School clarifies the difference between the Dixwell of the mid 1960s and the Dixwell 
of the early 1970s: where Venturi embraces the existing city, Johansen has located the school 
across the street from several single-story, single-family suburban houses. None of these houses 
existed at the time Johansen design the Grant School; the aging, three-story Victorian houses that 
were located there had been designed for demolition and redevelopment as part of the 1964 
amendment to the renewal plan. [figure 2.43]  
 
Conclusion 
Between 1960, when the Dixwell plan was adopted, and 1970, when the last major 
projects were completed, the neighborhood underwent a remarkable transformation: some 1,110 
households and 194 businesses were relocated; approximately 300 buildings were demolished; 
308 new housing units were constructed; several hundred buildings rehabilitated; and a half 
dozen community facilities completed, including a new school, a community center, several 
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churches, a public plaza, and a shopping center.
95
 By the early 1980s, however, almost all signs 
of the renewed neighborhood of the 1960s had disappeared. 
The closing of the Winchester factory and skyrocketing unemployment rates had a 
devastating impact on Dixwell, and by the early 1980s, the area was struggling with the effects 
of the drug trade and addiction, as well. In 1981, the New York Times revisited Dixwell and 
found Capitol Market, one of the anchors of the shopping center, had departed. The empty 
storefront was only one among several. The new, integrated housing was now almost all black 
and residents were much poorer. The reporter interviewed a disillusioned Isabelle Russell, a 
health counselor and community activist who in the late 1960s had made the decision to move to 
One Dixwell Plaza instead of departing for suburbs. “I see programs written up with beautiful 
language and a lot of numbers, but when I walk down the street, they don‟t match up,” Russell 
said. Mayor Lee agreed. “We thought we were doing everything right,” Lee recalled. “But now 
we realize a lot of it came out wrong.”96 The alliance between city and neighborhood and the 
vision that drove their work in until the mid 1960s had both been forgotten. In an oral history 
conducted in 2004, Renewal Committee member Charles Twyman recalled his hopes for a more 
extensive public housing program for displaced residents and speculated, hesitantly, that the 
neighborhood‟s elites had allied themselves too closely to the city and not listened carefully 
enough to the poor.  
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This was our idea of improving things. I mean, better housing, yes, but more 
importantly I think really trying to change the social pattern, the fabric….we 
didn‟t realized we were sort of playing into the hands of another plan, a grander 
plan and plans were developed….Our grand plan always appeared as though it 
was, you know, right on target with their plan. That‟s what we thought… we did 
not—I‟m talking about the so-called inner circle—did not plan well enough, I 
think, to consolidate those energies, you know, by the groups that were buildings 
this housing, to organize it as a broad community effort.
97
 
 
In 1960, the political scientist E.E. Schattschneider offered a terse and clever commentary on 
Dahl‟s vision of pluralism in New Haven: “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”98 Indeed, in the case of Dixwell, the inability of 
moderate, middle-class community leaders to represent the poor lead to a crisis in the years after 
1967 and widespread disillusionment with the work they had already done. But race figures here 
strongly, as well as the growing influence of the black power movement, which offered the only 
ideology sufficiently distinct from the city‟s liberal pluralism that it was able to develop a 
thorough-going critique of renewal and its effects on the black community in New Haven. If 
many young activists felt Lee and the Redevelopment Agency had never seen the black 
community as genuine partners in the planning process, they may have been correct, but they 
were also speaking with the wisdom gained from more than a decade of community activism 
around renewal. In 1958, doubts about the good faith shown by Lee and his planners were 
complaints on the margins of black discourse in New Haven; ten years later, they fit neatly into 
the critique of institutional racism that black power offered. Meanwhile, the collapse of the 
liberal ideas behind renewal and the political alliance that helped promote it had little direct 
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effect on the built environment of the neighborhood but made all the difference in the world 
when it came to understanding and interpreting it. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Abandoned Project: Racial Struggle and the Politics of Integration 
Roxbury, Boston 
  
Introduction 
In March 1962, more than two thousand people crowded into a high school auditorium in 
the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston for a public hearing. The issue for the evening—the 
expansion of the geographical area included in the Washington Park Urban Renewal Project—
might not have seemed especially incendiary, but as Boston expanded its Title I efforts in the 
early 1960s, all of the city‟s renewal plans were coming under close scrutiny. None were 
watched quite as closely as Washington Park, the city‟s first major rehabilitation project, 
focusing on an older residential area in Roxbury, at the heart of Boston‟s growing black 
community. Representing the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), Development 
Administrator Edward J. Logue opened the meeting with a brief statement about city‟s plans to 
use renewal funds to rehabilitate housing and build schools and public buildings in the expanded 
area. He was then joined on stage by six city councilors who opened the floor to the main event 
of the evening: the testimony of citizens and community organizations who wanted to express 
their support for or criticism of the expansion. 
Boston‟s black community had lined up behind the prospect of urban renewal in 
Roxbury, and support for the expansion was overwhelming. Sixty-one local community leaders, 
including clergy, businessmen, politicians, and representatives of community organizations, 
spoke in favor of the plan, arguing for the importance of intervention in a neighborhood that was 
experiencing disinvestment and neglect. A pastor from St. Joseph‟s, a local church, threw his 
support behind the project, arguing that “something that has to be done” in the area. A state 
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representative praised the renewal project as “the first project in the United States that will 
benefit principally the colored people.” Another local clergyman dramatically proclaimed that if 
Jesus Christ appeared on the streets of Roxbury that day, he would vote in favor of urban 
renewal. 
It was hardly evident at the hearing that renewal was a contentious topic in Boston in the 
early 1960s, or that the BRA was struggling to reestablish its reputation in the wake of the 
widely publicized failure of its flagship project of the 1950s, the West End. The few objections 
of the evening came from residents from other Boston neighborhoods who condemned urban 
renewal as a “propaganda program” and decried the BRA‟s whole-scale demolition in the West 
End as the “destruction” of a community. Roxbury residents took no heed of this advice. “We 
don‟t appreciate [outsiders] telling us know to live,” replied Roxbury resident Melnea Cass, 
speaking on behalf of the Boston branch of the NAACP. “Let us, the residents, tell you what we 
want, because we really know what we want here in Roxbury.”99 
“What we want here in Roxbury,” in early 1962, was urban renewal. Since the mid-
1950s, community institutions in the neighborhood had been educating residents about renewal 
and organizing residents to support it. A local interracial organization, Freedom House, had 
spearheaded the campaign, but the local churches and businesses had been enlisted to spread the 
word. The area‟s primary civil rights group, the local branch of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), backed it, and other community organizations had 
met to discuss what it might mean for Roxbury. Just a few months after the publication of Jane 
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Jacobs‟ Death and Life of Great American Cities, with the disaster of the West End still 
unfolding, just as protestors turned out in the streets to object to the BRA‟s renewal plans for the 
Allston neighborhood and the public debate on urban renewal was gaining traction in 
newspapers and magazines nationwide, urban renewal had found support in a most unlikely part 
of the city: the struggling black neighborhood of Roxbury. 
Given the critique of urban renewal that was developing around 1960 and what we know 
today about renewal‟s devastating effects on communities of color, it is hard to understand the 
extent of the support that black community groups in Roxbury had for urban renewal in those 
years. Part of the reason for their support, of course, had to do with the promises made by the 
BRA‟s new development administrator, Ed Logue, and the BRA‟s shift from the kind of large-
scale clearance projects exemplified by the West End to a new “planning with people” approach 
that included consultation with community groups, more limited clearance, and low-interest 
loans and technical assistance that would help residents rehabilitate existing housing in the 
neighborhood. The new BRA, Logue promised, would rehabilitate and renew rather than 
redevelop and destroy, positioning itself as an ally with helpful tools for neighborhoods 
struggling with aging housing stock and signs of blight. 
And yet if initially residents and community organizations were attracted to the more 
concrete promises of the BRA‟s new “planning with people” approach, they also grasped the 
ways in which the transformation of the built environment might become part of a much broader 
transformation of black life in Boston. Especially in the early 1960s, as the black community 
confronted the core Northern civil rights issues of education, housing, and employment, 
community leaders began to dream of a racially integrated Boston where blacks might have the 
same opportunities as whites. As the Roxbury ghetto grew and the civil rights and black power 
79 
 
movements energized a formerly small and quiescent Northern black community, support for 
redevelopment and rehabilitation became inextricably linked to part of the much larger cultural 
project of racial integration that dominated black discourse and activism throughout the postwar 
years. At first, community leaders discussed the possibilities of government intervention in an 
exploitative private housing market that confined blacks to a ghetto and limited their housing 
choices. Then, as they became more involved in the planning process and as the civil rights 
movement picked up pace, they began to think through renewal‟s potential to address racial 
segregation and poor conditions in the schools; to modernize the neighborhood‟s housing stock 
and attract white residents; to provide jobs for black workers; and to construct physical spaces 
where racial integration might take place. For many, especially the older, more established, and 
more moderate liberals in the community, the fact that renewal also placed hardships on the 
community—especially on the poor, the transient, and the renters—was less important than the 
possibility it might help further integration and help the black community as a whole.  
Younger, more radical blacks, on the other hand, were developing a view of racial justice 
that was much more sensitive to class issues and community control over decisions that affected 
daily life in Roxbury. As they became more organized in the mid 1960s, they were aggressive in 
their attempts to use renewal to bring jobs to Roxbury, and their criticisms of renewal coalesced 
around the issue of residential displacement. As this chapter argues, urban renewal began as one 
of a number of solutions to problems of racial discrimination and isolation, part of a larger 
project to open up opportunities for black people and integrate Roxbury into the larger, wealthier 
metropolitan area; only as new community groups emerged and new critiques of racial relations 
developed in the 1960s did support for renewal falter and goals shift. By the early 1970s, the 
integrationist project had run its course and community self-determination was ascendant; the 
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BRA had grown wary of its critics and slowed its efforts in the area, and even renewal‟s greatest 
supporters had stopped seeing the modernization of the built environment as a viable or 
meaningful strategy in the struggle for racial equality.  
Both contemporary observers and historians writing about this urban renewal project tend 
to frame it in terms of class, emphasizing the divide between the established middle-class and 
blue-collar residents and activists who supported renewal and the very poor Southern migrants 
who were displaced by it as the primary dynamic of the project.
100
 Without directly contradicting 
this view, I want to caution against reducing the story of renewal in Roxbury to a story of social 
conflict within the black community. Both proponents and critics of renewal saw themselves, 
first and foremost, as activists in the larger civil rights and black power movements, and their 
ideas and actions are diminished without the context of the ongoing debate about racial 
integration and community power. Could the black community accomplish more by acting in 
concert with white liberals or by drawing on its own resources? Integrationists saw the black 
community as metropolitan in scope and upwardly mobile. They assumed hardship and a certain 
amount of geographic displacement would be part of racial progress, and they placed a premium 
on modernity and equal access to middle-class resources and racially integrated physical spaces, 
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where contact between blacks and whites would reduce the prejudices of whites. Younger and 
more radical activists challenged this vision with their own, which focused on the strengths of 
the existing local community and emphasized collective justice rather than individual 
opportunity. In Roxbury this debate played out, contentiously, over renewal and rehabilitation 
plans in the Washington Park Urban Renewal Area, particularly over the construction of new 
housing and new schools and the issue of black involvement in jobs created by the urban renewal 
program. Unlike desegregation efforts in the schools, which maintained community support into 
the 1970s, however, renewal plans and activities increasingly came under attack by community 
activists and were ultimately abandoned by the city and community alike.  
 
No Urban Villagers 
  
The Boston neighborhood of Roxbury is a few miles southwest of downtown, a streetcar 
suburb of two- and three-story wooden houses that was annexed to Boston shortly after the civil 
war. [figure 3.1] Lower Roxbury, closest to downtown, is flat and bustling; Middle and Upper 
Roxbury, the neighborhoods closer to Frederick Law Olmsted‟s outlying Franklin Park, are hilly 
and tree-lined, largely residential, tethered to downtown Boston first by the elevated railways 
and then by commercial corridors like Washington Street and Blue Hill Avenue. Once Yankee, 
then predominantly working-class and Irish, then predominantly Jewish with a small number of 
middle-class blacks, Roxbury was undergoing another dramatic demographic shift in the 1950s, 
becoming poorer, blacker, more isolated from the rest of the city, and more transient.
101
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Black Bostonians were profoundly unsettled by the change. With a long history of 
abolitionism, Boston enjoyed a reputation for liberalism. Bypassed by the Great Migration in 
favor of metropolitan centers like New York and Chicago, it had relatively few black residents, 
many of whom lived alongside whites in neighborhoods like the West End, the South End, and 
Middle and Upper Roxbury. As black migrants from the rural South began arriving in Roxbury 
in large numbers in the 1940s and 1950s, however, the neighborhood began to show signs of 
blight, abandonment, and increasing segregation. Young white Jewish and Catholic families 
began moving to the suburbs. The major Jewish institutions in the neighborhood moved out. City 
services deteriorated. In 1958 large parts of the neighborhood were redlined, meaning that 
homeowners and landlords were no longer eligible for loans, and fire insurance became 
exorbitantly expensive.  Residents began to complain about abandoned buildings, overcrowded 
apartments, trash and autos and snow left on sidewalks and roadways, and aging buildings that 
absentee owners no longer repaired. Long-time residents like Melnea Cass, who had moved from 
the South End to Upper Roxbury in 1930, noticed increasing tension between black and white 
residents.
102
  
Convinced that the stability of the neighborhood was threatened, Roxbury residents—
mostly long-time African American homeowners—began to organize. The murder of a local 
rabbi in 1949 sparked the creation of Freedom House, an interracial community center intended 
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to foster better race relations in the area. Headed by a husband and wife team of black social 
workers, Otto and Muriel Snowden, Freedom House also helped organize block groups in the 
neighborhood. Community groups like the Dale Area Improvement Association and the Warren 
Neighborhood Association sponsored clean-up campaigns, planted trees and flowers in the 
neighborhood, and protested the growing number of bars and package stores on Humboldt 
Avenue, one of Roxbury‟s main commercial streets.103 [figures 3.2, 3.3] But as more newcomers 
crowded into Lower and Middle Roxbury, and housing conditions deteriorated further, it became 
clear that self-help programs could not address problems that stemmed from municipal neglect, 
such as substandard schools and the accumulation of waste and snow, or from institutional 
discrimination, such as the prohibitive rates for fire insurance that came with redlining. “We had, 
by this time, recognized that clean-up programs, property improvement projects, petitions for 
street paving, and the like had little success potential without being related some kind of over-all 
planning,” Muriel Snowden later recalled.104 
“Over-all planning” was what urban renewal seemed to promise. With its emphasis on 
rehabilitation as well as redevelopment and its requirement of a “workable program” that 
mandated the consideration of individual renewal projects in the context of an overall plan, the 
1954 Act was meant to encourage longer-range planning and more systemic intervention in the 
urban housing market than the original, 1949 Act. When educational groups like the American 
Council to Improve Our Neighborhoods (ACTION) explained the legislation, they emphasized 
the need to break a long-term cycle of neglect rather than focusing on the acute problems of the 
                                                 
 
103
 On the block groups, see Muriel Snowden, “Planning with People: Finding the Formula,” 
typescript for Boston College Seminar, April 1963, p. 4. Vertical files, Loeb Library, Harvard 
University.  
 
104
 Muriel Snowden, “Citizen Participation,” Journal of Housing 8 (September 1963), p. 437.  
84 
 
“slums.” For Roxbury, a neighborhood in transition, urban renewal seemed to be a chance to 
redirect resources into their community and reverse its physical deterioration. Freedom House 
circulated pamphlets on renewal among its members and block leaders, and the Roxbury 
Community Council, an umbrella group for approximately three dozen Roxbury organizations 
including businesses, churches, and schools, was formed with the specific mandate to investigate 
the possibility of renewal.
105
 
From the beginning, it was clear that any “over-all planning” would have implications for 
Boston‟s black community. Pro-renewal literature like the pamphlets the Snowdens circulated 
tended to describe both the “blight” of poor housing conditions and the process of renewal itself 
as affecting whites and people of color in the same way. The black press, however, was well 
aware of the dual housing market operating in metropolitan areas and the ways in which urban 
intervention—particularly urban intervention that involved residential displacement—might 
adversely affect blacks. As early as 1948, the economist Robert C. Weaver had framed the 
redevelopment program then under consideration as both threat and promise. By the late 1950s, 
observers were increasingly pessimistic about its effects. Surveying projects under development 
in the late 1950s, Frank S. Horne, a housing administrator and Harlem Renaissance poet, wrote 
that “We are beginning to reap the whirlwind of the threat with little or nothing of the promise. 
The assembly and redevelopment of land has become the primary goal; what happens to „the 
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people‟—and especially the minorities—is an afterthought and, too often, an opportunity to 
reclaim desirable areas from them for developments which largely exclude them.”106 
And yet, many believed that inaction was dangerous, as well. To someone like Muriel 
Snowden, whose education at the New York School of Social Work in the 1940s included the 
classic works of Chicago School sociology, the emergence of the black ghetto signaled an 
alarming breakdown in the city‟s natural stages of growth. Chicago School sociologists like 
Robert Park and Ernest Burgess had theorized that newcomers to the city were absorbed and 
assimilated into urban life by relocating from overcrowded, low-status neighborhoods in the city 
center to progressively better housing in more high-status neighborhoods on the periphery. Yet 
discriminatory practices in the housing market that closed the suburbs to blacks trapped them in 
increasingly overcrowded, deteriorating urban neighborhoods. In Boston, the vast majority of 
Boston‟s African Americans lived in a “black crescent” stretching from the South End, the oldest 
and most established of the black neighborhoods, through Roxbury into North Dorchester. 
[figure 3.4]  Whites were rapidly leaving; in 1950, Roxbury had been 30 percent black and 70 
percent white, but by 1960 those percentages were reversed. Part of the Snowdens‟ urgency in 
addressing housing conditions in Roxbury was their conviction that these neighborhoods faced 
continued deterioration and increasing isolation from the rest of Boston, with no respite in sight. 
One of the pamphlets they circulated among their block groups was an explanation of the effect 
of race restrictive covenants by the economist and future Secretary of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development Robert Weaver.  Entitled “Hemmed In,” it explained that:  
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Deterioration of physical facilities is the most obvious result of residential 
segregation. Physical deterioration is caused by economic and not racial factors. It 
occurs whenever and with whomever overcrowding is prevalent. But 
overcrowding, regardless of its cause, bring a decline in neighborhood 
standards…As long as a group is relegated and confined to a physically 
undesirable area (as any overcrowded neighborhood inevitably becomes), its 
occupants are all lumped together in the mind of most people and then their 
perpetual and universal banishment to the ghetto is defended on the basis of the 
imputed „racial‟ characteristics.107        
 
Deteriorating conditions, in other words, were not just a nuisance for residents; they also helped 
stigmatize blacks and perpetuate a cycle of racial isolation, prejudice, and discrimination.  
Thus black residents saw poor conditions as dangerous residents in a way they were not 
perceived in the white ethnic neighborhoods of Boston, and a sense of geographical constriction, 
of being trapped in a deteriorating neighborhood, was felt keenly throughout Roxbury, by long-
time working-class residents as well as the home-owning middle class. Between the spring of 
1958 and the spring of 1959, at the height of the suburban boom, Morton Rubin, a sociologist at 
Northeastern University, surveyed attitudes toward residential mobility among black and white 
residents in several Boston neighborhoods undergoing rapid demographic change from black to 
white. He found not only did white residents want to move—something which might be 
expected, given the loss of status that white residents experienced during racial transition—but 
68 percent of black residents were unhappy in their present neighborhood. Among them, middle-
class residents and young families favored a move to the suburbs, while working-class residents 
wished to move to other Boston neighborhoods. Only the poor, the most recent arrivals, the 
elderly, and long-time residents—those with the few resources—expressed preferences for no 
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move or a move within their current neighborhood. In Boston, the stigma of the racially mixed 
neighborhood was felt by both black and white residents.
108
 
Roxbury had been targeted for slum clearance efforts as early as 1949, but as the city 
struggled with the West End project throughout the mid and late 1950s, it had little interest in 
pushing forward with the project. Neither Freedom House nor the Roxbury Community Council, 
the two strongest local proponents of renewal efforts, managed to catch the city‟s attention until 
the election of Roxbury native Mayor John F. Collins in November 1959. During his first year in 
office, Collins announced an ambitious $90 million city-wide urban renewal program, linking his 
own career to the progress of renewal in Boston, and hired New Haven‟s respected 
redevelopment administrator, Ed Logue. The Boston Redevelopment Authority granted the 
Snowdens and Melnea Cass of the NAACP a “long-sought” meeting in March 1960, and Logue 
and the Snowdens quickly formed an alliance as Washington Park became a high-priority project 
for the Authority.
109
 Although previously the BRA had worked with both the Roxbury 
Community Council and Freedom House, the Snowdens argued that they were more effective 
organizers and better prepared to deal with the renewal bureaucracy than the large and unwieldy 
Council. In April 1961 the Snowdens signed a contract with the BRA to be the sole organization 
with responsibility for organizing the community to participate in urban renewal. 
The planning process lasted throughout 1961 and 1962 and was, for the most part, 
amicable and productive. Under pressure to get a successful rehabilitation project underway after 
the failure of the West End, the BRA pushed the project forward with a concerted effort to 
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establish good working relations with the community. As Washington Park project planner 
Lloyd Sinclair commented, the lengthy West End project was a “sad, discouraging, bitter 
experience which the BRA doesn‟t want to repeat here.”110 First they assembled a small steering 
committee of approximately two dozen members—ministers from the local churches, principals, 
delegates from local organizations like the YMCA and eventually also from some of the 
neighborhood block organizations—to help establish community priorities for renewal. Then 
Freedom House organized a larger, broader-based organization comprised of project-area 
residents known as the Citizens Urban Renewal Action Committee, or CURAC, to provide 
feedback on the developing plan. [figure 3.5] Enthusiasm for renewal remained high; working 
meetings were frequent and well-attended, and the BRA‟s major public hearings were typically 
attended by 1000 to 2000 residents whose support for the project was vocal and strong. The BRA 
wasn‟t alone in its desire to see the project realized; the politicians and planners were joined by 
the more active community members, mostly long-term tenants and homeowners with their life 
savings tied up in a neighborhood where house values were sinking, who agreed that something 
must be done about the area quickly. 
The differences between the city‟s vision and the neighborhood‟s, however, were 
significant. The BRA envisioned a renewed Roxbury first and foremost as a strengthened 
neighborhood. Their plans depicted the complete neighborhood unit, including all of the 
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elements of a self-contained community: new housing, new parks, new schools, a rehabilitation 
program for homeowners, a new shopping center, a courthouse, a library, and several new 
buildings for the neighborhood‟s institutions. It envisioned Roxbury, in the planners‟ words, as 
“a New England neighborhood in the middle of a great city.”111 The steering committee and 
CURAC members, on the other hand, brought a variety of concerns to the table, many of which 
challenged the very notion of a self-contained community and had little to do with physical 
planning. In early planning meetings, BRA planners distributed mimeographs of blank maps of 
the urban renewal area—maps with only streets and parks indicated—and asked members of the 
Steering Committee to show them where they would like new community facilities. [figure 3.6] 
They refused, explaining that physical planning was best left to the professionals. But they were 
outspoken in other matters: they wanted more police protection, better municipal services, 
additional schools and playgrounds, the elimination of store front churches and package stores, 
and increased open space.
112
 They were concerned about the possibility of increased valuations 
and taxation after rehabilitation and wanted reduced fire insurance rates, low-interest loans, and 
low-cost rental housing constructed in other parts of the city. Homeowners were afraid they 
would not receive fair compensation for their homes during the acquisition process. A 
participant-observer at many of the community meetings during the planning process, the 
sociologist Rubin believed that “Renewal [was] supported as an act of desperation.”113 
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Many of their requests to remove signs of blight and deterioration betray the bias of the 
so-called “respectable” middle- and working-class residents who were most deeply involved in 
the planning process; the areas of Roxbury where the new Southern migrants were settling were 
the areas that were most often targeted for demolition, as were signs of their presence in the 
neighborhood: the most dilapidated housing, the storefront churches, the package stores, and 
disreputable places of entertainment like the old Rivoli Theater. Over and over, however, they 
also expressed broader concerns about the effects of renewal on the racial geography of the city. 
When the BRA distributed physical planning standards to the Steering Committee in 1961, for 
example, members noticed immediately that the standards recommended the construction of one 
elementary school in a quiet, residential area and one junior high school on a major street. The 
group agreed that “a new school is not necessarily a good school unless there is an opportunity to 
gain knowledge with all groups of children” and an education subcommittee sprang up to protest 
the potential sites, which were located in the center of the renewal area and thus more likely to 
be racially segregated than sites at the project‟s edge.114 Cass‟ NAACP continued to press for 
“over-all planning for city-wide housing production and rehousing…that will accommodate the 
development of economic and racial balance throughout the city.”115 Many community members 
categorically refused to entertain the possibility of new public housing in the area, arguing 
against a concentration of the needy in black neighborhoods. The steering committee also 
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rejected a proposed home for unmarried women and children out of hand as a “symbol of 
inadequacy,” questioning the very assumption that these types of services were especially 
necessary in Roxbury. As Freedom House reported in 1962, as the plan moved from the steering 
committee to the broader-based CURAC, “There is….the constant question of the entire 
WPURA [Washington Park Urban Renewal Area] program in terms of the perpetuation of 
segregated housing pattern…” Participants at planning meetings repeated expressed concerns 
that “there will be no effort to help displaced Negroes to relocate outside the WPURA.”116 Fear 
of isolation ran high. There were very few objections to the plan, even from residents living in 
buildings slated for demolition or major rehabilitation. Indeed, participants supported even 
greater demolition than the BRA planners felt was politically feasible in the wake of the failure 
of the West End, repeating their concerns that limited clearance ran the risk of creating a “gilded 
ghetto,” improving existing community conditions without altering larger patterns of residential 
segregation. Logue found their support of extensive clearance “irresponsible and foolish,” but 
ultimately, in its effort to “plan with people,” the BRA accepted many of the recommendations 
these committees and eliminated contentious items from the plan, including both public housing 
and the home for unmarried women.
117
 In July 1961, the urban renewal area was expanded from 
a 186-acre project in the dilapidated Middle Roxbury to a 472-acre project that also included 
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much of the better maintained Upper Roxbury in an effort both to expand the project‟s reach and 
keep the overall percentage of demolition politically palatable.
118
 [figure 3.7] 
By late 1962, the final plan was complete. [figures 3.8, 3.9] It prescribed 35 percent 
demolition in the area, a higher percentage than the BRA had initially proposed and a 
significantly higher percentage than was planned for the city‟s other two residential rehabilitation 
projects in Charlestown and the South End. Some 6,500 houses were to be rehabilitated. New 
development included 1,500 units of new moderate-income housing; three new elementary 
schools; a civic center including library, court house, and police station; two hundred units of 
public housing for elderly, the only public housing included in the project; and new community 
facilities and shopping, especially in Dudley Square and along Warren and Humboldt Streets. 
[figure 3.10] As at Dixwell, the urban renewal plan prescribed the consolidation of many small 
businesses into a limited number of local shopping centers and the radical reorientation of 
shopping, housing, and public facilities toward plazas, parking lots, and courtyards isolated from 
the street. Even the residential rehabilitation represented thorough-going change; illustrations of 
a “typical rehabilitated dwelling” showed a Boston triple-decker stripped of all architectural 
ornament, with modern, enlarged windows and an airy new staircase instead of the traditional 
front porches. [figure 3.11] 
The support Roxbury residents showed for renewal, modernization, and change 
throughout the planning process contrasts strongly with the protests of the residents of the old 
West End, especially in light of the academic literature on the West End that began to appear in 
the early 1960s. The planner and sociologist Herbert Gans, who had lived in the West End just 
prior to demolition, argued in The Urban Villagers that the neighborhood had little of the social 
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disorganization the planners attributed to it and instead housed a vibrant, functioning working-
class community. In “Grieving for a Lost Home,” the psychiatrist Marc Fried demonstrated that 
residents had deep, meaningful ties to their neighborhood and that relocation could constitute a 
crisis so profound that residents might experience feelings of grief over the loss of home and 
neighborhood. The planner Chester Hartman followed up on the city‟s promises to relocate West 
End families into decent, affordable housing and discovered that a significant number of 
displaced families and individuals faired poorly in the process. Reacting against the wholesale 
destruction of the West End, these researchers began to theorize about the importance of low-
rent housing and stable, long-term community ties, even in neighborhoods that did not conform 
to middle-class norms. When the sociologist Morton Rubin returned to Roxbury as renewal 
began in the summer of 1963, however, his surveys revealed a two-to-one feeling of optimism 
about what renewal would bring to the neighborhood, accompanied by some reservations about 
the way relocation would be handled and about rising costs.
119
 “Renewal is causing a small 
dispersal of owners, dislocated but compensated at fair appraisal prices,” Rubin wrote. “Such 
persons felt that renewal is an opportunity for them to leave an undesirable situation. There is no 
bereavement for a lost home…stable blue-collar workers among these Negroes appreciate the 
need for adequate educational, recreational and safety facilities in a rehabilitated neighborhood. 
They are not urban villagers. Their eye is on a future with civil rights rather than on the past.”120 
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Building the New World: Jobs, Education, Housing 
The processes of relocation, demolition, and construction in the Washington Park Urban 
Renewal Area began at a moment of transition in Boston‟s black community. Throughout the 
early 1960s, advocates of renewal had strategically used the planning process and the series of 
public hearings that accompanied it as an opportunity to organize the community around the idea 
of neighborhood renewal. Freedom House held information sessions, block leaders knocked on 
doors in the neighborhood, and pastors delivered sermons on the importance of renewal, all of 
them emphasizing new housing opportunities, better schools, improved city government 
services, and the potential for renewal to help dismantle the ghetto walls and improve living 
conditions for blacks in Roxbury and beyond. Those promises might have rung hollow, however, 
if these had not also been the years these were also years in which black activists in Boston—
some of them the same people who had been involved in the planning process in Roxbury—
began to mobilize around the civil rights issues of education, housing, and employment, taking 
inspiration from the burgeoning national civil rights movement. In 1962, a group of activists 
formed the Boston Action Group (BAG), headquartered at St Mark‟s Social Center in Roxbury, 
to apply pressure to companies that refused to hire black workers or hired only a few token 
workers in low-paying positions. Wonder Bread was targeted with the first boycott, and within a 
month more black workers were hired.
121
 Shortly afterward, the local chapter of the Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE) targeted the First National Bank of Boston, which, after pickets 
appeared at their offices downtown and in Kenmore and Dudley Square, also hired more black 
workers. As various parts of the renewal plan moved into execution, local leaders began to apply 
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pressure on the BRA to make similar changes. Rev. Breeden, also a member of the Citizens 
Committee for Equal Opportunity, met with Logue in December 1963 to negotiate “racially 
inclusive employment at all stages of the renewal process” and criteria for the selection of 
developers and tenants for the proposed shopping center.
122
 
Even more than jobs, education was a powerful, galvanizing issue in Roxbury. In the 
early 1960s, Freedom House, which for several years had sponsored decorous coffee hours on 
topics of interest to women in the area, suddenly found its sessions on education and de facto 
segregation in the schools filled with opinionated and impassioned attendees. Its program 
gradually shifted focus from housekeeping and neighborhood issues to school desegregation and 
then to other civil rights issues. In 1961, the Snowdens invited local ministers Cornelius Hastie 
and James Breeden to speak about their participation in a Freedom Ride in the South. In 1962, 
Kenneth Clark spoke about the effect of school segregation in the North, and Boston University 
student Margaret Trotter Dammond recounted her experiences in a voter registration drive in 
Albany, Georgia, working with the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). They 
were followed by Morris Milgram, a developer of interracial housing in 1964 and Bayard Rustin 
in 1965. 
Speakers on schools were by far the most popular, and education remained at the heart of 
the civil rights debate in Boston. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Roxbury‟s existing facilities 
were overcrowded and physically deteriorated. One, the dilapidated, ninety-year-old Howe 
School on Dale Street, had been declared hazardous to the health of its students. Textbooks were 
outdated and teachers transient and unable to control disruptive behavior in the classroom. 
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Student achievement lagged far behind other city schools. Parents found the city‟s attempts to 
reform Roxbury‟s schools with “compensatory programs” meant to enrich the curriculum of 
underprivileged students to be both inadequate and insulting. Complaining that the 
predominantly white teaching staff underestimated and failed to challenge black children, dozens 
of parents like the Snowdens, whose daughter was enrolled at the Ellis school, and Erna 
Ballentine Bryant, whose son was at the Garrison school, campaigned successfully to have racist 
or incompetent teachers dismissed.
123
 
Increasingly, however, Roxbury parents saw the obviously unequal distribution of 
resources among the Boston city schools as their key issue, and the Boston School Committee, 
the administrative and political body in charge of the city schools, as their primary target. To 
these activists, it seemed obvious that de facto segregation was operating in Boston‟s school 
system and that the education their children was receiving was inferior to that offered to white 
children in the city. As Roxbury activist Ruth Batson recalled: 
When we would go to white schools, we‟d see these lovely classrooms, with a 
small number of children in each class…When we‟d go to our schools, we would 
see overcrowded classrooms, children sitting out in the corridors, and so forth. 
And so then we decided that where there was a large number of white students, 
that‟s where the care went. That‟s where the books went. That‟s where the 
money went.
124
 
 
Thus in 1963, members of Washington Park‟s education subcommittee, including Elizabeth 
Price, Barbara Elam, and Paul Parks, joined Ruth Batson, the head of the NAACP‟s education 
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committee, in a campaign to desegregate the Boston public schools.  In a public meeting in June, 
Batson challenged the Boston School Committee to recognize racial inequities in Boston 
schools, particularly the overcrowded and dilapidated schools in Roxbury, and called for an 
investigation. The School Committee‟s refusal to admit even the possibility of de facto 
segregation ran against both informal observation of the student population and the results of 
independent studies, which suggested extreme segregation in the city‟s schools caused not just 
by residential patterns but by institutional practices that placed blacks and whites in different 
schools.
125
 The School Committee‟s refusal enraged activists, who organized series of 
increasingly popular marches and boycotts in order to draw attention to the issue. (As Batson 
later recalled, that was the year that “all hell broke loose in Boston.”126) They demonstrated at 
School Committee meetings, organized a “March on Roxbury” modeled on the national March 
on Washington, and called for city-wide student “stay-outs” in June of 1963 and then again in 
February of 1964. On both occasions, as the School Committee reminded students that it was 
against the law to play truant, thousands of students opted instead to attend community-
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organized “Freedom Schools,” where volunteers taught African American history and non-
violent resistance. Activists pushed on from the local level to the state, asking the legislature to 
address inequalities in the city‟s schools. In 1964, the Kiernan Advisory Commission found that 
segregation did, in fact, exist in 78% of Boston‟s schools, and the 1965 Racial Imbalance Act 
empowered the state board of education to deny funding to any school district that did not have a 
credible plan to “balance” its schools.127 The Boston School Committee still refused to admit any 
pattern of racial segregation and didn‟t seem likely to do so any time soon; in fact, Batson‟s chief 
antagonist, School Committee member Louise Day Hicks was re-elected in November 1965.  
In the face of the School Committee‟s intransigence, local leaders began the process of 
integration on their own. On the eve of the new school year in 1965, Ellen Jackson launched 
Operation Exodus, a voluntary, privately funded busing program that took advantage of a 1961 
law that permitted parents to enroll their children in any school with empty seats throughout the 
city of Boston. In 1966, after a School Committee election that endorsed the status quo, a similar 
program, the Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity or METCO, was organized to 
transport Roxbury children to schools in Boston‟s suburbs. The number of students leaving 
Roxbury on weekday mornings swelled through the 1960s from approximately 200 with 
Operation Exodus‟ first campaign in September 1965 to several thousand in the early 1970s.128  
The ideal of an integrated society that drove this activism was not simple. Activists like 
Batson had had been deeply influenced by Supreme Court‟s rejection of the separate-but-equal 
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principle in Brown v. Board of Education; to them, it was essential that housing, schools, and 
public spaces be racially integrated, if they embraced the strategy for pragmatic reasons: 
 “…there were black people and a lot of our friends who said, „Ruth, why don‟t 
we get them to fix up the schools and make them better in our district?‟ And of 
course, that repelled us because we came through the separate but equal theory. 
This was not something that we believed in. Even now, when I talk to a lot of 
people, they say we were wrong in pushing for desegregation. But there was a 
very practical reason to do it in those days. We knew that there was more money 
being spent in certain schools, white schools—not all of them, but in certain white 
schools—than there was being spent in black schools. So therefore, our theory 
was move our kids into those schools where they‟re putting all of the resources so 
that they can get a better education.”129 
 
Others, like the Snowdens, had been influenced by the work of psychologist Kenneth Clark, who 
demonstrated the impact of segregation on black children‟s self-image, and by postwar research 
into the nature of racial prejudice, including social psychologist Gordon Allport‟s “contact 
hypothesis” that interracial cooperation between social equals working toward a common goal 
was a powerful way of reducing prejudice. Indeed, much of their work at Freedom House, from 
their advocacy of urban renewal to their youth programming, involved bringing blacks and 
whites together in common cause. In 1963, Freedom House helped organize “home-visits” of 
whites to black households as part of a national campaign to foster better interracial 
understanding. With the home visits, “Negroes and whites have the opportunity to sit down 
together in each other‟s homes on what Dr. Gordon Allport calls an „equal status contact‟ basis 
to talk frankly and informally,” Muriel Snowden wrote, describing the event. In 1964, Freedom 
House launched the Work and Study program, which brought black and white high school and 
college students to Roxbury to help paint the exteriors of houses whose owners were too old or 
                                                 
 
129
 Batson is quoted in Polly Welts Kaufman, “Building a Constituency for School 
Desegregation: African-American Women in Boston, 1962-1972.” Teachers College Record 
92:4 (Summer 1991), pp. 619-631. On Batson, see Robert W. Peebles, School Desegregation: A 
Shattered Dream? (New York: Vantage Press, 2007), 56-58.  
100 
 
infirm to do the work themselves. It was a way of engaging young people in a shared project of 
neighborhood improvement that also indirectly drew on Allport‟s contact hypothesis.130  Even 
when it was not prompted by a common task, interracial exchange remained a hallmark of their 
leadership into the mid 1960s. 
 In a very direct sense, the events of the mid-1960s shaped the direction of the 
Washington Park urban renewal project, as happened when the Racial Imbalance Act halted 
progress on the first of the neighborhood‟s new elementary schools on Humboldt Avenue. This 
vision of a new, integrated world—summed up by the March on Washington‟s slogan, “To build 
an integrated society”—and the social activism of the mid 1960s also affected renewal in 
Roxbury in less direct and more unexpected ways. In 1962, a team of Brandeis University 
researchers headed by Louis Watts had interviewed middle-class blacks in Roxbury about their 
plans to move out of the neighborhood. Initially, they assumed that most would want to leave 
Roxbury for the suburbs. “Integration is in the air, and the longed-for appears at last to have 
become the possible,” they wrote. “To our minds, everything pointed to an exodus from the 
ghetto into the till-now white parts of Boston.”131 And yet they found that fewer than half of the 
250 families they interviewed had entertained the thought of moving. Ten months later, only 33 
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families had moved, only nine of whom had moved out of the Roxbury or North Dorchester 
ghetto to less segregated neighborhoods. Surprised by these results, they visited the families 
again six months after that, but the results were the same. The frustrated geographic mobility that 
Morton Rubin had sensed in the late 1950 had been replaced by optimism about the future of 
Roxbury. By large margins, these families believed that urban renewal would improve housing 
conditions in the area and make it easier to borrow for rehabilitation and repairs. They also 
thought that urban renewal would promote racial integration in housing and schools, as well as 
recreational facilities. At least among the middle class, fears of racial containment had been 
allayed by hopes for a more racially balanced neighborhood where they lived.
132
 As the Rev. 
George Thomas, the 31-year-old pastor at St. Mark‟s Congregational Church said, “There‟s a 
great physical need here—employment, housing, job opportunities, schooling, security, and it 
calls for social action.”133 “This is the place to be,” Cornelius Hastie, the 32-year-old vicar of St. 
James‟ Church, told Time magazine in the spring of 1963. “If we can‟t administer to the needs of 
the impoverished people in the Inner City, then we have nothing to say to anybody.”134  
Concerns about relocation persisted into the early 1960s, since demolition of dilapidated 
housing and rehabilitation of overcrowded and aging units would displace several hundred 
families. If residents hadn‟t been able to find decent housing before renewal, how could the BRA 
expect to rehouse displaced families after renewal tightened the housing supply? New public 
housing was a potential relocation resource—many displaced families qualified—but neither the 
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BRA nor the Roxbury community members involved in the planning process favored additional 
public housing. Instead, the BRA endorsed the construction of moderate-income housing 
constructed under Part 221(d)(3) of the 1961 Housing Act, just as the NHRA had in New Haven. 
The 221(d)(3) approach had a number of advantages: it was neither public housing, which often 
faced public opposition, nor market-rate housing, which would be out of reach for the vast 
majority of displaced families and, like the West End‟s luxury high-rises, symbolize the 
displacement of poor and working-class families from the neighborhood. Instead, 221(d)(3) was 
aimed at “moderate income” working class and lower middle class families, including families of 
three or four with annual incomes up to approximately $7,700. The “moderate-income” category 
was conceived as a way of addressing the housing needs of families who earned too much to 
qualify for public housing but who were not able to afford market-rate housing, although in 
Roxbury‟s black community, which earned less than the national average, it included much of 
the middle class. Moreover, experts agreed that new housing, and particularly the moderate-
income housing created under 221(d)(3), stood the greatest chance of establishing a new, 
integrated pattern of living.
135
  
 Two strategies for constructing moderate income housing emerged in the Washington 
Park urban renewal area in the early 1960s, one defined by technology and quick, efficient 
construction, the other defined by community participation. Logue, sensitive to complaints about 
displacement, had already identified the construction of new housing in the area as a high 
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priority and shortly after his arrival in Boston had engaged the architect Carl Koch to develop a 
prototype for industrialized multifamily housing. The departure of a local private school to the 
suburbs gave the BRA the opportunity to acquire the 15-acre site along Washington Street and 
push forward with “relocation housing”—that is, new, moderate-income housing where 
displaced families would have first priority—on the former school grounds, creating new 
housing at the southeastern edge of the urban renewal area without any residential 
displacement.
136
 Koch, a 1937 graduate of Harvard‟s Graduate School of Design and a leading 
advocate of prefabricated housing, recalled Logue and the BRA placing enormous pressure on 
him to get the housing completed quickly: “We were told these people have been given promises 
for 100 years, and that we should get the job done overnight if possible,” he said.137 He worked 
through multiple options for the site, including a mixture of high-rise and low-rise housing units 
grouped around courtyards similar to that favored by Jose Luis Sert at Harvard‟s Married Student 
Housing in Cambridge during the same years, as well as a scheme that retained the original 
academic building. Ultimately, however, he decided upon a more loosely grouped, low-rise high-
density scheme on a different part of the site. [figures 3.12, 3.13] The 202-unit Academy Homes 
opened in 1964, an excellent example of systems built housing, constructed with standardized 
and interchangeable components, including precast wall panels and long-span, pre-stressed floor 
planks; in fact, the complex‟s “Techcrete” building system was awarded a Progressive 
Architecture citation in 1965. [figures 3.14, 3.15] Advertised as offering “Garden Living in the 
Heart of the City,” the four-story apartment complex climbed the hilly site with eleven different 
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apartment plans and modern amenities like sliding glass doors and ample parking.
138
 The public 
spaces of the site were green and leafy—mature trees had been preserved—and the units were 
grouped around courtyards, several of which had play equipment for families with children. 
[figure 3.16] Housing and Home Finance Administrator Robert Weaver was present at the 
groundbreaking in May 1963, where a street was named in his honor. In his address, Weaver 
called Roxbury a place where you could find a “decent home” regardless of race and described 
urban renewal as a symbol of racial progress.
139
  
The second strategy involved engaging local organizations directly in the construction 
process by involving them as housing sponsors. Two of the neighborhood‟s largest black 
churches, St. Mark‟s Congregational Church and the Charles Street A.M.E., both staunch 
advocates for renewal during the planning process, each sponsored a housing development: St. 
Mark‟s Marksdale Gardens Homes, with 82 units, and Charles Street A.M.E.‟s Charlame Park 
Homes, with 92. Both were designed in 1963 and completed and occupied in 1964. In a nod to 
the neighborhood‟s tradition of one-, two-, and three-family houses and black homeownership, 
                                                 
 
138
 “Academy Homes: Garden Living in the Heart of the City,” brochure in the BRA collection, 
Boston Public Library. On Academy Homes, which was sponsored by Building Services 
Employees Union, Local 254, and developed by the Development Corporation of America, see 
also: “Boston Union Sponsors Housing,” Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1963; Anthony J. 
Yudis, “Setbacks Plaguing Roxbury Renewal Project,” Boston Globe, September 29, 1963; 
Abraham Oseroff, “Labor Union Housing Project to Wipe Out Slum Area,” Christian Science 
Monitor, November 15, 1963; Yudis, “Academy Homes Fought Many Obstacles,” Boston Globe, 
March 28, 1965; John Allen Long, “Experiment in Modest Apartment Rentals,” Christian 
Science Monitor, June 14, 1965; Joseph Eldridge, “Low-Cost Roxbury Romance,” Boston Globe, 
December 26, 1965; John Zeisel, “It Takes More Than Technology;” Samuel Paul, Apartments, 
pp. 148-149.  
 This project represented Koch‟s second foray into 221(d)(3) housing; he had previously 
designed Liberty Square in New Haven, CT, one of the first 221(d)(3) projects completed in the 
US.  
 
139
 Muriel Snowden, “Planning with People,” 439. 
 
105 
 
the churches sponsored row housing, rather than apartments. Charlame Homes, designed by the 
Boston firm Bedar and Alpers, consisted of a series of two-story, flat-roofed, brick-faced blocks 
arranged in parallel rows in a manner reminiscent of public housing projects from the 1930s and 
1940s.
140
 [figures 3.17, 3.18, 3.19] Marksdale Gardens, designed by the black-owned and 
operated Associated Architect and Engineer, consisted of a series of staggered, two-story row 
houses arranged around a series of open spaces, including a parking lot and three small 
courtyards.
141
 [figure 3.20, 3.21, 3.22]  
In a neighborhood that had not seen any new housing construction in more than three 
decades, Marksdale struck a particularly effective compromise between new and old. [figure 
3.23] With its pitched roofs, cedar shingle siding, and use of brick facing, it spoke the 
architectural language of the neighborhood while remaining obviously modern in site planning, 
particularly in its orientation away from the street, and in details like its cantilevered overhangs 
and its horizontally oriented windows. In comparison with the larger scale of earlier public 
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housing projects and high-rise housing constructed in redevelopment areas like the West End, 
Marksdale fit in. “Rather than dominating the area,” as one critic wrote, Marksdale “is a small 
group which easily integrates into the neighborhood.” Like the surrounding houses, all units had 
their own entrances and fenced-in gardens, but they also had modern features like glass doors, 
electric kitchens, and open planning. The Boston Globe called it a “successful” example of 
subsidized housing, pointedly comparing a photograph of Marksdale with a photograph of 
Columbia Point, a high-rise public housing project built in South Boston in the mid 1950s. 
[figure 3.24] The Globe architectural critic Franziska P. Hosken found it “pleasant” and 
“attractive;” the New York Times critic Ada Louise Huxtable was even more effusive, calling it 
“reminiscent of Tapiola [the internationally renowned postwar garden city] in Finland” and 
remarking that the project “could set architectural standards for this country.”142 
But some of the most important characteristics of these new housing developments were 
social rather than physical. All three developments would be open to residents of all races; 
Executive Order 11063, issued in November 1962, had banned racial discrimination in new, 
federally supported housing. But even more than nominal integration, Roxbury residents hoped 
for new spaces where blacks and whites would live as equals. Their vision is evident throughout 
the promotional material for the new housing developments: presentation drawings such as those 
done for Marksdale Gardens by Associated Architect and Engineer—itself a black-owned firm—
depicted black and white children playing together [figure 3.25], while early photographs, such 
as the photo of Charlame that appeared in an Ebony article on 221(d)(3) housing, showed 
interracial families enjoying the modern spaces of the new housing projects. [figure 3.26]  
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It was not clear, when these housing developments opened, whether young white families 
would want to live in a neighborhood that seemed to be increasingly poor and increasingly black. 
“Unless we have some white families living here, with their children going to school with our 
children we will never achieve integrated schools and so will defeat our purpose,” St. Mark‟s 
Reverend George Thomas, one of the driving forces behind the church‟s sponsorship of 
Marksdale Gardens, had declared during the planning process.
143
 By April 1964, Marksdale had 
accepted five white families and had several more applications pending; by 1966, the white 
population seems to have reached an average of approximately one family in eight across the 
new subsidized developments.
144
 Roxbury residents began to speak of “reverse integration,” the 
movement of white families into a black neighborhood with housing and amenities so modern 
and desirable that they could attract white residents with wider housing choices than blacks. In a 
report on the area written in 1966, the BRA predicted that “the old lines of segregated 
neighborhood patterns [would] crumble as relocation and new construction provide greater and 
freer housing choices.”145 St. Mark‟s Reverend Thomas had expressed similar sentiments in a 
sermon on the Sunday of the March on Washington in August 1963: “A whole new world is 
being built around us. The realization that things are in a flux has always been in the minds of 
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men. But what is novel right now is that the whole of human consciousness and the very physical 
shape of the world [are] being altered all over the world to be free.”146 
Indeed, the physical shape of Roxbury was transformed in the mid 1960s, as the first 
elements of the Washington Park plan were implemented. Both Charles Street A.M.E. and St. 
Mark‟s sponsored extensions adjacent to their original developments which opened in 1965, 
transforming the formerly mixed commercial corridor along Humboldt Avenue into a quiet 
residential area. Academy Homes II was constructed along Washington Street. At the eastern 
edge of the urban renewal area, where the most extensive demolition was taking place, a 
massive, concrete YMCA designed by The Architects Collaborative opened in March 1965. 
(Architectural Record described it as a “catalyst” for change in the neighborhood, and a “bold” 
and “strong” presence “in the kind of place where impermanence is common.”147) [figure 3.27] 
Playgrounds opened up along St. James Street and Walnut Avenue. [figures 3.28, 3.29] Carl 
Koch was hired by the Development Corporation of American, the contractor and developer for 
Marksdale Gardens and Academy Homes, to construct another Techcrete housing project, the 
70-unit Westminster Terrace, along Walnut Avenue on a former estate.
148
 [figure 3.30] A seven-
acre, enclosed shopping mall near Marksdale and Charlame, the Washington Park Shopping 
Mall, opened in September 1966. [figure 3.31] “A few years ago all there was here was a 
warehouse and old wooden houses that were all falling down and a vacant lot they made a 
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dump,” one resident commented during the ribbon-cutting ceremony. “Seeing it like this 
now…makes you feel new.”149 
 
A Matter of Voice 
Toward the end of 1965, Paul Parks, the engineering half of Associated Architect and 
Engineer, took a journalist on a tour of Roxbury. They drove through leafy suburban streets near 
Franklin Park, past crumbling apartments in Lower Roxbury and North Dorchester, and, finally, 
past the new housing in Middle Roxbury. Narrating the story of the neighborhood, Parks tried to 
explain the distress they saw in its most deteriorated parts. “Negroes are criticized for running 
property down, but the truth is, by the time we‟re allowed to move in…the landlord cancels the 
janitorial service. The streets aren‟t cleaned. The apartments are no longer repaired,” he said. 
“People here have never been exposed to other ways of life, to other habits….The image of the 
Negro has been one of poverty and despondency. There has been no positive identity.” Later, 
when they see bright curtains, chrysanthemums, and newly seeded lawns in the new housing 
projects at the center of the urban renewal area, he speculated on the divide between the urban 
renewal area and the streets around it. “Urban renewal has made us into a community,” he said. 
“We‟ve had meetings, we know one another, we plan, we‟re working for a better life. Sometimes 
I think Roxbury is going to be a jewel in a sea of nothingness, and the people around us, the 
poorer Negroes and whites, are going to explode on us.”150  
That tension, between those who benefitted from renewal and those who did not, had 
never been far beneath the surface in Roxbury, but renewal in Roxbury had begun at a moment 
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of optimism and was sustained initially by strong community support. By the mid 1960s, the 
black community was beginning to question the good faith of white liberals like Logue and the 
leadership of moderate, pro-integration middle-class blacks like the Snowdens, who were having 
had a hard time retaining the right to speak for an increasingly low-income and politically 
radicalized neighborhood. The turning point came with a public debate on relocation and public 
housing.  
Already in 1964, it seemed as if relocation process then underway was not proceeding as 
smoothly as the BRA claimed. Improbably, the BRA asserted that it had found affordable, decent 
housing for some 97 percent of Washington Park relocates. In 1965, however, the League of 
Women Voters issued a report that was highly critical of both the BRA‟s relocation practices and 
its relocation statistics.
151
 Rumors circulated that a follow-up survey of relocated families 
conducted by the BRA itself had revealed many families in substandard housing but had been 
suppressed. Civil rights groups like CORE and the New Urban League began attending meetings 
sponsored by Freedom House and the BRA, arguing that the BRA was having difficulty 
relocating low-income families from the neighborhood and often failed to find them standard 
housing.
152
   
Then in 1965, the issue of public housing arose again. Residents on both the steering 
committee and CURAC had rejected the possibility of new public housing in the Washington 
Park urban renewal area several times during the planning process. At a community meeting at 
Freedom House in October 1965, BRA staff broached the topic again, and in April 1966, they 
proposed a thirty-unit, low-rise project for large families—one of the types of families the BRA 
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had the most difficulty relocating—and put the project up for a vote. In a tense meeting, the 
project was rejected, 45 to 29, although purportedly 200 people were present. 
The vote against a small housing project looked profoundly unsympathetic toward 
displaced families seeking low-cost housing in the neighborhood. “Are the relative few people 
who met at Freedom House the true spokesmen for the thousands of people in Roxbury? Who 
really speaks for the colored masses?” Harold Vaughan wrote in the Bay State Banner in June 
1966, objecting to the decision.
153
 During community meetings during 1965 and 1966, the 
consensus supporting the BRA‟s plans for the neighborhood began to erode. The first organized 
opposition to the renewal project came in 1966, when a group of displaced tenants threatened 
with a second relocation began to protest the social costs of the plan.
154
 The Boston Housing 
Authority hadn‟t constructed a single family-sized unit in twelve years, the Massachusetts 
Committee on Discrimination in Housing wrote. “The Redevelopment Authority administers a 
program that by itself does now have sufficient tools to produce low-rent housing. Yet it has 
been willing to acknowledge this and it has not brought the varied tools of the public housing 
program—the only program that can meet these families‟ needs—into renewal areas as a 
prerequisite to displacing thousands of families.”155 
Concerns for the fate of displaced families reflected not only a growing awareness of the 
failings of the BRA but also a new and more radical perspective on issues of racial justice. Many 
of the early supporters of urban renewal were racial liberals who were concerned with issues of 
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individual prejudice and individual opportunity made possible through desegregation. By 
contrast, the emerging generation of community leaders were increasingly concerned with issues 
of class and what Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, the authors of the 1966 tract Black 
Power, termed “institutional racism.”156 “To the Freedom House crowd, the project became one 
of making Washington Park safe for the middle class,” commented Reverend Ed Blackman of 
Roxbury‟s Eliot Congregational Church  in 1966. “They organized the community…against 
itself.”157 Such a direct challenge to renewal heralded significant changes to come.  
Indeed, the final years of the Washington Park urban renewal project were marked by a 
retreat from the integrationist project and repeated attempts to bring the power and resources that 
accompanied renewal—federal grants, construction contracts, and jobs—back to Roxbury itself.  
As the nation backed away from integration, black employment and workforce development, a 
perennial but secondary issue in the earlier negotiation of renewal, now came to the fore. 
Just outside the boundaries of the urban renewal area, Unity Bank, a converted auto dealership, 
was the first biracial bank in New England. Conceived by a Harvard MBA who had written his 
thesis on black banking, it was formed with the express purpose of loaning to local, black-owned 
businesses and called itself “the bank with a purpose.” 158 Unlike the YMCA across the street, 
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Unity Bank was represented a practical, minimal intervention into the existing urban fabric. 
Black architect Don Stull was hired to design a new exterior brick wall and freshen the interior 
with a new carpet, a new coat of paint, and a mural. [figures 3.32, 3.33] 
The failures of the West End project still fresh in their minds, the BRA moved quickly to 
establish an image of technocratic efficacy and continued responsiveness to the community. 
They marshaled Washington Park‟s first residential rehabilitation loan through the approvals 
process. Previous redlined, the Washington Park urban renewal area was now eligible for loans 
made through the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group (BBURG), a coalition of Boston-area 
saving banks that had been formed by earlier in an attempt to make financing available in 
renewal areas like Roxbury. The first loan recipient, black attorney John Bynoe, had already 
unsuccessfully attempted to get a loan to rehabilitate his ten-room house near Harris Park when 
the BRA intervened. In a ceremony attended by the chairman of the BRA, and the president of 
the bank that had made the loan, the BRA promised that Bynoe was only the first of many 
recipients; some $20 million in financing was now available through the 22 Boston-area banks 
that were part of BBURG. Furthermore, the BRA announced, it had hired project staff to help 
process loan applications and was prepared to provide technical assistance to homeowners who 
were now able to obtain the loans that would enable them to move forward with rehabilitation.
159
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By mid 1964, however, the BRA was processing only six applications per month, not the fifty it 
had expected.
160
 Despite their promises, the banks were reluctant to make loans in the 
neighborhood, and a number of owners sold their properties, either on the private market or 
By mid 1965, approximately fifty buildings scheduled for rehabilitation had been abandoned, 
vandalized, or burned and acquired by the BRA for demolition, and the agency estimated that 
another 100 buildings would be need to be acquired and demolished in the near future.  
By the late 1960s, the Washington Park residential rehabilitation program had some 4600 
properties in its caseload and was one of the largest in the nation. Although almost $1.7 million 
in private financing had been invested by owners bringing their properties up to code, 
rehabilitation was neither progressing as quickly as expected nor providing the kind of low-cost 
housing that the BRA felt the area needed. In a concerted attempt to make the program more 
efficient and less expensive, with the same technocratic approach that informed Academy 
Homes, the BRA launched the unfortunately named Boston Urban Rehabilitation Project 
(BURP) to coordinate the work of several large-scale, white contractors in the area. The move 
sparked anger in the community. When Robert Weaver, now head of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, returned to Freedom House in December 1967 to speak on the project, 
he was met with a mix of applause and boos from the audience. Bryant Rollins, a journalist and a 
member of the New Urban League, charged that the renewal project “gave no consideration to 
local developers, non-profit developers, or local management” and demanded that one thousand 
of the units requiring rehabilitation be turned over to local black contractors.
161
 “A program 
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ostensibly designed to „help‟ us operates in such a way as to continue to deprive us and keep us 
powerless and therefore „in our place.‟”162 Construction projects receiving federal funding had 
long operated with a small number of black workers to qualify them as integrated, but unions had 
treated them harshly, issuing them only temporary permits and dismissing midway through a job. 
Now, under the guidance of Leo Fletcher, local workers began to demand full control over the 
jobs that renewal and rehabilitation created. 
163
 An all-black construction union, United 
Community Construction Workers, was formed to deal with the BRA and the city, organize 
training for black construction workers, and take their grievances directly to the construction 
sites with pickets. Boston‟s first black city councilman, Tom Atkins, weighed in on the issue in 
1968: “If we must sacrifice some degree of efficiency for other value, then we must do it. It is a 
matter of voice, of dignity, of the acquisition of usable skills.”164 
As the construction of new moderate-income housing and other shopping centers and 
community institutions progressed in the mid and late 1960s, it became increasingly clear that 
the “reverse integration” of whites into Roxbury was not a viable large-scale proposition. The 
number of whites and interracial families at the early moderate-income housing projects 
stagnated in the mid-1960s at roughly fifteen percent, and new moderate-income apartments at 
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Warren Gardens and resident-owned subsidized townhouses at St. Joseph‟s Coops had only 
modest levels of integration.
165
 [figures 3.34, 3.35] The interracial vision that was still promoted 
in images of the housing complex had never come to pass. [figure 3.36] The often-promised 
stimulus to new private housing construction never materialized, either; some 1576 subsidized 
moderate-income units were constructed in Washington Park between 1960 and 1972, but only 
32 units of private, unsubsidized housing were.
166
 Among these private projects was the black-
controlled Hinton Terrace, where Associated Architect and Engineer paired with a group of 
black businessmen to construct a group of fifteen town houses intended to nurture 
homeownership in the area. [figure 3.37]  
The one important remnant of the integrationist project was in the realm of education, 
where private, voluntary busing programs continued to be popular with Roxbury parents and 
where the issue of new school construction emerged again. Initially three new elementary 
schools had been planned for the neighborhood, but in 1965 Massachusetts‟ Racial Imbalance 
Law had halted all new school construction projects until cities could prove that the student 
populations at the new schools would be “balanced” with no more than fifty percent students of 
color. Only in 1967, with the establishment of an independent Model Demonstration Subsystem 
in the Roxbury-North Dorchester area, did progress resume on one of the three schools, the 
Humboldt Avenue school first discussed in the early 1960s. [figures 3.38, 3.39, 3.40] Named 
after one of Boston‟s early twentieth century black newspapermen, William Monroe Trotter, it 
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opened in September 1969, the nation‟s second magnet school, with a student population that 
was fifty percent black—with students drawn from the surrounding Roxbury neighborhood—and 
fifty percent white—with students who chose to attend this progressive new school and were 
bused in from throughout Boston. Here, both local support and city support for integration 
remained strong. The School Committee In a sense, “reverse integration” occurred every 
morning, Monday to Friday, as school buses pulled up to the new school. 
 
Conclusion 
By the late 1960s reductions in federal funding for renewal as well as the election of a 
new mayor had slowed the renewal process in Washington Park. Construction on the last 
unfinished projects, including a police station, a branch library and civic center, and senior 
housing would continue into the 1970s, but when the BRA terminated Freedom House‟s contract 
and closed the Washington Park Site Office in 1969—an event that motivated in part by the 
agency‟s response to black opposition—the renewal project was essentially over. By 1971, Otto 
Snowden was thoroughly disenchanted with the state of the Washington Park area. “If 
Washington Park as it stand today with parcels of land still vacant, blighted buildings still 
standing, streets and sidewalks unpaved—if this is what a „renewed‟ community should look 
like, then, very simply, all of us have been fools and idiots to have gotten involved in it at all,” he 
said.
167
 [figure3.41] 
Freedom House continued its support of the school desegregation campaign into the early 
1970, acting as a command post for community groups dealing with the crisis provoked by court-
ordered busing in 1974 and the racist violence that it generated among some working-class 
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whites. By the mid 1970s, however, even proponents of integration in the schools had come to 
doubt the wisdom of their stance. As the legal scholar Derrick Bell, an acquaintance of the 
Roxbury activists, wrote, “now that traditional racial balance remedies are becoming 
increasingly difficult to achieve or maintain, there is the tardy concern that racial balance may 
not be the relief desired by victims of segregated schools…Our clients‟ aims for better schooling 
for their children no longer meshed with integrationist ideals.” Education, not integration, he 
pointed out, had always been the Roxbury parents‟ primary goal, and it was possible that 
desegregation lawyers, serving the interests of both black school children and the ideological 
goal of integration, had neglected the former in favor of the latter.
168
 The same might be said of 
advocates of renewal in Roxbury, whose commitment to integration (and to urban renewal as a 
tool for achieving it) was so strong that they often lost sight of renewal‟s impact on the black 
community. 
The cultural project of racial integration was the product of a very specific period in the 
1960s, challenged, transformed, and perhaps ultimately superseded by the cultural projects of 
black power and community control, especially in neighborhoods like Roxbury which had 
become almost entirely black by the 1970s. Within a decade, the project had lost meaning to 
many of its adherents. Even Muriel Snowden retreated from her uncompromising support. 
“…I‟m not an integrationist anymore,” Snowden recalled in an oral interview in the late 1970s. 
“I‟m not talking about that anymore. I‟m talking about options, I think that‟s what I‟m really 
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talking about…. This is a big turn-around for me, because I at one point would have said, I don‟t 
see why, for example, should we have black girl scout troops in Roxbury…If you have the 
option for a desegregated or an integrated kind of life, I think it should be your choice.”169  
As the experiences at Roxbury demonstrate, if urban renewal was a cultural project embedded in 
a specific time and place, it had lost cultural meaning as well as political support and viability as 
urban policy.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Balancing Acts: Participation, Protest, and Community Control 
Upper West Side, New York City 
 
 
Introduction 
In early 1961, Father Harry Browne, a priest working on Manhattan‟s Upper West Side, 
wrote to a prominent planning consultant asking how he could explain the city‟s West Side urban 
renewal plan to his working-class Puerto Rican parishioners, many of whom were facing 
displacement. The city was planning for new schools, safer streets, and modern, low- and 
moderate-income housing for this aging neighborhood of overcrowded brownstones. Would the 
renewal plan help residents, as promised? Browne supported the city‟s goals—indeed, he had 
actively supported the West Side Urban Renewal Plan throughout the early planning process in 
the late 1950s—but he was worried that the plan did not provide for the return of every family 
that would be displaced. Judging from the extent of redevelopment that was planned, thousands 
of residents would need to move. Even those who were lucky enough to secure new housing in 
the neighborhood faced a long waiting period before they could return. Many worried they 
would be forced to relocate to the outer boroughs, far from family. Was it true, as rumor had it, 
that Puerto Ricans were being pushed from the neighborhood to make room for new 
development? 
170
 
The consultant, Roger Shafer, demurred. Puerto Ricans were not so much being pushed 
away, he replied, as they were being given a chance to better their lives by moving out of an 
increasingly crowded and dangerous neighborhood. “In answer to your question of what to say to 
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the Puerto Rican family who accuses you of trying to push them out of the neighborhood over to 
Staten Island,” Shafer wrote, “I would consider the following approach: Throughout the 
centuries people have come a long distance to America to improve the status of their living 
conditions. To get your wife a decent kitchen and a clean home and a good neighborhood, surely 
it is worth moving to Staten Island.”171 
From the aging brownstones of the Upper West Side to the new, middle-class housing on 
Staten Island: Shafer‟s narrative of social and geographical mobility represents the height of 
postwar liberal optimism about the social promises of urban renewal—and the profound 
insensitivity that planners exhibited on issues of displacement as late as the late 1950s. The sheer 
scale of human displacement required by the West Side Urban Renewal Plan is shocking to us 
today; some 3200 families and individuals—or about 10,000 people—in this neighborhood of 
twenty blocks and 40,000 people lived in housing scheduled for demolition or extensive 
rehabilitation in the 1958 urban renewal plan. Some displaced families would be offered public 
housing in other parts of the city; others were offered moving expenses and assistance finding a 
new apartment elsewhere in the city, but relocation provisions were, on the whole, minimal. 
Conceived at the height of the postwar suburban boom, when a surprising 25% of the American 
population was estimated to be on the move, the urban renewal plan assumed that residents 
would be geographically mobile and have few attachments to their neighborhood. It did not 
acknowledge the difficulty that people of color, large families, or individuals with limited 
English would have leaving a familiar neighborhood and finding new housing; if anything, the 
plan saw renewal as an opportunity for the city to disperse poverty and arrest decline on the 
Upper West Side and in the West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA) in particular.  
                                                 
 
171
 Ibid. 
122 
 
If the logic of slum clearance in Robert Moses‟ New York in the 1950 dictated that the 
city‟s poor and working class would need to make room for new, middle-class residents, 
however, Father Brown and other community activists took their cues from the social 
movements of the 1960s, exploited the plan‟s provisions for citizen participation, and argued that 
renewal could be used to create and preserve space for a community that was made up of 
members of different races and ethnicities and different incomes and visions for urban life. The 
participatory provisions themselves were modest; this was New York‟s first foray into 
neighborhood renewal, after all, and its first attempt to involve residents in the planning process. 
By the standards of the late 1960s, under the heightened scrutiny of activists who had become 
wary of the city and its methods of dealing with renewal area residents, these provisions might 
have seemed unacceptable. But they helped create a citizen organization that played a crucial 
role in promoting and preserving affording housing in the mixed-income neighborhood, and they 
established an expectation of resident participation in the planning process that had effects far 
beyond what was initially envisioned.  
In 1969, the planner Sherry Arnstein pushed a seminal essay on the varieties of citizen 
participation she had observed in the US in the late sixties, particularly in the fields of urban 
renewal and urban planning.
172
 In “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” Arnstein devised a 
hierarchy of types of participation and non-participation, ranging from Therapy and 
Manipulation (Non-Participation) on the bottom rungs, through Informing, Consultation, and 
Placation (Tokenism) in the middle, to Partnership, Delegated Power, and Citizens Control 
(Citizen Power) at the top. It was a succinct statement of the priority placed on participatory 
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democracy in the late 1960s and a refutation of the various types of outreach and consultation 
(“Tokenism”) that renewal agencies typically engaged in. But as an ideal type, it also established 
an extraordinary standard for participation that blinds us to the more subtle and complex ways in 
which residents engaged in and affected their own built environment in urban renewal areas like 
the West Side. The WSURA was one of the few urban renewal areas that became a genuine 
experiment in community control when, in the early 1970s, a group of residents facing 
displacement squatted in condemned buildings and demanded changes to the urban renewal plan. 
The squatters movement was, however, only the final chapter in a series of attempts to control 
the fate of the area, and perhaps not even the most significant one.  
Resident activism—broadly conceived—took myriad forms in the WSURA in the 1950s 
and 1960s. It included idealistic discussions of the possibilities of renewal in the mid 1950s; 
outrage and protest over the city‟s preliminary plan, which seemed to destroy the neighborhood 
in the process of saving it; the organization of socially and economically integrated cooperatives, 
which offered one solution to the problems of providing low-income housing; brownstone 
gentrification and clean-up campaigns that appealed to neighborhood pride; and sustained 
negotiations with the city to secure low-income housing in the area and provide housing for 
residents who had been displaced from the area.  
Resident activism—again, broadly conceived—also included the formation of a 
community organization with the specific mandate to limit the number of low-income units in 
the area and kill city proposals for public housing—all in the name of retaining a mix of incomes 
in the neighborhood. Lila Abu-Lughod has written about “the romance of resistance” and the 
reluctance of scholars to recognize the complicated relationship that ordinary people have with 
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structures of power.
173
 The story of the WSURA shows how complicated the issue of resident 
involvement can be and how effectively it can build community and identity, even when citizen 
control is out of reach and when immediate goals are not met. If the story of the West Side Urban 
Renewal Area is the story of the mass displacement of poor residents and people of color, it is 
also the story of multiple, conflicting attempts to define community and reshape the 
neighborhood in its image. While residents and community organizations did not manage to halt 
the large-scale displacement caused by renewal (and later by gentrification), they were more 
successful than they might have imagined at creating community, in both its social and physical 
forms. 
 
Renewing the West Side: Planning Strategies 
A residential district of tenements and brownstones between 59th and 110 Streets, 
Central Park, and the Hudson River, the once-fashionable West Side was in decline in the 1950s. 
[figures 4.1, 4.2] While the East Side increasingly attracted upper-middle-class and wealthy 
households and new high-rise development, the West Side‟s tenements and brownstones were 
subdivided into smaller apartments and turned into rooming houses as working-class and poor 
households moved into the area. The West Side had always been demographically diverse, home 
to middle-class and working-class Jewish and Irish residents who had moved to the 
neighborhood in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as well as wealthy professionals 
who lived in the elevator apartment buildings along Central Park West and elderly men who 
lived in single-room occupancy hotels along Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues. It was also one 
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of the more racially integrated areas in Manhattan, with a significant number of African 
Americans and Puerto Rican families, many of whom had moved to the neighborhood since the 
Second World War. Although the area was experiencing racial tension and high crime rates and 
had increasingly poor housing conditions—especially at the northern edge and on the side 
streets—few thought of the West Side as a “slum.”174 Rather, marginal areas like the West Side 
were increasingly the kind that interested planners and city officials in the 1950s, as city agencies 
abandoned the slum clearance and redevelopment paradigm for a model that assumed that 
targeted intervention would encourage further private investment.  
Mayor Wagner‟s initial proposal for West Side renewal found favor in Washington, 
where federal officials were wary of Robert Moses and his methods and interested in the new 
“renewal” techniques. As city officials hammered out the specifics of the project, the initial, 
ambitious plans to renew the entire West Side and devote the city‟s full allowance of federal 
low-income housing funds to the area were scaled back, at one point shrinking to a mere four-
block demonstration area.
175
 By early 1956, the city had settled on a project area of twenty 
blocks, from West 87th to West 97th, and from Amsterdam Avenue to Central Park West. 
[figure 4.3] In May 1956, the federal Urban Renewal Administration approved a demonstration 
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grant towards a detailed planning study of the area, and in June, the City Planning Commission 
designated the area as “deteriorating,” qualifying it for federal aid. Between the summer of 1956 
and the spring of 1958, an army of planners and consultants visited the area, compiling data and 
sketching out options for its future. The architectural firm Brown and Guenther coordinated the 
effort and worked on site planning and design in conjunction with the City Planning 
Commission, while the economic consultant Chester Rapkin investigated the costs of new 
housing in the area and the feasibility of rehabilitation, and Elizabeth C. Day researched the 
social structure of the neighborhood and made recommendations about the potential for 
community participation in the planning process. The result of their efforts, a lavish, 96-page 
report containing the preliminary plan for the area and entitled simply Urban Renewal, was 
published by the City Planning Commission in April 1958. 
Like so many planning reports of the day, Urban Renewal began by outlining a picture of 
a neighborhood facing overcrowding, deteriorating housing conditions, and uncertainty about its 
future. Like the larger West Side, the project area was going through demographic transition. 
Between 1950, when Census figures were taken, and 1956, when the City Planning Commission 
took statistics in the area, the overall population of the neighborhood increased from 33,000 to 
39,000. The Puerto Rican population, 4.9% of the population in 1950, had increased to 33.4%, 
and the non-white (predominantly African American) population had increased from a little more 
than 1% to 9%. While the overall percentage of the white population had dropped precipitously, 
from roughly 94% to roughly 58%, the trend in the area was not merely the flight of long-time 
white residents; more than half of the white families living in the project area were newcomers 
themselves. Many of these new white households were wealthier than the ones they replaced, 
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since per capita income for the area was rising even as more low-income families of color moved 
in.  
The report duly noted several of the demographic trends driving change in the 
neighborhood, such as the departure of white families to the suburbs and the arrival of low-
income families from Puerto Rico. It did not, however, mention another cause of change, perhaps 
the most destabilizing of all: the displacement of thousands of residents from nearby Title I and 
public housing projects. Beginning in the late 1940s, Amsterdam Houses, a public housing 
project; Columbus Circle, the city‟s first commercial Title I project; and Lincoln Square, the 
showpiece cultural center, displaced thousands of families living to the south of the West Side 
Urban Renewal Area. Beginning in the early 1950s, Manhattantown, the scandal-ridden Title I 
project, and the adjacent Frederick Douglass Houses, a public housing project, displaced several 
thousand families who had lived immediately to the north. Although in theory the housing 
authority and the private relocation firms working with Title I sponsors offered relocation 
housing for these families throughout the city, in practice the vast majority of tenant relocated 
themselves to new apartments close to home, and adjacent areas often bore the brunt of the 
effects of displacement.
176
 The phenomenon of overcrowding and deteriorating housing 
conditions associated with public housing and redevelopment projects was not, perhaps, as 
widely discussed as white flight or Puerto Rican migration, but it had already gained a name by 
the mid 1950s: “slum shifting.” Displacement from the sites of nearby housing and 
redevelopment projects played a significant role in the transformation of the area in the early- 
and mid-1950s and helped shape subsequent community response. 
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Aging housing stock, landlord neglect, and pressure on the housing market in the area 
resulting in the subdivision of apartments and conversion of brownstones to rooming houses all 
contributed toward declining housing conditions in the neighborhood. Although the area 
included a number of modern elevator buildings and luxury apartments along Central Park West, 
the twenty-block area had been selected precisely because it had some of the oldest, most 
densely developed housing in the area, including old law tenements along Columbus Avenue and 
parts of Amsterdam Avenue and brownstones lining the east-west side-streets.
177
 There had been 
almost no new construction in the area since before the Depression, institutional lenders were 
reluctant to grant mortgages in the area, and owners were less and less likely to improve their 
buildings.
178
 A full seventeen per cent of the dwelling units in the area were single-room 
occupancy, and roughly two-thirds of the brownstones had been converted to rooming houses. 
Residential densities on some of the side streets reached as high as 800 persons per acre. Rents in 
the brownstones and old-law tenements—the most deteriorated housing in the area, where many 
of the Puerto Rican families lived—were excessive, roughly double what was charged in nearby, 
high-quality elevator apartment buildings on a square-foot basis.
179
 The physical condition of 
neighborhood institutions was similarly varied. The area had a number of well-established, 
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thriving institutions, including churches, synagogues, and wealthy private schools, as well as a 
large and modern junior high school on West 93rd Street between Amsterdam and Columbus 
Avenues, PS 188 or Joan of Arc. Because the number of children living in the area had doubled, 
however, the local public elementary schools were over capacity and in some cases experiencing 
turnover of 50% during a single school year. 
The case for public intervention made in Urban Renewal was not that different from the 
case made in the SCC reports of the late 1940s and early 1950s: the West Side was in crisis, 
overcrowded, increasingly poor and transient, and physically deteriorating. Private landlords had 
a vested interest in profitable overcrowded conditions, and only public intervention would halt 
the decline. But the solutions proposed in the report differed significantly from Moses‟. Earlier 
Title I projects had typically targeted relatively small deteriorated areas of six to thirty acres, 
prescribing near-total clearance of the existing buildings on the site, the reassembly of the land 
into superblocks, and the construction of luxury modern high-rise housing and shopping for a 
new, middle- and upper-income population. Some of these early projects, like Corlears Hook and 
Morningside Gardens, were middle-income cooperatives sponsored by unions; others, like 
Columbus Circle and the Harlem and North Harlem projects, were developed by speculative 
investors and included high-end, market-rate housing. All involved large-scale clearance and the 
relocation of residents and small businesses in the project area on the assumption that the only 
way to improve housing conditions was through a completely new urban environment of high-
rise buildings and open space oriented away from the existing street grid. The West Side project, 
on the other hand, had a different starting point: only some of the buildings in the 106 acres of 
the study area were so physically deteriorated that they required demolition. In most parts of the 
project area, the city could encourage stability and reinvestment by enforcing the housing code 
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and offering federally insured, long-term, low-interest loans to owners willing to rehabilitate the 
older housing stock. The redevelopment of specific areas still played a crucial role in this 
scenario, but the explicit aim was to restore the confidence of buildings owners and investors in 
an existing neighborhood without redeveloping it entirely—working with existing owners and 
with the neighborhood‟s existing physical structure. 
Urban Renewal proposed two alternate schemes for the area: Plan A, involving extensive 
redevelopment, and Plan B, depending more heavily on rehabilitation. Both were primarily 
concerned with increasing the amount of high-quality housing in the neighborhood. Plan A 
[figure 4.4] recommended the redevelopment of both sides of Columbus Avenue and stretches of 
Amsterdam Avenue and West 97th Street with high-rise towers—a relatively new building 
typology in New York City in the mid-1950s—as well as the redevelopment of the most 
deteriorated areas on the side streets with double-loaded corridor apartment buildings. [figure 
4.5] Unlike the typical SCC project, the plan aimed to provide housing for all income levels: 
low-rent public housing, subsidized middle-income, and luxury or market rate. Specific parcels 
had not been allocated and the proportion of low-, middle-, and high-income housing had not yet 
been worked out, but the report explained how, with various types of financing, the city could 
achieve a wide range of rentals, from $14 to $18 per room per month in public housing, to 
$21.29 per room per month (limited-profit cooperative housing), to $44.82 (rental housing 
constructed under FHA Section 220 financing), to $45.00 to $60.00 (conventionally financed 
housing).
180
 New construction would be supplemented by a program to finance the rehabilitation 
of deteriorated brownstones in the area, while most of the modern elevator buildings and almost 
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all of the buildings fronting Central Park were left untouched. This version of the plan also 
proposed a new public school along West 92nd Street and the construction of a network of mid-
block public pathways and open spaces, including three connecting walkways that would lead 
from West 96th Street, a major through-street at the northern edge of the project, to Joan of Arc, 
the local junior high school. [figure 4.6] Demolition of adjacent housing would create play areas 
for all three schools in the area: Joan of Arc, the proposed new school along West 92nd Street, 
and PS 166 along West 89th Street. 
Plan B [figure 4.7] involved more extensive rehabilitation of existing buildings in the 
area. This version preserved plans for a new school and the mid-block pathways and open space, 
but its residential strategy was quite different: only half the blocks fronting Columbus Avenue 
would be redeveloped with housing, and almost twice as many brownstones along the side 
streets would be slated for rehabilitation rather than demolition. Alternate versions of both Plan 
A and Plan B suggested more radical design strategies, including the closing of West 92nd St 
between Amsterdam and Columbus to traffic to create a large campus for Joan of Arc Junior 
High and a number of single-decked air rights garages over Columbus Avenue, the surface of 
which would serve as a pedestrian crossing over the busy avenue.
181
 Neither version made many 
provisions for traffic improvements, although the report speculated that in the scenario outlined 
in Plan A, in which both frontages of Columbus Avenues were redeveloped, the new structures 
could be required to provide sidewalks within the building line, so that the avenue could be 
widened to include local access streets, separated by rows of trees from cross-town traffic. 
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At the heart of both proposed schemes was an ambitious program of brownstone 
rehabilitation, to be undertaken by individual owners and financed by FHA-insured mortgages. 
This was the untested, experimental part of the plan; the provisions of the 1954 Housing Act had 
made it possible to use the so-called “tools” of Title I—the power of eminent domain, the write-
down, the long-term, low-interest loans offered by the FHA—to rehabilitate as well as redevelop, 
but few cities had embarked on their own programs, and there were few examples to follow. The 
city was committed to a renewal program that depended as much as possible on private 
investment, so it seemed likely that it would support but not carry out the rehabilitation itself. If 
the tools were provided, would individual landlords be able and willing to rehabilitate their 
properties? A detailed study of eight blocks in the area had shown that, although both the 
brownstones and the tenements were deteriorated and overcrowded, the vast majority of both of 
these buildings types were structurally sound. Brownstone rehabilitation, however, was more 
likely to be a profitable venture than tenement rehabilitation; nine in ten brownstones were 
deemed to be in “acceptable condition” or could be returned to acceptable condition through 
renovation and repairs, as opposed to only four in ten tenements. Both versions of the proposed 
plan thus involved the extensive demolition and redevelopment of the old-law tenements, and 
Plan A eliminated them entirely. Along with the new high rise housing on redeveloped parcels 
along Columbus Avenue, the brownstones would become the basic residential buildings blocks 
for the new neighborhood. While the report was skeptical about the financial feasibility of purely 
private rehabilitation—rehabilitation involving no government subsidy whatsoever—it suggested 
that a combination of liberal mortgages made available through the FHA 220 program, write-
downs in acquisition costs, and real estate tax concessions would make large-scale rehabilitation 
in the area possible. 
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While redevelopment would be limited in comparison with previous Title I projects, it 
still played a major role in both plans proposed in the report. A comparison of the aerial 
photograph of the project area in the mid-1950s [figure 4.3] with a perspective used on the front 
cover of the report [figure 4.8] underlines the dramatic impact redevelopment would have, 
particularly under Plan A: in a densely developed area of three- to five story brownstones and 
tenements, the plan proposed a new hierarchy of urban spaces: a busy, modern avenue of high-
rise, high-density housing running through the center of the area; low- and mid-rise housing on 
the side streets, their density decreased by the elimination of the most deteriorated housing; and 
quiet, landscaped pathways between blocks and courtyards in the rear yards of the rehabilitated 
brownstones. Like the Title I plans developed by Moses‟ slum clearance committee, these plans 
show a commitment to reducing building coverage and increasing open space, maintaining high 
residential density through the use of high-rise housing, and reorganizing residential life around 
interior playgrounds and green spaces.  
While the plan preserved the street grid, a high percentage of the housing stock in the 
area, and existing densities, it still represented a major intervention into the physical fabric of the 
neighborhood. Relocation plans suggested that some 2,641 households would be displaced by 
Plan A and some 3,242 households would be displaced by Plan B.
182
 In an effort to minimize the 
relocation burden and “disturb the continuity of neighborhood life as little as possible,” the 
report recommended staging the renewal process.
183
 Acquisition of condemned parcels—and 
thus displacement, relocation, and demolition—would begin at the northwest edge of the area, 
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and proceed south and east in four distinct stages of approximately 30 months each. Public 
housing, a potential relocation resource, would be constructed first, and work on the new school 
and school playgrounds would begin immediately, alleviating overcrowding and improving the 
area‟s community facilities. Many of the condemned tenements and brownstones would be 
allowed to remain standing as long as possible, so as to give residents the maximum possible 
time to find new housing. 
Given what must have been an obvious and inevitable consequence of renewal in this 
area—the large-scale displacement of low-income Puerto Rican families, who lived in the most 
deteriorated housing and would be disproportionately affected by redevelopment and 
rehabilitation plans—one of the most interesting and significant aspects of the report was its 
commitment to racial and economic integration, made explicit in a chapter entitled “Goals of 
Renewal.” The report echoes the city‟s commitment to open-occupancy housing, first made with 
the 1957 Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs law, which barred racial discrimination in publicly aided 
housing projects. In principle, at least, housing in the West Side project, like housing in all Title I 
projects to date, would be racially integrated.
184
 But the goal of an economically “balanced” 
neighborhood was a more complex and elusive notion, developed specifically, it seems, for the 
West Side of the late 1950s. As the report pointed out, the apartments facing onto Central Park, 
the brownstones on the side streets, and the tenements of Columbus Avenue had always been 
occupied by residents of very different class backgrounds and income levels. “Although this 
original pattern left much to be desired from a design point of view,” the report argued, “it was a 
balanced neighborhood in a democratic pattern with considerable character which should be 
                                                 
 
184
 In practice, Title I projects had a mixed record; the high rents charged for most of the new 
housing ensured a middle- and upper-middle class population, though certain limited-income 
cooperatives like Morningside Gardens, sought and achieved a certain level of racial integration. 
135 
 
maintained. An economically integrated community also must have fairly extensive provisions 
for middle-income families, not just for high-rental and public housing tenants.”185  
In the context of area‟s changing demographics, particularly the increase in low-income 
Puerto Rican residents, the goal of “racial and economic integration” is not as liberal as it might 
first seem; the emphasis on “middle-income” families suggests that the city would use 
redevelopment and rehabilitation to retain or attract middle- and upper-middle class residents, 
who were likely to be white, at the expense of lower-income residents, who were likely to be 
Puerto Rican, all lofty language about “democratic patterns” aside. But the inherent flexibility of 
the concept and its broad appeal across the ideological spectrum mean that ideas of “integration” 
or “balance,” written into the plan from the very beginning, would become the rallying point 
around which future debates about the neighborhood would take place. 
 
Community Response to the Preliminary and Final Plans 
Conceived in response to some of the failings of the SCC‟s approach, formulated as an 
attempt to use some of the untested techniques written into the 1954 Housing Act, the West Side 
renewal project precipitated a shift in the city‟s planning and redevelopment bureaucracy. It was 
not the type of project the SCC would have embraced in any case; throughout the 1950s, Moses, 
the chairman of the Slum Clearance Committee, remained a vocal proponent of large-scale 
clearance and superblock planning and a critic of rehabilitation, which he did not believe was an 
economically feasible alternative in New York City.
186
 The report had been supervised by the 
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City Planning Commission, an agency with few ties to the SCC, and shortly after its release in 
April 1958, Mayor Wagner established the Urban Renewal Board, which was charged with 
implementing its recommendations in what became known as the West Side Urban Renewal 
Area (WSURA). The chairman of the City Planning Commission, James Felt, was appointed its 
head, and Samuel Ratensky was given leave from the Housing Authority to become its executive 
director.
187
 
From the beginning, the Urban Renewal Board was faced with the task of gathering 
support for the project in the face of growing opposition to the SCC‟s established Title I 
program. Initially, the project benefited from its obvious differences from Moses‟ bulldozer 
approach and its promises of fixing up rather than tearing down the neighborhood. Shortly after 
Wagner‟s announcement, Joseph Montserrat of the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
one of the most important Puerto Rican organizations in the city, offered his support, saying. 
“It‟s obvious we‟re not meeting the needs of lower income groups today. If this is the way to 
prevent continuing deterioration, we‟re for it.”188 The local Democratic club, the FDR-Woodrow 
Wilson Democrats, had also expressed early interest in the project, as had a number of 
                                                                                                                                                             
scattered sites while preserving the modern apartment buildings in the area, but for the most part 
SCC Title I projects remained remarkably consistent in their planning throughout the 1950s. See 
letter from Moses to Robert Wagner, November 29, 1955, Box 116, Folder “Housing 
Correspondence for Mr. Moses‟ Library project January 1, 1955 to December 31, 1955,” Robert 
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rebuilding old structures with federal aid is wholly impractical in New York City.” 
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institutions located in the project area and citywide advocacy groups like the Citizen‟s Housing 
and Planning Council. 
And yet the success of the project was not a foregone conclusion. Between 1955, when 
the project was first announced, and 1958, when the city began the planning process, sponsor 
scandals and increasing debate over relocation for Title I projects had shifted the dynamic of 
redevelopment in New York. Residents living in areas targeted for redevelopment were 
increasingly effective making their opposition known. Activist Harris Present and the Lincoln 
Square Businessmen‟s Committee, an organization of small business owners facing 
displacement, were waging war against the Lincoln Square Title I project, just 17 blocks south of 
the West Side study area. Protesting at public hearings, launching litigating against the project, 
the Lincoln Square opponents were bringing their case before the city‟s press and political 
establishment with more success than community groups had previously.
189
 Groups as diverse as 
the Women‟s City Club of New York, the organization that had investigated conditions at 
Manhattantown; the Community Service Society; the Citizens‟ Union; Samuel Spiegel, State 
Representative from the Lower East Side and a housing advocate; the local chapter of the 
NAACP; and the local chapter of ADA all were calling for a review of the SCC‟s policy of 
handing off relocation responsibilities to sponsors and the establishment of a central relocation 
bureau. Relocation, which was fast becoming a major political issue in the city, was destined to 
be a contentious and difficult issue in the West Side Urban Renewal Area, as well. 
In addition, the very nature of the plan, which proposed multiple, scattered 
redevelopment sites and the rehabilitation of hundred of brownstones by individual owners, 
suggested that the plan would need extensive support from project area residents—not simply to 
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overcome local opposition and pass through the series of public hearings required of all Title I 
projects, but to ensure that individual building owners would comply with the code enforcement 
and rehabilitation requirements of the plan and that the implementation would progress 
smoothly. Urban Renewal had stressed the need for citizen participation on both practical and 
ideological grounds, but its plans to organize several different types of organizations with 
differing stakes in the project—citywide, West Side, and project area—were vague.190 
With funds from a private foundation, in coordination with city officials, the Community 
Council of Greater New York (CCGNY) hired staff and began to organize local groups in 
support of the plan in January 1959.
191
 A number of prominent West Siders with an interest in 
renewal—including the former Deputy Mayor Stanley Lowell—formed the nucleus of the Park-
Hudson Urban Renewal Citizens‟ Committee, which, as its name implied, was intended to help 
represent the interest of the entire West Side, from the river to Central Park. This organization 
consisted of 46 individuals, many of whom held leadership positions with community 
organizations in the area, although they did not necessarily represent them. Park-Hudson became 
involved in physical planning and zoning issues as well as the formation of a “conservation area” 
to the west of the WSURA where code enforcement might help maintain good housing 
conditions. It also formed a bankers‟ committee to promote savings for down-payments for on 
cooperatives that might be built in the WSURA. In May, the CCGNY staff began to organize the 
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 New York City Planning Commission, Urban Renewal, p. 88. Among the examples noted in 
the report are in Dayton, Ohio, where professional organizers were made available through the 
Community Welfare Council, and Philadelphia, where staff associated with a neighborhood 
house in the East Poplar project helped organize the community. 
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 Funding initially came from a grant from the Fred L. Lavanburg Foundation. When the grant 
ran out, the Housing and Redevelopment Board contracted with the Community Council of 
Greater New York to continue the work for another eight months.   
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Provisional Council of Organizations in the West Side Urban Renewal Area, a group of 
representatives of 40 community organizations and institutions located within the 20-block urban 
renewal area. This group included representatives of churches, synagogues, parent-teacher 
associations, block associations, tenants groups, and business organizations. It was headed by 
Milton Akers, the headmaster of the elite, private Walden School, located at Central Park West 
and West 88th Street, at the southeastern edge of the urban renewal area. Father Harry Browne, a 
priest at St. Gregory‟s and a teacher at a local parochial school, was drawn into the organization 
and led its housing committee. The Provisional Council was still being organized when the city 
released the preliminary plan for the WSURA on May 28, 1959.
192
 
In the words of the community organizer working with Park-Hudson and the Provisional 
Council, the preliminary plan “shocked” West Side residents.193 Although the physical plan was 
not very different from one of the plans described in the widely circulated 1958 report—namely 
Plan A, the plan in which all old law tenements and both frontages of Columbus Avenue were 
slated for redevelopment—the city‟s version contained specific details the earlier document did 
not, most importantly, a breakdown of how many much low-, middle-, and high-income housing 
would be constructed. To many area residents who had heard the report‟s language of “balance” 
and integration, the figures were staggering: of 7800 projected new units of housing, only 400 
would be low-rent public housing, contained in a single public housing project, while 2400 
                                                 
 
192
 Both groups are described in The Community Council of Greater New York, “Citizen 
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would be middle-income units built with public subsidy and a full 5000 would be market rate. In 
addition, there were several changes in the physical plan for the neighborhood, including the 
consolidation of commercial space into six shopping areas scattered through the project area and 
the additional of public plazas. Some 5800 households, a number larger than estimated in the 
report, faced relocation. 
On the basis of the 1958 report, both Park-Hudson and the Provisional Council had 
voiced tentative support for the project, suggesting it would not face too much opposition in the 
area. The preliminary plan, however, met with an immediate, negative response on the part of 
residents and small businesses. Within weeks, local groups had formed to oppose the plan. 
Thomas Matthews, an African American neurosurgeon who lived on Central Park West, 
organized the West Side Business and Professional Group to represent the opposition of the 
area‟s 460 small businesses. The social worker Jane Wahlberg led the West Side tenants 
Committee, a group calling for less displacement and more low- and middle-income housing. 
The area‟s Catholic churches, St. Gregory‟s and Holy Name, whose Irish and Puerto Rican 
parishioners were likely to be displaced by renewal, were also opposed to the plan.
194
 
Between May 1959, when the preliminary plan was announced, and October 1959, when 
it was adopted by the Board of Estimate, the city held approximately thirty community meetings 
in the project area in an attempt to explain the plan and muster support for it. During this time, 
the Provisional Council, the group charged with representing local interests, acted in a mediating 
role. As Father Browne later recalled, it worked for “concession and compromise on 
controversial aspects of the plan,” notably the proportion of low-, middle-, and high-incoming 
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housing units that would be constructed under the plan.
195
 The City Planning Commission held a 
public hearing on the plan on June 29, during which the relative lack of low- and middle-income 
units was again a point of contention. Matthew and Wahlberg, the heads of the businessmen‟s 
and tenants‟ organizations, set up shop in West 96th Street storefront and rallied opponents at a 
mass meeting held at Joan of Arc Junior High School on July 14, shortly before the CPC was 
scheduled to make a decision on the project. In a story that made the front page of the New York 
Times, Walhberg called the plan “one of the hugest real estate land grabs the city has ever 
known” and said that it belied “ the sound concept of true urban renewal.”196 Speaking before 
approximately 300 people at the rally, Matthews argued that the plan would “eliminate the small 
businessman” by reducing the number of commercial spaces from the 461 currently in the area to 
only 80 in the six proposed shopping centers.
197
  
The CPC responded to these objections with several concessions, promising greater 
attention to the relocation process for small businesses and approving the project with an 
increase in the proportion of low- and middle-income housing units—600-3600-3600, rather than 
400-2400-5000.
198
 The small business owners and the Wahlberg‟s tenants‟ organization 
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 For the city‟s account of the changes made to the plan, see “City Planning Commission 
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remained opposed the plan, and they found allies in various local politicians like the Reform 
Democrat Irving Wolfson, who agreed with Matthew that the plan would have devastating 
effects on the area‟s small businesses. Meanwhile, the Park-Hudson Urban Renewal Citizens 
Committee, the Provisional Council of Organizations, and various West Side and city-wide 
groups like the Citizens Union and the West Side Americans for Democratic Action all backed 
the plan.
199
 The project gained CPC approval, but it was politically sensitive enough that 
Manhattan Borough President Hulan Jack delayed its public hearing in front of the Board of 
Estimate until after September‟s primary election. In an effort to ease its passage, the CPC 
announced a staging schedule whereby work would begin at the northern edge of the WSURA 
and residents and small business could be relocated within the area while waiting for new 
accommodations. In October, Jack gave his support to the plan in principle but called for 
additional low- and middle-income housing. The CPC compromised again, and the Board of 
Estimate passed the preliminary plan on October 22, with revised housing figures, now 1000-
4200-2800.
200
 The preliminary plan now in place, the city began to hammer out the specifics that 
would lead to the final plan and the implementation of the project. 
                                                                                                                                                             
public housing project (Frederick Douglass Homes) to the north of the WSURA, it preferred to 
add moderate-income housing to the area. 
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 Journal of Proceedings of the Board of Estimate of the City of New York X (July 28, 1959, to 
September 17, 1959), pp. 10101-10109. Criticism focused on the lack of low and middle income 
housing, inadequate compensation for small business, and the unnecessary demolition of 
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Significantly, the area‟s small business owners were both the most organized and vocal 
opponents of the plan during this first round of debate. Since many of them were located on the 
ground floor of the old-law tenements along Columbus Avenue, the areas slated for demolition, 
and because the preliminary plan made provisions for only a fraction to return to the 
neighborhood, their opposition to the plan was not surprising. Small business owners, in fact, 
were often the first to organize against Title I projects. Highly dependent on local clientele, they 
were doubly affected by the renewal process—first by displacement, then by the need to develop 
a new base of customers in a new location—and thus more inclined to oppose it. Unlike low-
income tenants, another group facing displacement under renewal and redevelopment plans, 
business owners tended to be well-informed about the city‟s plans, familiar with dealing with 
city officials, and deeply skeptical of the city‟s right to take their property. The city, by contrast, 
was rarely sympathetic to their pleas to stay put. The consolidation of local businesses in strip 
malls or shopping centers was a common physical planning approach in renewal and 
redevelopment projects in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the likely closure of some of the 
more marginal of the area‟s small businesses was seen as the price of progress. Indeed, small 
businesses had fewer legal guarantees than residents during the relocation process and received 
substantially less monetary compensation in comparison.
201
 In the negotiations over the WSURA 
preliminary plan, they received only more comprehensive and specific relocation procedures, not 
any substantive changes in the plan itself. 
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 Title I legislation mandated that displaced residents be relocated to “safe, decent, and sanitary 
housing.” While in practice this was not always the case for project area residents, no such 
comparable language existed for small business owners. Although by 1959 New York City was 
taking steps to increase the payments made to project area residents, small business owners 
lagged far behind. 
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Debate over the housing component of the WSURA plan was another matter entirely. All 
kinds of local organizations—from the pro-renewal Provisional Council to Wahlburg‟s 
oppositional tenants‟ group—grasped onto the plan‟s notion of a “balanced” community as an 
ideal to strive for, and the proportion of low-, middle-, and high-income housing in the project 
area quickly became the aspect of the plan where negotiation would take place. Unlike the 
business owners, for whom any real victory would have meant changes to the plan itself, groups 
concerned with housing were engaged in a numbers game that was still largely theoretical. The 
strong push for consensus on the part of the Provisional Council and the relative lack of 
organization on the part of the area‟s Puerto Rican population meant that the gains achieved in 
the process of approving the preliminary plan were relatively modest—600 low-income units—
but the issue “economic integration” was not yet resolved.  
 
The Final Plan 
With the preliminary plan in place, certain elements of the West Side project could move 
forward, among them the 400-unit public housing project, which would be constructed by the 
Housing Authority, the public school, and the rehabilitation demonstration project scheduled for 
selected parts of West 94th and West 95th Streets between Central Park West and Columbus 
Avenue. But the larger project stalled for three years in further planning and bureaucratic red 
tape, and when the final plan came before the CPC and the Board of Estimate, it went through a 
second and very different round of opposition and public debate. 
When the final plan was announced on May 1, 1962, it contained few substantive 
changes from the preliminary plan: a minimum of 1,000 units of low-rent housing, of which 800 
would be in new construction and 200 in rehabilitated apartments; 4200 units of middle-income 
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housing; 2800 units of market-rate housing; a new elementary school, two new school 
playgrounds, and six landscaped plazas. Among the changes were several traffic improvements, 
including parking bays and landscaping for Columbus Avenue and the “necking” or narrowing 
of many of the residential side streets to keep down the amount of through traffic.
202
 Four of the 
middle-income sites had been designated as limited-profit cooperatives sponsored by 
neighborhood groups. During the planning process in late 1960 and 1961, a schematic scale 
model of the final plan [figure 4.9] and renderings of the redeveloped Columbus Avenue [figure 
4.10] and the public plazas [figure 4.11] had been presented to local groups and exhibited at the 
East River Savings Bank on Amsterdam Avenue. Now, with the publication of the final plan, the 
city released renderings of the proposed residential buildings [figure 4.12], some of which were 
included in a three-color brochure produced specifically to help gather support among project 
area residents. The architectural renderings exhibited in the neighborhood in 1960 and 1961 
emphasized the clean, modern look of Columbus Avenue, dubbed “The Avenue of Tomorrow” 
in captions, as well as the blend of old and new visible in the spaces created by the public plazas 
on the side streets. The brochure, on the other hand, contained images of stoops and brownstones 
[figure 4.13] as well as modern buildings and emphasized the preservation of the existing 
neighborhood over the new development. “Old-time New York residents still remember a quiet, 
more leisurely city: clean, attractive, good to look at, good to live in,” the brochure stated. “That 
is essentially what the plan seeks to make out of these 20 crowded blocks…There will be large 
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 Among the proposed traffic improvement were the effective widening of Columbus Avenue 
by mandatory 15-foot setbacks and east-west boundary or “connector” streets separating 
“subneighborhoods” of six or eight blocks whose interior, “residential,” streets were to be 
narrowed and given different textures and colors of paving materials to discourage through 
traffic. 
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areas of new building in the neighborhood, [but] the good houses of today will still be there. In 
short, the neighborhood will keep the charm of diversity.”203 A passage on “citizen participation” 
reassured readers that the plan had been developed with project area residents and was illustrated 
with a photograph showing community representative Father Browne talking with city officials. 
[figure 4.14] 
Between 1959 and 1962, however, the climate of public opinion in the project area had 
changed. Father Browne‟s Provisional Council had reorganized itself as the Strycker‟s Bay 
Neighborhood Council, named after a historical designation for the area, and elected Father 
Browne as its president. The city‟s main point of contact with the neighborhood, the SBNC was 
assisting with relocation planning and increasingly concerned about the problems faced by 
displaced residents.
 204
 The local Democratic club, the FGR-Woodrow Wilson Democrats, had 
recently published an analysis of the West Side plan that found the plan‟s provisions for low-
income residents insufficient and called for a major shift in the housing breakdown to 2650 low-
income, 3680 middle-income, and 1655 market-rate units.
205
 Most importantly, the area was 
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 Shortly after the public hearings on the preliminary hearing, the Park-Hudson Urban Renewal 
Citizens‟ Committee folded and the Provisional Council held a constitutional convention, 
renamed itself, and became the most active citizens‟ organization working in the renewal area. In 
November 1959, the group drew up a list of steps the city could take to ease the relocation 
process in the area; in June 1960, it called an emergency meeting to calm fears when relocation 
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Citizens‟ Participation Program: The Role of the Strycker‟s Bay NC,” typescript. Henry Joseph 
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finally developing a vocal Puerto Rican constituency led by Aramis Gomez, a resident who had 
recently been relocated from the nearby Lincoln Square project area, who, along with several 
other community members, had formed the Puerto Rican Citizens‟ Housing Committee 
(PRCHC) in the summer of 1961. In a report drawn up in January 1962, the group contended that 
Puerto Ricans were “being „pushed‟ out of so-called prime real estate in Manhattan” and that 
“the overall housing program seems to envision a New York without Puerto Ricans.”206 Like the 
Reform Democrats, they pushed for a significant increase in the number of low-income housing 
units as well as more meaningful Puerto Rican participation in the renewal project. 
Public hearings on the final plan, held in May and June, 1962, were contentious. 
Emphasizing the city‟s commitment to open housing, its attempt to provide housing for all 
income levels in a single neighborhood, and its innovative rehabilitation program, proponents 
praised the project at the first CPC hearing on May 17. Speaking on behalf of the national 
NAACP in support of the plan, Jack Wood argued that rehousing every low-income resident in 
low-income housing in the area amounted to a policy of racial “containment” and “would 
encourage the development of a community characterized by racial and economic imbalance.” 
Jackie Robinson, the former baseball star, appeared at the hearing to express his support, praising 
the project as “the first truly integrated project the city ever attempted.” Attacking the extent of 
Puerto Rican displacement, the city‟s poor track record with relocation, and the disparity 
between the number of household displaced and the number of low- and middle-income housing 
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was funded and staffed by the city‟s powerful Commission on Intergroup Relations, COIR. 
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units, critics argued that the social costs of the plan were too high. The PRCHC‟s Gomez 
attacked the plan as a “masterpiece of deception” intended to “get rid of the Negroes, Puerto 
Ricans, and low-income families from the area” and declared that “if you [the CPC] approve this 
plan, you are declaring war on the Puerto Rican community.”207 After three years of delays, the 
city wanted nothing more than to begin the West Side project. On May 29 the CPC announced its 
approval of final plan, urging it forward through the upcoming Board of Estimate hearings 
“quickly and expeditiously” and warning that changes in the plan at this late date would cause 
delays.  
Both critics and proponents geared up for a second round of debate at the Board of 
Estimate hearing in June. In a series of meetings leading up to the Board of Estimate hearings on 
June 22, Father Browne pushed the SBNC to support an increase in the number of low-income 
units to 2500 without success. He and other opponents of the plan organized a rally at Holy 
Name Church in support of more low-income housing on the night of June 21. In the face of this 
opposition, city officials conceded defeat and phoned Browne, promising an increase in the 
number of low-income units in the plan from 1,000 to 2,500 and the number of middle-income 
units from 4,200 to 4,900. The number of luxury units was reduced, from 2,800 to 2,000.
208
 In 
addition, the city‟s Bureau of Relocation would be authorized to step in and terminate private 
relocation contracts if at any time the Bureau believed that relocation was not being handled 
adequately.
209
 The rally was held anyway, and the crowd sang anti-renewal songs written by an 
SBNC activist. 
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At the Board of Estimate hearing the next day, Monserrat denounced the destruction of 
5000 low-income units in the WSURA and the impact that would have on the Puerto Rican 
community. A representative of the local branch of the NAACP, Percy Sutton, spoke against the 
plan, challenging the national association‟s position and requesting more low-income units and 
minority representation on the City Planning Commission on the grounds that “members of the 
minority groups should participate in these decisions that affect us.” Father Browne, who had 
declined to represent the SBNC‟s position on low-income housing in the plan, spoke about the 
plan‟s insufficient attention to low-income residents who would be displaced by the project. 
Defending the plan, officials cited the “very high degree of voluntary turnover” among Puerto 
Ricans, arguing that the effects of displacement were not as dire as the opposition made them out 
to be. Moreover, if the city built housing for all the low-income residents in the area, there was 
the danger of “permanently embedding a low-income and minority ghetto in the area.”210 As one 
official said, the plan‟s “vision is of an entire neighborhood truly integrated on a stable basis, not 
simply caught at the point where there is apparent integration while one group is moving in and 
another out.”211 Several later, on June 26, the Board of Estimate approved final plan. 
By the time the plan went through its second round of hearings, two opposing views of 
the West Side plan had emerged: one that was optimistic about the effects of renewal and that 
favored the use of renewal tools—particularly new middle-income housing and loans for 
rehabilitation—to draw new residents to the neighborhood and precipitate change; one that was 
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skeptical about the effects of renewal and wanted to use the its tools—low-income housing, and 
to a lesser extent limited-profit middle-income housing—to secure a place for current residents 
who would be displaced during the process. One was consensual and used the liberal language of 
participation, integration, and “balance;” the other was increasingly militant and wanted the city 
to concentrate its resources on helping the poor. The issue of low and middle-income housing 
was where they found common ground to negotiate. 
 
High-Rise Living on the Avenue of Tomorrow 
The public projects—the public housing and the new school, both of which were 
constructed by city agencies with their own architects, plans, and budgets—moved into 
implementation quickly. The well-oiled machinery of the New York City Housing Authority 
(NYCHA) got the area‟s first redevelopment project, Stephen Wise Homes, underway in 1962. 
The 399-unit project, located on Site 29, between West 90th and West 91st and Columbus and 
Amsterdam Avenues, opened in January 1965. [figure 4.15] The project was an early NYCHA 
experiment with public arts; two 19-story brick buildings, designed by Knappe and Johnson, 
enclosed a plaza in filled with a herd of plum-colored, stubby-legged concrete horses by the 
sculptor Contantino Nivola.
212
 [figure 4.16] A second public housing project, 70 low-income 
units in a low-rise building on Site 15, on West 94th Street between Amsterdam and Columbus, 
opened in May. The new public school in the area, PS 84, located on Site 26, on West 92nd 
Street between Columbus and Central Park West, opened in September 1962. A brick-faced, 
three-story building with an adjacent play area, it represented a major improvement in facilities 
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for local schoolchildren, who transferred there from an overcrowded school that had closed at the 
end of the previous year.  
The new residential development was the next element of the plan to move into 
implementation. In accordance with the city‟s vision of a mixed-income West Side, plans for the 
redevelopment areas along Amsterdam and Columbus Avenues—the areas where new 
construction would be concentrated—included both market-rate and subsidized-middle income 
housing. (For the most part, the public housing was confined to the side streets, where land 
prices were lower.) Of the three types of housing, the middle-income housing posed the biggest 
challenge. As city officials like Moses had been arguing for years, it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to construct anything but luxury housing in Manhattan without subsidy, and even then it 
was difficult to keep monthly rents (for rental apartments) or maintenance charges (for 
cooperatives) low enough that families of modest means could afford them.
213
 In the WSURA, 
planners made use of legislation unique to New York State, the 1955 Mitchell-Lama Act, which 
offered generous financing terms for housing projects whose sponsors agreed to accept limited 
profits on their investment.
214
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 The Limited-Profit Housing Companies or Mitchell-Lama Program was devised in 1955 to 
encourage the production of housing in the “middle-income range,” between public housing, 
which rented for $8 to $14 per room per month and privately built, market-rate housing, which 
rarely rented for less than $34 per room per month. (Figures are for 1955.) A combination of 
low-cost financing and tax exemptions—the Act authorized state or city loans covering up to 
90% of construction costs repayable for period of up to 50 years, city could also grant tax 
exemptions of 50% for thirty years—helped bring down the cost for private developers, who 
agreed to a maximum return of 6% and public oversight of design, construction, and rents, and 
operating costs. It was a popular financing mechanism in New York; some 138,000 Mitchell-
Lama units, rental and coop, were built between 1958 and 1975. On the program, see “Mitchell-
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The sponsorship requirement attracted organizations with strong social agendas that 
helped develop a culture of cooperative living on the avenues. The first and most active sponsors 
to come forward were the major community organizations involved in the planning process—the 
Riverside Neighborhood Assembly, which had been involved in the earliest planning stages, in 
the 1950s; the Goddard-Riverside Community Center, a local settlement house; and the SBNC, 
the organization formed to represent project area organizations and residents in the planning 
process. Along with a fourth sponsor, a group of individuals organized specifically for the 
purpose of sponsoring middle-income housing in the neighborhood, they pushed forward the first 
middle-income housing projects in the WSURA. 
All of them approached sponsorship with the idea that middle-income housing could help 
solve some of the neighborhood‟s problems. Goddard-Riverside‟s housing offshoot, the 
Goddard-Riverside Housing Corporation (G-R Housing Corporation), for example, looked to 
bring middle-income residents in the so-called helping professions to live in the area and 
strengthen the community, while the Strycker‟s Bay Housing Corporation, formed out of the 
SBNC, wanted to provide as many units for displaced project area residents as possible. 
Believing that homeownership would encourage stability and investment in the area as well as a 
more socially minded community, these groups organized their projects are cooperatives rather 
than rental buildings. They set up storefront sales offices in the neighborhood, interviewed 
potential cooperators, and launched pre-occupancy programs aimed at introducing future 
residents to cooperative living. All actively sought families; Goddard Tower was the first 
cooperative in the city with a significant number of four-bedroom apartments, and the Strycker‟s 
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Bay sponsors opted to have fewer units than zoning guidelines allowed so that the units could 
have more rooms. They recruited families of color and Spanish-speakers and favored applicants 
who supported racial integration within the cooperative. When they interviewed potential 
cooperators, they also looked for residents who supported renewal on the West Side and were 
interested in sending their children to the local public schools. All four buildings contained a 
designated number of “skewed rental” units, low-income units whose lower rents and 
maintenance charges were subsidized by the middle-income units, echoing the ideals of 
economic balance of the project as a whole.
215
 
These community groups began moving shortly after the approval of the preliminary 
plan, retaining architects and economic consultants, developing site plans and designs, and 
seeking cooperators who wanted to purchase units in the development. By early 1961, the 
Stryker‟s Bay Housing Corporation had an executive board, an architect, a pro bono consultant, 
and preliminary plans for approximately 240 units on Site 17, on Columbus Avenue between 
West 93rd and West 94th Street, and already approximately one hundred families, many of 
whom were residents of project area, had put down a deposit on their downpayment.
216
 The G-R 
Housing Corporation established a sales office in 1961, and by the end of the year it had 
collected down payments from 125 families for housing on Site 11, on the east side of 
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Amsterdam Avenue between West 94th and West 95th Streets.
217
 RNA House, sponsored by the 
Riverside Neighborhood Assembly, secured Site 8, on West 96th Street between Amsterdam and 
Columbus, and Columbus Park Towers, sponsored by a group of West Side residents, was slated 
for Site 16, on Columbus Avenue between West 93rd and West 94th Streets.  
With these projects underway, city officials and local groups—notably the SBNC—
continued to negotiate they way in which the parcels along Columbus and Amsterdam Avenue 
would be redeveloped.
218
 Headed by Father Browne, who was increasingly active in anti-poverty 
work and critical of the way the city‟s housing and renewal programs were displacing low-
income families, the SBNC was aggressive in its advocacy for more low-income units to house 
residents who had been relocated from the project area. The city agencies were changing as well, 
backing away from Moses-era policies that favored using redevelopment areas for market-rate 
housing. When the Urban Renewal Board was reorganized as the Housing and Redevelopment 
Board (HRB) in 1962, it had the specific mandate to construct more middle-income housing in 
the city. In the WSURA, the middle-income cooperatives in the first stage of the plan became the 
model for subsequent housing projects, and the HRB actively sought sponsors for the second and 
third stages that were interested in providing housing for displaced, low-income, and minority 
families.
219
 When market-rate projects stalled for lack of financing, the HRB began to re-
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designate these sites for middle-income housing. Successive amendments to the plan added two 
new public housing projects and progressively altered the proportion of low-, middle-, and high-
income units, so that by the end of the decade almost all of the new development was limited-
profit housing, and each of these middle-income developments contained a designated number of 
“skewed rental” units.220 
The first of the high rise housing developments—Goddard Tower, the Strycker‟s Bay 
Apartments, RNA House, and Columbus Park Towers—finally opened in the spring of 1967 
after a four-month delay caused by a plumbers‟ strike. Because of their tight budgets, carefully 
calculated to yield the lowest possible cost per room, they were architecturally modest, and 
because they were designed to incorporate as many units as possible, they were massive, on a 
completely different scale from the neighborhoods brownstones or pre-war elevator buildings. 
The Strycker‟s Bay Apartments‟ 235 units, designed by Holden, Egan, Wilson & Corser, were 
located in two plain red-brick towers sited so as not to require the demolition of an older 
apartment building on the site. [figure 4.17] Columbus Park Towers, designed by Ballard, Todd 
Associates, had 162 units in a 27-story tower with concrete balustrades. Goddard Tower, 
designed by Frederick G. Frost Jr. and Associates, had 193 units rising 27 stories above one of 
the six landscaped public plazas designated in the final plan. [figure 4.18] RNA House, designed 
by Edelbaum and Webster, was a long slab with a concrete façade and 207 units. [figure 4.19] 
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Strycker‟s Bay Apartments and Columbus Park Towers, both located on Columbus Avenue, and 
Goddard Tower, on Amsterdam, had commercial space on their ground floors, and all had 
community rooms and facilities like nursery schools, as well as an active and engaged group of 
residents, many of whom had been involved for years in pre-occupancy programs intended to 
build community within the coops. Although neither the architectural language nor the spatial 
organization of these first middle-income buildings was especially innovative, their sheer scale 
and presence along the reconstructed avenues matched an equally new social agenda for 
neighborhood life on the upper West Side.
221
 
And yet, problems with the plan‟s vision of an orderly, humane renewal process and an 
integrated new neighborhood were already emerging. Shortly after the city took title to the 
redevelopment parcels in early 1963, a private firm began an extensive survey of residents who 
would be displaced by redevelopment or rehabilitation projects and discovered that even though 
the city had staged the relocation process to last six years and displace as few tenants as possible 
at any one time, “many hundreds of tenants” had already fled the area. The mass exodus, begun 
well before city workers arrived to help families plan their move, belied official statements that 
the relocation process might help families find better accommodations.
222
 The business 
relocation process—which depended in large part on relocating businesses to temporary “holding 
areas” while their owners waited for their new spaces to be built—had fared no better. In 1966, a 
New York Times reported checked in with Elemer Vadasz, a bakery owner who, two years 
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earlier, had moved from condemned premises on West 96th Street to a holding area on 
Columbus Avenue. The new building he was planning on returning to was still an empty lot, and 
his business was struggling. By 1966, one hundred of the estimated 500 small businesses that 
had existed in the project area in 1959 had gone out of business.
223
  
Moreover, there were signs that the harmonious racial and economic balance envisioned 
by the planners would prove elusive. Shortly before PS 84 opened in 1965, the school‟s largely 
white, middle-class parent-teacher association successfully petitioned the Superintendent of 
Schools to have the children from Stephen Wise assigned to another elementary school to 
prevent PS 84 from becoming “too low-income.” When Stephen Wise opened in 1965, its school 
children walked several blocks to PS 75 outside the project area rather than crossing the street to 
attend the new school.
224
  By the time the first housing started to open in 1967, the middle-
income housing program itself was in crisis. Because rising construction costs and higher interest 
rates were pushing up the cost of constructing these buildings, rents and monthly carrying costs 
in Mitchell Lama housing projects rose precipitously in the mid 1960s. Goddard Towers had to 
appeal to the city to postpone their mortgage payment to avoid increases in monthly carrying 
costs even before the building opened for occupancy, and residents were faced with a 15% 
increase in carrying charges within a year of occupancy.
225
 By the time New Amsterdam Houses, 
a limited-profit rental building one block north of Goddard Tower, opened in 1968, interest rates 
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and construction costs had risen so much that rents projected at approximately $25 per room per 
month were now $43. 
By the late 1960s, the local consensus the community groups and the city had reached in 
1962 with the passage of the final plan began to unravel. When Mayor Lindsay visited the site to 
tout the Mitchell-Lama program at the end of 1968, he was met by a group of pickets who 
carried a coffin and chanted that the city had killed the middle-income housing program with 
rising rents.
226
 In 1968, the SBNC—which had long worked closely with city planners and had 
sponsored its own middle-income housing project—found itself in the unexpected position of 
opposing two proposed Mitchell-Lama housing projects in the area on the grounds that the new 
units, once projected at under $30 per room per month but now $58 or more in the second and 
third stage projects, were out of reach for most families.
227
  
 
Brownstones and Rehabilitation on the Side Streets 
Brownstone rehabilitation was still an ill-defined, untested technique in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, as the West Side project got underway. As a potential alternative to 
redevelopment, it appealed to city officials, who felt public pressure to slow down the rate of 
demolition in Manhattan‟s neighborhoods, to the small group of residents who already owned 
and lived in their own brownstones in the urban renewal area and who wanted to see adjacent 
houses fixed up, and to planners, who were increasingly concerned with maintaining the smaller 
and more intimate scale of the pre-war city. New York needed “quiet, old-fashioned 
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neighborhoods” just as much as it needed “brand-new monumental projects,” said Albert Cole, 
the national housing administrator, expressing his approval of the West Side project in 1958.
228
 
Rehabilitating the brownstones on the neighborhood‟s side streets rather than redeveloping them 
meant that the area would “keep the charm of diversity—the mixture of old and new, big and 
small, the variety of people and material and buildings that has always attracted people to city 
living,” the Housing and Redevelopment Board declared in its summary of the final plan in 
1962.
229
 
The catch phrases the city used in discussing the plan—phrases like “worth saving,” and 
“keeping the good”—obscured the extent to which the HRB hoped to use rehabilitation to 
change the area‟s side streets, where the majority of the once-grand, turn-of-the-century 
brownstones had been subdivided into single rooms or small, low-rent units.  Almost two-thirds 
of the 665 brownstones in the WSURA were in use as rooming houses, many of which lacked 
private bathrooms and had only makeshift kitchens. Single rooms housing entire families were 
common. Unlike the densely developed old-law tenements, with their high lot coverage and their 
narrow light wells, however, the brownstones could easily be converted back into the high-
quality, middle-class housing the city desired. With their high ceilings, spacious, well-lit rooms, 
and private back yards, they were “potentially excellent housing,” as the HRB stated in its 
summary of the final plan.
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Rehabilitation thus was as much an attempt to reduce overcrowding, modernize the area‟s 
housing stock, and encourage middle-class occupancy as it was an effort to maintain the scale 
and physical diversity of the neighborhood or reignite interest in the area‟s historic 
architecture—a significant point in light of the emphasis on preservation we often associate with 
rehabilitation today. The focus on modernization is evident in the initial study of the area in 
1958, in which architectural and economic consultants made detailed studies of three types of 
brownstone rehabilitation: minimum, which called for very few structural changes, just the 
patching of plaster and floors and the addition of baths and kitchenettes; intermediate, which also 
involved the removal of the stoop, the resurfacing of the façade, and new heating and wiring; and 
extensive, which called for the merging of multiple structures, the reconstruction of the entire 
interior space, and the consolidation of individual rear yards into communal landscaped parks 
and play areas. The emphasis in all three schemes was on the viability of these buildings as 
modern, five- or six-unit apartment buildings, not on their restoration to an earlier state. Where 
possible, the consultants wanted to eliminate old-fashioned features like stoops and reconfigure 
the units to emphasize flowing interior spaces and the open, green, park-like spaces they hoped 
to achieve through demolition elsewhere in the WSURA. 
All three types of rehabilitation, but especially the intermediate and extensive types, were 
so costly that the consultants doubted individual homeowners would invest in them without some 
kind of city, state, or federal assistance, a point that touched on the economic challenges of 
rehabilitation as a way of renewing the neighborhood. What could the city do to encourage 
private investment in an area that was widely perceived to be declining and dangerous? What 
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combination of financial incentives would encourage investors to purchase and modernize these 
buildings? While city officials had initially conceived of rehabilitation as a purely market-driven 
enterprise, part of an effort to involve more private capital in the renewal and redevelopment 
process, the HRB believed it would need to offer some form of subsidy, encouragement, or 
guidance to attract new owners to the area and facilitate the process. Because of their location in 
a designated urban renewal area, rehabilitation projects were eligible for generous FHA-insured 
loans. In addition, city officials convinced three West Side banks to establish a lending pool of 
$3 million to help with rehabilitation work—an essential form of assistance, since few 
institutions were willing to lend in the area—and exempted brownstone owners who improved 
property anywhere in the WSURA from city realty taxes for a designated period of time. The 
HRB also set up a site office at 167 West 89th Street offering free consultation to prospective 
brownstone owners that eventually grew to house a staff of thirty, including mortgage 
consultants as well as architect and engineers who made preliminary studies of properties 
eligible for rehabilitation.
231
 
In an effort to show how rehabilitation might work in the area, the HRB planned to 
purchase and then auction off a limited number of brownstones to buyers who agreed to 
rehabilitate them in accordance with city regulations. In April 1960, while the final plan was still 
in preparation, the HRB designated eighty-one brownstones on West 94th and West 95th Streets 
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between Central Park West and Columbus as part of a “Demonstration Rehabilitation Pilot Area” 
at the northern edge of the WSURA, in the first stage of the project.
232
 [figure 4.20] The HRB 
began by targeting twenty of these brownstones for immediate purchase and rehabilitation. 
Rather than using eminent domain to acquire the buildings—as the city usually did in urban 
renewal areas—the HRB entered into private negotiations with landlords. With half a dozen city, 
state, and federal agencies involved, however, it took several years to get the program underway. 
Between 1961 and late 1963, the city purchased nineteen brownstones, all of which were in use 
as rooming houses, for $20,000 to $35,000, and developed a set of architectural and financial 
guidelines to guide the rehabilitation process.
233
 When the HRB finally put a trial group of four 
brownstones up for auction in December 1963, only one of a group of a hundred prospective 
buyers qualified under the city‟s stringent standards. The HRB changed tactics, offering the 
houses for direct sale, rather than auction, in late 1964, but even then the red tape associated with 
the program and various associated city, state, and federal agencies proved formidable. The HRB 
acquired and sold an additional sixteen brownstones in 1967, but the complicated public-private 
negotiations and delays involved in the city‟s program meant that the showcase demonstration 
program, ironically, did not set the pace for rehabilitation in the neighborhood.
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NYCHA, which purchased four contiguous brownstones in the demonstration area for 
conversion into public housing in 1961, was an unexpected participant in brownstone 
rehabilitation in the area. The housing authority had been a strong proponent of high density, 
high-rise housing and superblock planning throughout the 1950s; in fact, with almost 400 
apartments housing 1,200 people on a 2.3 acre site, the nearby Stephen Wise Homes, the first 
public housing project constructed in the WSURA, was one of its highest density projects to date 
and typical of its approach. At 48-54 West 94th Street, NYCHA converted four buildings once 
containing a hundred single rooms into one structure containing 40 public housing units, renting 
from $43 to $79 monthly under the housing authority‟s supervision. Building on the success of 
this first project—and responding to growing community pressure to provide more local public 
housing for relocated families—NYCHA began planning to take over an additional 36 
brownstone rooming houses on six sites on West 89th, West 90th and West 91st Streets in 1963. 
As it had done on West 94th Street, NYCHA rebuilt several of these contiguous brownstones, 
22-42 West 91st Street, in 1965 as a single public housing project, retaining the façade but 
constructing modern apartments within. The 36 brownstones NYCHA acquired eventually 
contained some 236 public housing units for displaced area residents.
235
 [figure 4.21] 
Several private groups also purchased contiguous units and converted them into 
cooperative apartments, including a group of seven families that purchased seven buildings on 
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West 93rd and West 94th Streets from a private school moving to another location on the West 
Side. Their cooperative, Old Ridge, included 30 apartments of one to four bedrooms, many of 
which were duplexes and had balconies or terraces facing onto a common landscaped garden and 
recreation area between the buildings.
236
 The 9-G Cooperative at 19-35 West 93rd Street was 
created from nine brownstones the city had considered too small for rehabilitation and slated for 
demolition and redevelopment as a 10-story apartment. Brownstone owners on the adjacent 
south side of West 94th street opposed the development of a mid-rise building on that site and 
began the fight to have it redesignated in 1963. The nine units were purchased from the city for 
$200,000 and the renovation was financed with a low-interest loan made possible through the 
213 program for cooperatives. The architectural firm Edelman & Salzman redesigned the units, 
retaining the facades but reorganizing the interior space to form 34 apartments of one to five 
bedrooms, extending the backs of the houses to a uniform 52 feet, and creating a community 
garden and recreation area behind the buildings. [figures 4.22, 4.23] Among the organizers of 
the cooperative were the former baseball star Jackie Robinson, who had publicly supported the 
WSURA plan during hearings in 1962, and his wife Rachel.
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Although the city encouraged cooperative conversions, offering three and four buildings 
together as “package deals” as it sold off the brownstones it had acquired, the majority of 
rehabilitation in the WSURA was carried out by individual owners who negotiated the purchase 
of individual brownstones privately. While the HRB had difficulty selling the brownstones it had 
purchased in the demonstration area on West 94th and West 95th Streets, private sales picked up 
quickly in the mid-1960s, particularly at the southern edge of the urban renewal area, on West 
87th and West 88th Streets. The Kempner Corporation, a real estate firm that did property 
management for brownstone owners, estimated that 32 brownstones had been sold in the 
WSURA in 1963 and 84 in 1964. By 1968, 226 had changed hands, mostly from absentee 
landlords to young couples who planned to renovate them and live in them, often in duplexes on 
the ground and first floors. Some funded rehabilitation privately, some took advantage of the 
FHA-insured loans; all benefited from tax breaks and the HRB‟s assistance in relocating tenants 
from the buildings.  
These young brownstoners, as they were called, were attracted to the architectural quality 
of the older buildings, the cultural diversity of the West Side, and the opportunity to own a house 
in Manhattan. While the city certainly played a role encouraging the conversion of rooming 
houses and low-rent apartment houses into middle-class, owner-occupied apartments, the 
WSURA was only one of a dozen neighborhoods in Manhattan and Brooklyn where an influx of 
these home-seeking professionals—among them lawyers, bankers, architects, editors, and 
teachers—sparked a brownstone revival. Prices soared; available for as little as $17,000 in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
bedroom unit to $10,900 for a five-bedroom unit, with monthly carrying charges ranging from 
$120 to $360.  
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early 1960s, unrenovated houses were worth $25,000 to $45,000 by 1965. By 1968, they sold for 
$60,000, with renovated houses going for much more.
238
 
One of the unexpected consequences of rehabilitation in the WSURA was the growth of 
local community organizations and the formation of a new constituency in the planning and 
development process. Like many of the middle-income cooperative owners in the high-rises 
along Columbus Avenue, brownstone owners were often drawn to the Upper West Side by the 
neighborhood‟s diversity and were committed to improving their houses, their blocks and their 
neighborhood. Interviewed in the late 1960s, one brownstoner spoke of “a sense of quickened 
pace, an assurance from the inhabitants that life is exciting, with an environment full of potential 
satisfaction no matter what my interest or mood at any moment.” Another compared the Upper 
West Side to Greenwich Village, which “has the variety of people (races and economic) and 
stores I hope the West Side will achieve.”239 Brownstone owners helped revive and carry on the 
work of many of the area‟s block associations, organizing clean-up days and tree plantings. In 
1963, Peggy Mann Houlton was among the group of West 94th street residents who saved the 
nine houses on West 93rd Street from demolition and formed the Little Old New York Citizens‟ 
Committee, which helped families buy and renovate brownstones and acted as a clearinghouse 
for information about the process. Unlike the cooperators along Columbus Avenue, the 
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brownstoners tended to have had a strong, individualist ethos, seeing themselves as “pioneers” in 
a declining and dangerous part of the city. 
Local groups like the block associations and the Little Old New York Citizens‟ 
Committee tended to involve themselves in the planning process because they were concerned 
about concrete problems affecting life on the WSURA‟s side streets, but by the mid 1960s, 
brownstoners were also becoming interested in guiding the neighborhood‟s overall growth and 
revitalization. They were among the most active organizers of the Committee of Neighbors to 
Insure a Normal Urban Environment—or CONTINUE—a group of brownstone owners, tenants, 
and local small business owners that coalesced around a fight to prevent the city from building 
additional public housing units in the neighborhood in 1967. Arguing that more public housing 
would concentrate low-income families and social problems in a neighborhood that was just 
beginning to turn around, CONTINUE argued that the city should be building market-rate 
housing and accommodating a limited number of low-income residents in “skewed” units within 
those projects. Headed by Dr. Arthur C. Logan, former head of the Harlem anti-poverty agency 
Haryou-Act and a well-known civil rights activist, and counting among its officers Roberta 
Brandes Gratz, a writer on urban issues who today is widely known as one of the foremost 
advocates and interpreters of Jane Jacobs‟ ideas, CONTINUE became one of the key players in 
the planning and execution of the third and final stage of the plan.
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In a sense, CONTINUE stepped into one of the roles that the SBNC shed as it became a 
more aggressive advocate for displaced site residents in the early and mid 1960s. Early on in the 
planning process, the SBNC had functioned as an impartial umbrella organization for varied 
local interests and had attempted, as best it could, to develop consensus among them. Beginning 
with the public approvals process for the final plan, however, the SBNC began to see itself as an 
advocate for low-income residents, particularly those displaced by the plan. Father Browne, the 
organization‟s president for several terms during the early 1960s, became an outspoken advocate 
on housing issues, testifying before Congressional committees and serving on several city-wide 
commissions. As the plan moved into implementation, the SBNC began to deal extensively with 
displaced families—often advocating for them in exchanges with unresponsive city agencies—
and campaign for more low- and moderate-income housing in the area. Although it maintained 
close ties with the city and in fact received funding from the HRB, the SBNC developed into a 
watchdog organization, holding the city to its promises to retain the economic diversity of the 
neighborhood by advocating for tenants and the construction of low-income housing in the 
WSURA.
241
 
Where the SBNC felt that the city was not doing enough to ensure that relocated families 
could move back into the WSURA, CONTINUE was concerned that too much low-income 
housing—particularly low-income housing in the form of public housing projects—would 
discourage further private investment in the neighborhood. Its members called for the expansion 
of programs that subsidized low- and moderate-income units within middle-income cooperatives 
                                                 
 
241
 On the SBNC, see Joseph Lyford, The Airtight Cage, esp. pp. 117-125. On Father Browne‟s 
career, see “Crusader for Housing,” New York Times, May 25, 1965; “Henry Browne, 61, 
Rutgers Professor,” New York Times, November 30, 1980; and Flavia Alaya, Under the Rose, 
esp. 168-186. 
169 
 
and rental apartment buildings, and they asked the city to revisit its plans to construct subsidized 
housing on several of the undeveloped parcels in the second and third stages of the plan and 
instead encourage market-rate housing, as it had suggested in the preliminary plan in the late 
1950s. Like the SBNC, CONTINUE argued that it was simply holding the city to its original 
promises to preserve an economically integrated neighborhood and favored “the completion of 
the WSURA Plan according to its original intent.” As CONTINUE became more active in the 
planning process, the two groups were set to clash.
242
  
 
The Occupation of Site 30 
In April 1970, 15-year-old Jimmy Santos died in an Upper West Side apartment, killed 
by the carbon monoxide emitted by a faulty heater. His death was no tragic accident—at least not 
to friends and neighbors familiar with the living circumstances of families like Jimmy‟s. The 
apartment was dilapidated and unsafe; the landlord who had failed to fix the heating system was 
indifferent to his tenants‟ complaints; the city inspectors who should have ensured that the heater 
was working had turned a blind eye to the landlord‟s neglect. What struck neighbors as even 
more galling was the fact that the city had publicly committed itself to improving housing 
conditions on the West Side by designating Jimmy‟s neighborhood a “conservation area” and the 
blocks immediately south an “urban renewal area.” Although the city had promised new and 
rehabilitated housing for more than a decade and construction had begun, housing conditions for 
many residents in the oldest and most dilapidated brownstones in the area had actually worsened 
as landlords put off repairs on the condemned buildings. 
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Angry over the cycle of neglect that had resulted in a child‟s death, neighbors and friends 
gathered at Jimmy‟s funeral at St. Gregory‟s Roman Catholic Church on West 90th Street and 
then followed his hearse back to his apartment building, where they collected the family‟s 
furniture and belongings and brought them to the city‟s urban renewal project office on 
Columbus Avenue. [figure 4.24] As the two trucks hauled the furniture southward, the journey 
turned into a protest, as the mourners sang “We Don‟t Want No Rats” to the tune of “We Shall 
Overcome.” As they approached the city‟s office, they began to formulate demands. “The city 
must find a new apartment for this family,” one man shouted as the group confronted city 
officials. “We must show them that poor people also have rights.”243 City officials, taken aback, 
placated the group with the promise of an apartment for Jimmy‟s family in a city-owned 
brownstone nearby. 
That night, however, a group of residents and activists armed with crowbars broke in to 
half a dozen unoccupied West Side tenements that had been shuttered and condemned as part of 
the urban renewal project. By morning, several dozen families had moved their furniture and 
belongings into the apartments. Within a week the squatters were repairing the damaged 
buildings, organizing politically, and calling for the city to recognize their right to safe and 
decent housing. Dozens and then hundreds of low-income families moved into tenements that 
had been emptied in anticipation of demolition and redevelopment. Operation Move-In, one of 
the largest and most sustained squatting movements in New York history, had begun. 
By 1970, the visions of an racially and economically integrated community advocated by 
both cooperators and brownstoners seemed untenable and naïve to the neighborhood‟s low-
income residents. More than a decade of city-led redevelopment along Columbus Avenue and 
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private brownstone rehabilitation along the side streets had displaced thousands of residents, 
many of whom, like the squatters, were low-income and Puerto Rican. Although the city had 
committed itself to providing decent housing for displaced families, it quickly developed a 
reputation as poor landlord, slow to respond to maintenance requests and reluctant to make 
improvements in buildings that were scheduled for demolition. Always the most contentious 
aspect of the renewal program, displacement now provoked anger. “On the Upper West Side, we 
had Amsterdam Avenue and Columbus, and they had resided on West End,” one resident, Melba 
Bruno, recalled. “Then suddenly they wanted everything.”244 
Tensions boiled over in the spring of 1970, when Jimmy Santos‟ death prompted a loose 
coalition of West Side community groups—among them the Puerto Rican activist group El 
Comité, and the anti-poverty agency Community Action, Inc.—to take action. They targeted nine 
city-owned buildings on West 87th, West 88th, and West 89th Streets—buildings that had been 
condemned for redevelopment but which were still partially occupied and still had heat and 
running water—and they helped twenty-nine poor Upper West Side families move into empty 
units. These families were soon joined by others. The squatters‟ movement grew rapidly, both 
within the WSURA and without. By July 1970, there were 100 families living in buildings on 
West Side between 87th Street and Columbia University; by November there were 
approximately 200, the vast majority of whom were living in private and city-owned 
brownstones and tenements located within the WSURA. The squatters began to organize: they 
elected leaders from their own ranks, including Melba Bruno, a Spanish-speaking instructional 
aide at one of the local schools; they began to fix up the old brownstones and tenements; and 
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they organized day care, emergency funds for distressed families, and a waiting list for families 
interested in joining them. [figure 4.25] 
By the spring of 1971, their numbers had swelled to several hundred families, and their 
demands had focused on a single site, Site 30, a redevelopment parcel along Columbus Avenue, 
between West 90
th
 and West 91
st.
 [figure 4.26] In four old tenements that had been condemned 
for redevelopment as middle-income housing, OMI established their headquarters, as well as a 
coffee house, a day care center, a school, and women‟s liberation center. “We want Site 30 to be 
renovated and all the squatters to have relocation rights,” said Joe Rivera, a squatter and a 
building delegate, articulating the squatters‟ primary demands. “We want 75 per cent of the new 
housing in the [urban renewal] area to be low-income, and we want the community to decide 
where and how to build it.”245 
Establishing their headquarters on Site 30 was a strategic move on the part of the 
Operation Move-In leaders; unlike the most dilapidated of the brownstones on the side streets, 
the four tenements on Site 30 were still structurally sound, spacious, and easy to rehabilitate. Site 
30 was also, critically, the first site scheduled for redevelopment under the upcoming third stage 
of the urban renewal plan. In order for the city to proceed with its plans for the southernmost part 
of the area, it would have to negotiate with the squatters. Bargaining from a position of strength, 
Operation Move-In boldly called in the promises the city had made more than a decade earlier—
promises to reconstruct a racially and economically integrated neighborhood. Led by Bruno, the 
squatters demanded a halt to demolition and construction, a chance to rehabilitate existing 
structures for low-income families, and a “right of return” for relocated families who had been 
forced to leave the Upper West Side. Frustrated with the renewal process and with an 
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unresponsive housing bureaucracy, the squatters began calling for a re-planning of the entire 
renewal area with more attention paid to the needs of low-income residents. Meanwhile, radical 
politics flourished in the old storefronts and tenements. OMI drew the support of the Asian 
Coalition, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, a gay rights group, and several Women‟s 
Liberation groups.
246
 Broadway Local, the community newspaper from which most of the 
images in this presentation come, spread the squatters‟ story across the city. [figure 4.27] 
The city was never sympathetic to the squatters‟ demands, but, faced with a public 
challenge to its liberal housing policies and anxious to continue with its plans, it ultimately 
granted various concessions, including the expansion of public housing in the neighborhood, 
including on Site 30 itself, and the “right of return” for all who had participated in the squatters‟ 
movement—that is, the first choice of new public housing and subsidized apartments constructed 
in the urban renewal area, as soon as they became available. OMI relinquished Site 30 in its 
negotiations with the city, but the squatting continued informally for much longer; as late as 
1974, there were still 274 squatter families living in apartments on the Upper West Side. 
The squatters‟ militancy stirred strong feelings among middle-class neighbors, 
particularly the multi-racial, middle-class brownstoners, some of whom panicked in the face of a 
forthright challenge to traditional property rights. “Polarization and hatred are supplanting 
cooperation and understanding among different economic and ethnic groups in the city,” one 
brownstoner newsletter warned. “The middle class people, who with great effort and dedication 
have established their families on the West Side in response to the idea of a truly integrated 
community…are disillusioned [and] frustrated.”247 Once loosely organized around the practical 
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problems of restoring nineteenth century houses, the brownstoners now also banded together in 
an organization called CONTINUE, which opposed the squatters‟ movement as a sign of the 
immanent ghettoization of the neighborhood and blamed the anti-poverty activists who had been 
involved peripherally as “manipulators of the poor.”248 
Indeed, OMI‟s rhetoric was revolutionary at times, as we can see in the documentary film 
Rompiendo Puertas (Break and Enter), filmed by the activist Third World Newsreel in 1970, 
during the early days of the movement. In one scene, the camera pans up one of the new middle-
income high rises on Columbus Avenue ominously. “The next step will not be breaking into old 
buildings,” a voice warns. “The next step will be breaking into those [new buildings], and see 
how they like it.” Others, radicalized along issues of Third World oppression, offered an anti-
colonialist critique of the displacement that they had endured: “From Saigon to Hanoi we have to 
move. From San Juan to Santiago, we have to move.” Still others began to formulated the idea of 
a city of sweat equity—one in which decent housing was a right to all who lived or worked in the 
area, not simply those who could afford it. “We are the people who built this city. We work here. 
We work in factories, hospitals, supermarkets, subways, banks. So we are the city,” one squatter 
said. “Why should we move?”249 
As we look at other accounts of the squatters‟ movement, however, it becomes clear that 
the squatters, too, were well aware of the liberal ideal of a “balanced” Upper West Side 
neighborhood in which families from different racial and class backgrounds might live together. 
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Indeed, appeals to diversity, integration, incrementalism, and middle-class liberal ideals were 
just a much a part of their strategy as revolutionary rhetoric. In the negotiations with the city, 
OMI activists repeatedly appealed to the urban renewal plan‟s vision of a racially and 
economically integrated neighborhood and pushed city officials to fulfill earlier promises. Where 
activists often took a hard line on issues of displacement and continued construction, OMI 
proved receptive to continuing development in the urban renewal area—so long as the 
development included public housing, and so long as that low-income residents from the 
neighborhood had first priority for the new units. The Puerto Rican and Dominican community 
that was forming around OMI and the squatter issue was not united in its politics; indeed, after a 
long period of quiescence, the Spanish-speaking community was just organizing again and 
becoming aware of its own political power. One of the remarkable things about the squatters‟ 
movement is its persistence and efficacy over several years despite the presence of both a 
radicalized element concerned with developing a critique of US imperialism—the members of El 
Comité, for instance—and local activists, often women and mothers, who were primarily 
interested in achieving short-term goals, like the guarantee of housing options and the 
improvement of the local schools. On the Upper West Side, the focus on Spanish speakers as a 
constituency with their own identity and agenda helped ameliorate potentially divisive 
differences. 
Indeed, the occupation of Site 30 sparked other actions during those same years, as 
activists in the squatters‟ movement become involved with other issues. In 1970, many of the 
same activists pressured the local elementary school to abolish the tracking system that had 
separated Spanish-speaking children from their peers and introduce new leadership; in 1971, 
they helped launch the city‟s first dual-language, English-Spanish program. As activist Federico 
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Lora said, “we were organized because of the housing issue…The parents moved with us from 
one issue to the other. When we moved, we moved not as revolutionaries but as part of the 
community because we were part of the community.”250 
 
Conclusion 
The Nixon administration‟s moratorium on the construction of subsidized housing 
effectively ended the experiment on the Upper West Side. The moratorium brought a halt to 
plans for additional public housing units along Columbus Avenue, leaving more than a dozen 
redevelopment parcels to languish, empty, for years. [figure 4.28] Market-driven gentrification 
continued to cause displacement as the Lincoln Square area to the south gentrified. In 1980, the 
Reagan administration decided that market rate construction could begin on all remaining 
redevelopment sites without any reference to the original public housing commitment. 
Ultimately, more than two decades after the squatters left, market-rate housing was built on Site 
30. 
If the squatters lost the struggle for Site 30, however, they had other victories. Far more 
than a struggle for turf, the occupation of Site 30 represents a crucial moment of identity 
construction for squatters, neighborhood activists, and especially the Spanish-speaking 
community on the Upper West Side. Here on the West Side, renewal was a catalyst for political 
organizing and a growing awareness of the power of the Puerto Rican and Dominican 
communities in New York—in the language of community organizers today, it “built capacity” 
even if it did not result in increasing in the low-income housing stock in the neighborhood. 
                                                 
 
250
 Lora cited in Rose Muzio, Puerto Rican Radicalism in the 1970s (diss. City University of 
New York, 2008), p. 135. 
177 
 
Similarly, the modest participation provisions of the 1958 plan also put in place a 
surprising advocate for tenants‟ rights in the increasingly confrontational Stryckers Bay 
Neighborhood Council, which helped create moderate-income housing projects that still provide 
affordable housing in an increasingly expensive neighborhood. (In fact, their low rentals and 
monthly maintenance fees have created something else entirely over time: housing projects that 
today have become “Naturally Occurring Retirement Communities” due to the fact that a 
significant number of those residents who moved in during the late 1960s have chosen to remain 
in their apartments, aging in place.
251
) 
 In many neighborhoods in the 1950s and 1960s, the struggle for more affordable housing 
and better schools brought residents together and sparked conflict over different goals and 
strategies. In urban renewal areas like the WSURA, the experience was heightened—not just 
because these debates were carried out in such a public fashion, but because the very premise of 
the urban renewal designation meant change would come to the neighborhood. The only question 
was what sort of change that would be. Multiple groups and organizations struggled to define it, 
better defining themselves and their vision of the neighborhood in the process. 
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Conclusion 
 
Beyond Jane Jacobs:  
Revisiting the Failures of Physical Planning 
 
 
Introduction 
 Shortly after Jane Jacobs died in the spring of 2006, New York saw an outpouring of 
appreciation for the famous writer and activist. She was praised as a writer and an activist, 
profoundly influential in both the realm of ideas and the world of planning and policy. The New 
York Times wrote that her 1961 book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, “was as 
radically challenging to conventional thinking as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, which helped 
engender the environmental movement, would be the next year, and Betty Friedan's The 
Feminine Mystique, which deeply affected perceptions of relations between the sexes, would be 
in 1963.”252 On the doorstep of the well-known Greenwich Village house where Jacobs and her 
family lived in the 1950s and 1960s, mourners lefts flowers and cards, one of which summed up 
a common sentiment: “Jane Jacobs 1916-2006,” the card read. “From this house, in 1961, a 
housewife changed the world.”253 
 To historians and many urban residents, Jane Jacobs‟ writings mark a milestone in the 
history of the American city.  Her condemnation of the reductive, top-down approach to city-
building of the 1950s and 1960s is still seen the authoritative refutation of an older model of 
planning, and her prescriptions for a smaller scale, self-organized city are now part of the new 
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planning orthodoxy. So closely is she associated with both the popular and professional rejection 
of state-instigated physical planning projects that it can be difficult to see Death and Life as 
anything but a paradigm shift in the way we understand cities signaling a radical shift in 
worldview. One set of assumptions guided enlightened planners and policy-makers beforehand, 
another did afterward. 
And yet, as this dissertation argues, debates on architecture, planning, resident activism, 
and the importance of the urban neighborhood were not as clear-cut as Jacobs made them out to 
be. As Lewis Mumford complained when Death and Life was first published, many of Jacobs‟ 
ideas were more securely rooted in the specific experiences of the West Village than she was 
willing to admit—and, conversely, there were gaps and oversights in her theories and 
prescriptions that may begin to help us understand what the experiences at Dixwell, Roxbury, 
and the Upper West Side have to teach us. 
 
Race as a Fundamental Characteristic of Neighborhoods 
Perhaps because so many in the black community ultimately came to the same 
conclusions that Jacobs did—that “urban planning [should be seen] more as an enemy than as an 
aid”—the divergent routes they took to come to these conclusions are not as clear as they should 
be.
254
 As Herbert Gans, Marshall Berman, and others have pointed out, Jacobs‟ city was 
fundamentally a world of white working class neighborhoods, ranging from “solid working class 
whites at the bottom to professional middle-class whites at the topic.” Initially, at least, people of 
color and issues of race seem to figure in Death and Life only rarely: in a discussion of the street 
life of East Harlem, for example, or of casual discrimination against Puerto Rican children in the 
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public spaces at Stuyvesant Town. In fact, in Death and Life, Jacobs maintains a resolutely color-
blind approach to the issues of neighborhood decline and revitalization that is not unexpected for 
a middle-class white liberal woman of her age, concerned about housing, schools, and civil 
rights, but reluctant to ascribe more importance to race than it seems to deserve. In Death and 
Life, Jacobs actively worked to minimize cultural differences in the use of streets and public 
space; speaking of issues of “public character” and privacy among New York Puerto Ricans, for 
example, she insisted that Puerto Ricans “are essentially the same as the people of the mixed, 
Americanized street on which I live, and essentially the same as the people who live in high-
income apartments or fine town houses, too.”255 Racial differences are handled with kid gloves—
she often refers to people of color not as “Negroes” or as “Puerto Ricans” but as “discriminated 
against.”256—and she repeatedly downplays race as a meaningful factor in neighborhood change. 
In the case of Roxbury, she‟s quite explicit: “Elm Hill Avenue section‟s basic troubles are not 
owning to a criminal or a discriminated against or a poverty stricken population,” she says in as 
terms as strong as she can formulate them. “Its troubles stem from the fact that it is physically 
quite unable to function safely and with related vitality as a city district.”257 It may be true, as 
Jacobs biographer Alice Sparburg Alexiou points out, that Death and Life was conceived and 
written before the events of the civil rights movement began to appear regularly in the headlines 
of the New York newspapers, and Jacobs herself was very much a product of a white intellectual 
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world that had not yet come to grips with the deep divisions in American society that the civil 
rights and black power movements would expose. But she also had a certain unshakable faith the 
power of the slum to unslum itself that was not widely shared by blacks of Puerto Ricans at the 
time. 
Indeed, the rejection of planning by blacks and Puerto Ricans was a much more complex 
affair. Unlike Jacobs, who placed her faith in the workings of the private housing market, urban 
residents of color faced the deteriorating conditions of the ghetto and the neglect of the absentee 
landlord. From their perspective, well into the 1960s, the state was poised to make changes in 
tangible and important ways: enacting non-discrimination laws for housing, integrating schools, 
desegregating workplaces, and creating jobs for minority-owned companies. Their first impulse 
was to control or direct government intervention themselves, not halt it altogether. 
 For communities of color, the dual housing market was a bitter reality that could not be 
explained away, and both integrationist black liberals and more nationalistic, community 
oriented blacks saw the need for continued negotiation with the planners for subsidized housing. 
Similarly, they both believed that they state would play a key role in the desegregation of local 
schools, the creation of low-interest loans that might make homeownership more affordable, and 
the opening of the traditionally all-white unions. In short, Jacobs‟ ignorance of the enormity of 
the problems faced by blacks and Puerto Ricans meant that she failed to understand just how 
fundamental race was a defining characteristic of the postwar neighborhood. Conversely, the 
kind of spontaneous unslumming that Jacobs described in the West Village and the North End 
was, almost by definition, a white, working-class neighborhood phenomenon. It was only 
possible where residents were established enough to have a bank account to draw on 
(neighborhoods with recent arrivals from the South and from Puerto Rico did not) and where the 
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neighborhood‟s upwardly mobile middle class had chosen to stay and invest in the neighborhood 
(which not the case with the black middle classes in Dixwell and Roxbury). Both Jacobs, 
discussing the West Village, and Herbert Gans, discussing the West End, had come to the 
startling conclusion that old buildings nevertheless still had value; for Jacobs, they could give 
small business a start, while for Gans they provided cheap rentals that allowed working class 
ethnics to live comfortably in central city locations. Neither, however, had genuinely deteriorated 
housing in mind, the type that was typical in the growing ghettos. And neither grappled with the 
problem of gentrification that would transform the Upper West Side in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
renovated brownstones, which were considered the more affordable housing option in the 
renewal neighborhood envisioned in the 1958 plan, quickly became popular among the middle-
class and upper-middles, a trend that continued displacing lower-income tenants long after the 
renewal project came to a close. (Meanwhile, housing activists focused on the high-rise housing, 
commonly seen as the more expensive option, and were able to use the city‟s minimal 
commitment to low- and moderate-income housing to secure an unusual kind of class diversity in 
apartments and coops along Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues.) 
  
Resident Activism 
As it was implemented in the late 1950s and 1960s, citizen participation was a flawed and 
contentious process, operating within—and exacerbating—class divisions in the Black 
community and disguising the power relations between neighborhood, local authority, and city. 
Often it was only given the most cursory respect by local agencies; in one particularly frank New 
Haven Redevelopment Agency memo, a staffer noted that the Dixwell project team had prepared 
four different alternate illustrative plans for community review and comment, including “the plan 
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we are prepared to carry out.” 258 But resident involvement was extremely effective as a method 
of organizing local support for renewal, and if it failed as an instrument of participatory 
democracy—if the process never was, as it was billed in Boston, “planning with people”—it 
nevertheless had very important consequences. 
In Dixwell, Roxbury, and the Upper West Side, active, public support on the part of 
project area residents was an essential factor in the political fortunes and the progress of the 
renewal project. Support, as evidenced by project area committees and a network of community 
members willing to speak on the project‟s behalf, helped ensure a project‟s passage through the 
series of public hearings that were required of it and legitimized the planning process at time 
when renewal faced opposition. (This was particularly important in Boston, where Logue and the 
BRA faced an openly hostile city council and public anger over the West End.) Moreover, a 
demonstration of support on the part of acknowledged community leaders could help persuade 
residents to back the project themselves. Just how consequential this support was in Washington 
Park becomes clear when we look similar projects like the one proposed for another Boston 
neighborhood, Charlestown. Redevelopment and rehabilitation were met with much greater 
resistance in this white, working class neighborhood where local leaders opposed the process 
from the start and where ultimately the BRA made only a fraction of the progress it made in 
Roxbury. The citizen participation process also helped maintain enough support for renewal to 
ensure compliance with it once the excitement of the public hearings was over—an important 
issue in new projects that included extensive residential rehabilitation, since the rehabilitation of 
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owner-occupied houses depended on the willingness of individual, local homeowners to make 
the changes the plan required.  
Second, investment in the participatory process—both on the part of the local authority 
and on the part of local leaders—had a small but significant effect on the types of redevelopment 
projects the local authorities were able to include in the plan and implement. We don‟t need to 
believe the local agency‟s exaggerated rhetoric about participation and its benefits to recognize 
that planners needed to keep local leaders involved in the renewal process, and keeping local 
leaders involved in the process meant that they had a certain impact on the overall shape of plan, 
however indirect and unexpected. 
The first and most obvious example of this indirect influence is in the lack of public 
housing in both Washington Park and Dixwell. In both cases the local authority toyed with the 
idea of constructing public housing the community as a part of their relocation program, and in 
both cases community leaders came out against public housing and made it a precondition for 
their cooperation and participation in the project. (In Washington Park, as we have seen, this 
opposition was seconded by CURAC, the broader-based committee of project area residents.) It 
was an easy point for the city to concede, since public housing was rarely a politically popular 
option. A limited number of low-income elderly housing units—200 in Washington Park, 60 in 
New Haven—were substituted instead.  
The impact of the participatory culture of the neighborhood renewal project is also 
evident in the progressive changes that residents were able to effect at elementary schools in 
Washington Park and on the Upper West Side. Residents who became involved either in the 
planning process or in protest against elements of renewal were organized and increasingly 
savvy in negotiating the city bureaucracy. Cities were eager to build schools—they counted as an 
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in-kind contribution toward project costs and thus helped fund other projects—and they could 
link social programs with reforms in the schools. More to the point, new schools displaced few 
and satisfied many. At Washington Park the city only managed to build one of three projected 
elementary schools, but one that did open, the racially integrated Trotter School, included one of 
the most progressive curricula in the city. On the Upper West Side, as we saw, the parent 
revolution at PS 84 was linked directly to the housing campaign there. 
Urban renewal has been linked to reform politics at the city level, but in a very real sense 
it introduced an old-fashioned exchange of favors at the neighborhood level, bringing resources, 
jobs, contracts, loans and grants, and attention to communities that were often not well 
represented otherwise. This kind of local involvement involved little of the self-conscious 
“citizen control” that Arnheim valorized and none of the issue-based organizing to defend the 
neighborhood that Jacobs so effectively spearheaded in the West Village. It was small-scale, 
opportunistic, and easily overlooked, but it was important nevertheless.  
 
A Return to Culture 
  Following cultural historians like Lynn Hunt, who argued for a return to culture and 
politics in fields of history that had too long been dominated by structural analysis, this 
dissertation has attempted to recover some of the sense of possibility—excitement, dread, and 
uncertainty—that accompanied neighborhood redevelopment projects in the 1960s. If scholars 
have shown us the origins and consequences of the urban renewal program and traced large-scale 
patterns, this dissertation focused instead on the local and short term and attempted to capture the 
tenor of the politics of urban change. 
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 It has also attempted to recover some of the spatial changes and new architectural forms 
that were the hallmark of neighborhood renewal projects. For a policy that was focused 
specifically on the modernization of the built environment, urban renewal has received relatively 
little attention from the perspective of physical planning, architecture, and urban design. The 
histories of projects at Dixwell, Roxbury, and the Upper West Side suggest that there were 
significant spatial aspects to the social debates of the 1960s—that racial integration, for example, 
was linked with the dismantling of older, often bustling and vibrant black neighborhood centers, 
or with the construction of modern spaces—schools, plazas, apartment buildings—that provided 
new territory in which blacks and whites could meet as equals. They also suggest that Black 
Power proponents and Puerto Rican nationalists may have focused on the rehabilitation and 
reuse of existing spaces for both practical and symbolic reasons. Scholars like Zipp and Klemek 
have linked modernism with the social and cultural ambitions of the “urban renewal order,” just 
as the gritty realism of architects like Venturi and Scott Brown was linked with populism, but 
clearly more work is needed on the micro-politics of design in older urban neighborhoods. The 
critic Herbert Muschamp once commented that the publication of Death and Life had been “one 
of twentieth century architecture‟s most traumatic events,” linking architecture and urban design 
with art—and then discarding art in favor of the social.259 As we have seen, though, 
neighborhood urban renewal plans were political designs, “art” and “society” both—indeed, one 
is incomprehensible without the other. 
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